World Without a Fourth Amendment by Slobogin, Christopher
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1991
World Without a Fourth Amendment
Christopher Slobogin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Slobogin, World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA Law Review. 1 (1991)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/299
ARTICLES
THE WORLD WITHOUT A FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Christopher Slobogin*
INTRODUCTION ........................................... 2
I. STATE AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS ................. 5
II. PROCEDURE: THE NECESSITY FOR AND SCOPE OF
INDEPENDENT AUTHORIZATION ..................... 8
A. The Need for Ex Ante Review in Addition to Ex
Post R eview ..................................... 8
B. Attributes of the Ex Ante Decisionmaker .......... 13
1. Com petence ................................. 14
2. Objectivity ................................... 14
C. Exceptions to the Independent Authorization Re-
quirement: The Supreme Court's Approach ....... 18
1. Exigency Exceptions .......................... 19
2. Lesser Expectation of Privacy Exceptions ..... 21
3. "Special Needs" Exceptions .................. 24
4. Absence of Discretion Exceptions ............ 28
D. Analysis and a Proposal: The Exigency Principle.. 29
1. Justifying and Refining the Exigency
Exception ................................... 29
2. The Invalidity of Other Types of Exceptions.. 33
E. Summary ....................................... 37
III. SUBSTANCE: THE NECESSITY OF CERTAINTY
THRESHOLDS AND HOW TO ESTABLISH THEM ....... 38
* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. For their help in
thinking through the ideas expressed in this Article, I would like to thank Professor
William Stuntz of Virginia Law School, Professor James Quarles of Florida College of
Law, and those faculty members from Sydney, New South Wales, and Monash Law
Schools (in Australia) who attended my workshops on search and seizure.
HeinOnline  -- 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1 1991-1992
UCLA LAW REVIEW
A. The Centrality of the Certainty Inquiry ........... 38
B. The Supreme Court's Approach to Determining the
Certainty Threshold .............................. 39
1. Levels of Certainty .......................... 39
2. Rationales for Exceptions to the Probable
Cause Standard .............................. 43
C. Analysis of the Rationales ........................ 46
1. Intrusiveness: The Core Factor .............. 47
2. The Harm Severity Factor ................... 51
3. The Difficulty of Detection Factor ............. 55
4. The Official Distraction Factor............... 64
D. A Proposal: The Proportionality Principle ......... 68
IV. RECONCILIATION WITH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT .. 75
V. CASE STUDIES ....................................... 79
A . Street Stops ..................................... 79
B. Roadblocks .................. ................... 86
C. Regulatory Inspections ........................... 92
D. Drug and Alcohol Testing ........................ 98
E. Undercover Activity .............................. 103
CONCLUSION .............................................. 106
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, searches for and seizures of evidence and
suspects are governed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution. That provision requires that all searches and seizures be
"reasonable," and that warrants be based on "probable cause" and
state "with particularity" what is to be seized.I American courts
have derived several general rules from this language. The most
fundamental guideline is that, in determining whether a search or
seizure is "reasonable," competing state and individual interests
must be balanced. 2 A second rule is that, given the specific refer-
ence to warrants in the Fourth Amendment, some preference
should be given in this balancing process to judicial authorization of
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. One of the earliest explicit statements of this idea by the U.S. Supreme Court
came in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949):
These long-prevailing standards [i.e., probable cause] seek to safeguard
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from
unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for en-
forcing the law in the community's protection .... The rule of probable
cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compro-
mise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing
interests.
[Vol. 39:1
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searches and seizures.3 Third, the courts have consistently, if some-
what amorphously, defined the "probable cause" required to sup-
port a warrant as a level of certainty somewhat closer to a more-
likely-than-not standard than a hunch or suspicion.4 Finally, the
courts have identified a number of search or seizure situations in
which a warrant is not required; for most of these situations, the
police must still have "probable cause," but in many others they
may operate on a lower level of suspicion.5
The subject of this Article is suggested by a single question:
How would we regulate searches and seizures if the Fourth Amend-
ment did not exist? This question is a useful one to ask even leaving
aside the possibility of amending the amendment. Starting on a
blank slate, as it were, should free us from current preconceptions
about the law of search and seizure, ingrained after years of analyz-
ing current dogma. Viewed from this fresh perspective, we might
gain a better understanding of the values at stake when the state
seeks to obtain evidence or detain suspects. This new understand-
ing in turn should invigorate criticism of current law, and might
Id. at 176.
In more modern days, the Court has affirmed the notion that search and seizure
law depends upon balancing state and individual interests. See Maryland v. Buie, 110 S.
Ct. 1093, 1096 (1990) ("Our cases show that in determining reasonableness, we have
balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its pro-
motion of legitimate governmental interests."); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (constitutionality of a particular search depends on "a balance
between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539
(1967) (justifying the Court's holding by asserting that it gave "full recognition to the
competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfill[ed] the
historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable govern-
ment invasions of privacy").
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (searches or seizures must be
justified by a warrant "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions"); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) ("In cases
where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used .... ").
Historians question, however, whether the Framers intended such a preference. See
infra note 243.
4. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the Court made clear that
probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 174, but also
that it "has come to mean more than bare suspicion," id. at 175; see also infra text
accompanying notes 128-130.
5. See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 140 (2d ed. 1986) (listing the main exceptions).
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even lead to fundamental reinterpretations of the Fourth Amend-
ment's language. 6
Starting from scratch, this Article develops an approach to
search and seizure regulation that is very different from current law
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court, yet at the same
time is reconcilable with the amendment's wording. Part I begins
the analysis by briefly cataloging the various state and individual
interests that must be considered in deciding how to regulate gov-
ernment attempts to garner evidence through searches and seizures.
Based on these factors, Parts II and III develop a regulatory
scheme, which has both "procedural" and "substantive" aspects.
Part II first makes the case for some sort of ex ante review of
searches and seizures. It then attempts to define what this proce-
dure should look like. Following a brief look at the United States
Supreme Court's exceptions to the "warrant requirement," it devel-
ops the following procedural rule: the government should have to
obtain third party authorization prior to any nonemergency search
or seizure (the "exigency principle"). Part III tries to develop the
substantive standards that should guide the ex ante decisionmaker,
whether it be the investigating agent or a third party. After analyz-
ing the Supreme Court's cases concerning the "probable cause" re-
quirement, it puts forward the following rule: the level of certainty
required to authorize a particular search or seizure should be
roughly proportional to the level of its intrusiveness (the "propor-
tionality principle"). Part III also defends this principle against
claims that it is too elastic to provide adequate guidelines for the
police.
The overarching thesis of these two Parts of the Article is that,
except in rare instances, only the exigency principle and the propor-
tionality principle should govern regulation of searches and
seizures. In one form or another, both of these principles have pre-
viously been proposed.7 But they have not been linked together,
nor made the sine qua non of search and seizure law; the assertion
6. Another reason to think about search and seizure from scratch is that the out-
come of such analysis may be useful in other countries, where the 200-year-old language
of the Fourth Amendment is only of passing interest.
7. For instance, the exigency principle replicates one of two "models" of the
Fourth Amendment proposed by Professor Bradley. See Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1491-98 (1985). The proportionality
principle is similar to an idea first proposed (and rejected) by Professor Amsterdam.
See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 390-91
(1974).
[Vol. 39:1
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that these rules are both necessary and sufficient in virtually all
cases is the key assertion of this Article.
Part IV argues that these two rules are not inconsistent with
the language of the Fourth Amendment, despite hundreds of judi-
cial decisions to the contrary. As is true with virtually all the provi-
sions in the United States Constitution, the Fourth Amendment is
subject to many interpretations; the version promoted by the courts
is just one of many possible versions. In particular, this Article con-
tends that the Supreme Court's definition of probable cause is
flawed and has prevented it from developing more sensible, coher-
ent approaches to regulation of searches and seizures.
Finally, in Part V, the ideas described above are applied to a
number of different types of investigative actions taken by the gov-
ernment: street stops, roadblocks, regulatory inspections, drug and
alcohol testing, and undercover police work. In the course of dis-
cussing these various methods of investigation, the Article develops
the concept of "generalized" (as opposed to "individualized") suspi-
cion and attempts to flesh out some of the subtleties associated with
the intrusiveness notion.
I. STATE AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
As American courts have recognized, the regulation of search
and seizure involves balancing the conflicting state and individual
interests implicated by the investigative process. Thus, any attempt
to produce a regulatory scheme must start by briefly sketching out
these various concerns. Obviously, the primary state objective im-
plicated by searches and seizures is effective law enforcement. Be-
cause of the significant harm that crime causes to the state's citizens
and to the state's social, economic, and cultural fabric, the govern-
ment's interest in apprehending offenders and securing evidence for
their conviction is extremely weighty. A second, somewhat coun-
tervailing government interest that must be considered is the state's
desire to maintain the allegiance of its citizenry. One way to ensure
this allegiance is to minimize the impact of crime through strong-
arm police tactics. At the same time, however, if the state's agents
are seen by the populace as arbitrary, uncontrolled actors, the legiti-
macy of the government, at least to the extent it pretends to be dem-
ocratic, may be undermined.8
8. A good recent example of this phenomenon comes from the Soviet Union,
where citizens who had become used to a modicum of freedom as a result of President
Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms began castigating him and his government for use of the
military to suppress democratic movements. Gorbachev Urges Curb on Press Freedom,
1991]
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This second goal of the state thus dovetails to some extent with
the key interest of its citizens in this context: avoiding unnecessary
searches and seizures.9 This interest encompasses at least three dif-
ferent aspects, two of which are clearly shared even by citizens who
are "guilty."' 0 First, the individual citizen, whether or not guilty of
crime, is entitled to protection against unjustified government in-
fringement of "privacy" and "autonomy."'" Even a criminal
should be protected from unnecessary intrusions into intimate areas
and from unnecessary restraints on liberty.' 2 Second, the individ-
N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at A8, col. 4. Even more recently, the Communist Party lost
control of the country as a direct result of a failed coup initiated by "hardliners."
Gorbachev Pleads, but Break Away Areas Defy Him, Putting Fate of Union in Doubt,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1991, at Al, col. 4.
Note that within a democratic state, some organizations (e.g., the military and
prisons) may have no pretensions at being democratic; in these legitimate "subcom-
munities," this state interest, as well as the corresponding individual interests, would be
appreciably diminished.
9. One might be tempted to add as a second individual interest the desire to be
free from harm produced by crime. But this interest is identical to the first state interest
described above; in either case, the aim is to prevent harm to the citizenry and should
only be "counted" once. On the other hand, the second state interest described should
be considered separately from the individual interest in reducing arbitrary government
actions, despite the similarity between the two, because it involves avoiding harm to the
state, not its citizens.
Note that mistaken searches and seizures not only infringe individuals' interest in
avoiding arbitrariness, and negatively affect the state's interest in maintaining legiti-
macy, but also may hurt the state's first objective of effective law enforcement. Even
upstanding citizens are less willing to assist the police when they feel the police cava-
lierly violate their rights. See Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the Backseat of a
Police Squad Car (Book Review), 70 B.U.L. REV. 543, 574 n.114 (1990) (citing evi-
dence that people are more reluctant to help police when they think police are abusing
their discretion).
10. Whether those citizens who have committed a crime should be protected from
arbitrary government action has been a matter of some debate. See, e.g., Loewy, The
Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229
(1983) (arguing that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the innocent,
and that the guilty are merely necessary incidental beneficiaries of the innocent person's
right not to be searched). The "individual interests" proposed in this Article sidestep
this debate.
11. Explicating the diverse meanings of the "privacy" and "autonomy" concepts is
beyond the scope of this Article, although some attempts at defining aspects of it are
made. See infra note 215. For some starting points on this difficult issue, see H. LATIN,
PRIVACY: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND TOPICAL INDEX OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
MATERIALS (1976); PRIVACY, A VANISHING VALUE? (W. Bier ed. 1980); Klopfer &
Rubenstein, The Concept Privacy and Its Biological Basis, 33 J. Soc. IssuEs no. 3, at 52
(1977). Clearly, property rights are relevant here.
12. This point is accepted in principle by most countries. See, e.g, UNITED NA-
TIONS CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (1988) ("In the per-
formance of their duty, law enforcement officials should respect and protect human
dignity and maintain and uphold the rights of all persons."). German courts have held
that, at least when a minor crime is involved, nonconsensual government intrusion into
HeinOnline  -- 39 UCLA L. Rev. 6 1991-1992
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ual, again whether guilty, or innocent, has an interest in avoiding
government action designed to harass, rather than to solve a partic-
ular crime. 13 If the objective of the police is not to garner evidence
but to hound the individual, then even the criminal is entitled to
protection from them. 14 Third, the innocent individual can legiti-
mately claim an interest in avoiding the stigma, embarrassment,
and inconvenience of a mistaken investigation.II In contrast to the
first two, this third interest obviously cannot be asserted by the
guilty individual. This Article will use the terms "invasiveness" or
"intrusiveness" to encapsulate the potential for stigmatization, har-
assment, and violation of privacy and autonomy associated with
government investigative techniques, except where differentiation
becomes necessary.
certain particularly private areas may never be permissible. See, e.g., The Diary Case,
described in Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032,
1043-44 (1983). For reasons discussed later in this Article, infra note 109 and text
accompanying notes 171-177, basing the legitimacy of a search on the nature of the
crime is not a good idea. The importance of the German approach for present purposes
is its illustration that some cultures are willing to countenance complete prohibition of
government intrusions into privacy even when they may be necessary to obtain evidence
and can be conducted without physically harming anyone.
13. This interest in avoiding harassment is probably most often implicated by
"seizures." The police frequently approach citizens for no reason other than to see
"what they are up to"; many people view this type of confrontation, however brief, to be
offensive. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.1 1(1968) ("[i]n many communities,
field interrogations are a major source of friction between the police and minority
groups.... [The friction caused by m]isuse of field interrogations [increases] as more
police departments adopt 'aggressive patrol' in which officers are encouraged routinely
to stop and question persons on the street who are unknown to them, who are suspi-
cious, or whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evident.") (quoting PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183-84 (1967)). Another type of harassment might be
constant, conspicuous surveillance of a person carried out by the police merely to let
their presence be known rather than to procure evidence. See generally Maclin, The
Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 1258, 1330 (1990) (distinguishing between a person's right of personal security
or privacy and the "right of locomotion").
14. This principle has been recognized even when the grand jury, which is con-
trolled by the court and much less likely than the police to engage in abuse, is the
investigating body. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972) (official
harassment of press using grand jury has no justification).
15. For an example of the public embarrassment caused by an overreaching
seizure, see Drug Profile Hit, 77 A.B.A.J., Feb. 1991, at 29 (describing mistaken police
arrest of Joe Morgan, former Cincinnati Reds player, as a "drug couiier"). See gener-
ally Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 COR-
NELL L. REV. 482 (1982) (study of 117 suits against the police, of which 29 apparently
involved allegations of an illegal search, 21% of which resulted in verdicts for the
plaintiff).
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Most would probably agree, at least in a general way, with this
description of the various state and individual interests implicated
by the state's efforts to control crime. The difficult part is determin-
ing how they interact with one another. To use language often em-
ployed by the United States Supreme Court,16 analysis of any
proposed rule involves balancing the "costs" and "benefits" of a
given approach to the identified state and individual interests. Un-
fortunately, an approach which favors the former will often be
costly to the latter, and one which benefits the latter will usually
undermine the former.
Inevitably, the extent to which one is oriented toward "crime
control" or toward "due process" will play a large role in how one
measures and balances the costs and benefits of a particular search
and seizure rule. 17 Nonetheless, a starting point can be suggested
that is probably neutral enough to avoid antagonizing either end of
the ideological spectrum. At the least, the interest in avoiding arbi-
trary government action, shared by both the state and the individ-
ual, should lead to two basic requirements: (1) some procedure for
assessing the propriety of the police action; and (2) some substan-
tive criteria for assessing its propriety.
II. PROCEDURE: THE NECESSITY FOR AND SCOPE OF
INDEPENDENT AUTHORIZATION
A. The Need for Ex Ante Review in Addition to Ex Post Review
At least two procedures for monitoring police actions can be
envisioned. The first involves some sort of third party authorization
of the proposed action (ex ante review). The second would provide
punishment for proven infractions of the rules (ex post review). To
regulate searches and seizures effectively, both are necessary.18
The need for ex post review should be self-evident: without a
procedure for sanctioning unnecessary privacy and autonomy inva-
16. Cost-benefit analysis has been most prevalent in the Court's decisions concern-
ing the scope of the rule excluding illegally seized evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
It also appears to underlie the Court's analysis in other areas. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (defining "probable cause"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 137-38 (1978) (standing).
17. The "crime control" and "due process" heuristics were first proposed by Pro-
fessor Packer, who used them to illustrate contrasting perspectives on the extent to
which police should be controlled by the law. H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMI-
NAL SANCTION 149, 153 (1968).
18. But not necessarily sufficient. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 428-29 (advo-
cating "on-the-spot direction and control" by police supervisors).
[Vol. 39:1
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sions, harassment, and grossly mistaken investigations, police have
no incentive to avoid them. A number of ex post mechanisms exist
or can be imagined, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
Article. To a large extent, the type of sanction or sanctions chosen
will depend upon the nature of the police force, the extent of judi-
cial power, and other aspects of the system. For instance, in many
European countries the police themselves are the principal enforc-
ers of the rules; infractions are punished through reprimands, de-
motions, discharges, or even criminal prosecutions brought by the
police and the prosecutor.1 9 In the United States, because of differ-
ences in police training and organization, such an approach is, by
itself, unlikely to work;20 American courts have relied instead on
the so-called exclusionary rule, which prohibits use in evidence of
illegally seized items.2' A third option, endorsed by a number of
commentators, is a system of civil liability.22 Other approaches
have also been suggested. 23
For deterrent, retributive, and compensatory reasons, some
sort of remedial procedure is essential. But the important point for
present purposes is that this ex post review, whatever its nature, is
not enough. From the individual's perspective, unnecessary govern-
ment interventions should be avoided altogether. Only a system of
ex ante review is likely to achieve this objective effectively, for two
reasons.
19. In Germany, for example, "meritocratic promotion policies, for whose good
order the parliamentary minister of the interior for that state is responsible... giveo the
policeman a direct incentive to avoid generating citizen complaints that will remain in
his personnel file throughout his career." Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal
Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1560-61 (1978). Moreover, Ger-
many has established several stages of reviewers, each of whom must justify their con-
clusions in writing, and a system of penalties "ranging from rebuke to dismissal with
loss of pension rights." Id.; see also id. at 1555-56 (describing French procureur's "reg-
ular evaluations of the police officers subject to his supervision, which become part of
the officers' official record"). But see infra note 27.
20. See, e.g., C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 63-64 (citing re-
search suggesting that citizen complaints are discouraged by the police and by complex
procedures and do not result in meaningful discipline); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 652-53 (1961) (describing "futility" of such methods); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 41-46 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (comparing police behavior in jurisdictions
with and without the exclusionary rule).
21. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1970)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. CT.
REV. 49.
23. Other suggestions for policing the police include ombudspersons, civilian re-
view boards, contempt citations, and a quasi-administrative procedure enforced by the
courts. For a discussion comparing these and other remedial devices to the exclusion-
ary rule, see C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, § 2.05.
1991]
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First, sanctions cannot, by definition, deter good faith infrac-
tions. When the police think they are doing the right thing, a post-
injury penalty does not create a disincentive to act. 24 Of course, ex
ante reviewers may be as prone to making mistakes as investigators,
thus providing little additional protection. But research evaluating
the impact of the warrant requirement in this country suggests
otherwise. Data from the National Center for State Courts indicate
that even "perfunctory" review by a magistrate is more likely to
assure the legitimacy of a search or seizure than is a system which
leaves the decision up to the police (if only because they must justify
their decision to a third party). 25 To the extent good faith viola-
24. This fact has been recognized by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. See,
e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984). Whether it should lead to the adoption of a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, cf. Leon, is not as clear. See generally Ingber, Defending the Citadel
The Dangerous Attack of "Reasonable Good Faith", 36 VAND. L. REV. 1511 (1983).
The point in the text is not that good faith actions that are illegal should remain unsanc-
tioned, but that, given their existence, some prevention mechanism is necessary.
25. A study of several jurisdictions conducted by the National Center for State
Courts found that, while often "perfunctory," the warrant process seldom authorized a
search later found invalid. Van Duizend, Sutton & Cater, The Search Warrant Process:
Preconceptions, Perceptions, and Practices 31, 56 (National Center for State Courts,
undated) (reported in MILLER, DAWSON, DIX AND PARNAS, THE POLICE FUNCTION
121-23 (4th ed. 1986) [hereinafter referred to as NCSC STUDY]). The authors found
that only 17 out of 347 (or roughly 5%) of all warrant-based searches were invalidated,
and that "many of the police officers who were most involved in the warrant process...
could not remember the last time they or a close associate were involved in a case in
which a motion to suppress was granted or a prosecution dismissed because of a faulty
warrant." Id. at 8-11. The implication is that most suppression motions that are
granted involve warrantless searches.
Of course, even if true, such a conclusion does not prove that elimination of the
warrant requirement would produce more improper searches. The NCSC study did not
provide any information on the suppression rate for warrantless searches (which are far
more numerous than warrant-based searches, id. at 21). If that rate too is low, eliminat-
ing the warrant requirement might not change the percentage of searches and seizures
subsequently found invalid. Moreover, even a higher rate for warrantless searches must
be discounted to some extent, since a warrantless search could be deemed "illegal"
solely because no warrant was obtained, a finding which would not occur if the warrant
requirement were eliminated.
At the least, however, the data make clear that the basis for a search is more care-
fully scrutinized when the review process, as slight as it may be, occurs. Other conclu-
sions from the NCSC study confirm this view. Warrant applications were usually
screened by prosecutors or a superior police official, a screening which occasionally
resulted in further information being added to the application. Id. at 24-25. Addition-
ally, the magistrate frequently asked for such information. Id. at 31. In its concluding
section, the study found that the warrant requirement made the police "at least contem-
plate" the probable cause requirement before a search, and thus induced a higher stan-
dard of care than would otherwise be used. Id. at 148-49. The authors also concluded
that the warrant requirement served to reduce the possibility that a search would occur
HeinOnline  -- 39 UCLA L. Rev. 10 1991-1992
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tions are possible,26 ex ante review provides protection ex post sanc-
tions do not.
Perhaps more importantly, ex post review, whatever its guise,
is likely to deter only a modest amount of deliberate police abuse.
A significant body of work, both empirical27 and theoretical, 28 indi-
in the absence of probable cause, and provided a clear and tangible record that permit-
ted more objective later evaluation. Id. at 148.
26. Of course, if the substantive system of rules is easily understood and applied,
good faith infractions may be a rare event, thus undermining this reason for ex ante
review. Unfortunately, rules which try, even approximately, to do justice to the com-
peting state and individual interests are unlikely to be simple. See infra notes 226-232
and accompanying text.
27. In the United States, at least, police administration of sanctions is unlikely to
deter illegalities. See supra note 20. Even in countries with supposedly better supervi-
sory structures, see supra note 19, internal review appears to be inefficacious. A study
of German practice, Bradley, supra note 12, quotes a number of authors to this effect
and concludes:
The impression gained by the author in interviews with prosecutors, de-
fense attorneys, and judges is that police discipline [in Germany] is effec-
tive in punishing police who are corrupt or who beat up suspects... but
that it has no effect on conduct such as failing to warn suspects of their
constitutional rights or conducting overly broad searches. Indeed, such
police conduct is apparently rather widespread in Germany and seems to
be encouraged by the police hierarchy.
Id. at 1053 n.I11.
With respect to the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, the research at best is ambiva-
lent. According to one author whose research in the area has been exhaustive,
"[w]hichever side is required to prove the effect of the rule loses." Critique, On the
Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740, 764 (1974) (authored
by Davies). In another work, the same author concluded that the "cost" of the exclu-
sionary rule, in terms of lost convictions, is minimal. Davies, A Hard Look at What We
Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ
Study and Other Studies of "Lost"Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 688 [here-
inafter Davies, A Hard Look]. From this conclusion, he drew a second one: whereas the
"systematic" effect of the rule may be significant (in terms of encouraging police to
learn the substantive rules), its "specific deterrent" effect on the police is negligible. Id.
at 689 ("The data on the effects of the rule suggest that the average police officer is
seldom involved in an illegal search that leads to the loss of an arrest.").
Civil remedies fare little better. See, e.g., Casper, Benedict & Perry, The Tort Rem-
edy in Search and Seizure Cases: A Case Study in Juror Decision Making, 13 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 279, 281-84 (1988) (from a review of cases and research involving suits
against police, the authors conclude that, because the defendant officers often prevail
and the awards that are made are not large, the tort remedy is unlikely to produce the
deterrent effect often claimed by its proponents). See generally Geller, Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment.: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q.
621, 690-95.
28. A recent article by Professor Stuntz suggests some reasons why the warrant
requirement probably provides additional protection over either the damages or exclu-
sionary rule sanctions. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L.
REV. 881 (1991). According to Stuntz, "[t]he harms that flow from illegal searches and
seizures are mostly intangible and diffuse." Id. at 883. Thus, when damages are the
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cates that administrative, civil, and exclusionary remedies are not
particularly successful at creating disincentives for the individual
police officer. Further, this work suggests that a warrant procedure
helps pick up the slack by forcing investigatory officials to justify
their actions before the fact.
In short, some sort of ex ante review of proposed investigative
actions would appreciably curtail police illegality (of both the good
and bad faith variety). Of course, any requirement that the police
justify their proposed actions to a third party has a cost (probably
proportional to the accuracy of the procedure); at the least, it will
divert resources that could otherwise have been expended solving
crime. But, if information about practice in the United States is
accurate, this cost can be minimized,29 and should not, by itself,
30
override the clear benefits associated with ex ante review.
sanction, it is "very hard for the system to avoid seriously over- or underdeterring police
misconduct." Id. Although Stuntz is not clear as to which of these two results the
"valuation" problem is likely to produce, id. at 910 n.62, I think, along with others, that
underdeterrence is the probable consequence. See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 430
(giving reasons why damages actions are likely to be ineffective); Casper, Benedict &
Perry, supra note 27.
When the exclusionary rule is the sanction, Stuntz notes, the "valuation" problem
is avoided because application of the rule does not require a "judgment about how much
harm the defendant has suffered." Id. at 883. But the rule is rendered at least partially
ineffective for two other reasons: judges' probable cause determinations are likely to be
biased after incriminating evidence is found, and police can perjure themselves to cover
up any illegalities. Id. at 884. Because the police know these two things (my assump-
tion, not Stuntz's), the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is dampened. See J.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
215, 223 -24 (2d ed. 1975) (exclusionary rule's impact diminished because police know
they can "fabricate probable cause" after a "snitch" and that a successful snitch biases
the system in their favor).
Warrants avoid the valuation problem because they protect against subsequent
suit. Id. at 883; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (the warrant,
"when properly supported by affidavit and issued after judicial approval[,] protects the
seizing officer against a suit for damages"). And warrants at least partially avoid the
two problems associated with the exclusionary rule "by forcing the necessary decision
to be made, and the police officer's account of the facts to be given, before the evidence
is found." Stuntz, supra at 884.
Also relevant here is Chief Justice Burger's point that the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary remedy is visited most directly on the prosecutor, whose case it either
weakens or destroys, rather than on the police, who may never know the evidence has
been excluded. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1970) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting).
29. The NCSC study found that American police perceive the warrant requirement
to be "burdensome, time-consuming, intimidating, frustrating, and confusing." NCSC
STUDY, supra note 25, at 149. But the study also concluded that magistrates rarely
reject warrant applications outright, and that their review of warrant applications usu-
ally lasts less than five minutes. NCSC STUDY, supra note 25, at 31. Even a less than
"perfunctory" review should not last much longer in the typical case. See infra note 50.
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B. Attributes of the Ex Ante Decisionmaker
Assuming one accepts the notion that ex ante review of the
government's investigative decisions is important, the next task is to
decide who should carry out this review. Several candidates for this
position can be imagined, ranging along a continuum of accessibil-
ity to the police. At one end of this spectrum are fellow police.
Analogous to practice in medical hospitals, 31 the investigating of-
ficer might have to obtain a "second opinion" from another officer
who is not involved in the investigation. A more onerous check,
occasionally followed in several countries, is a requirement that po-
lice seek approval from a prosecutor.32 Further along the spectrum
is a mandate, followed by the United States Supreme Court,33 that
the police obtain authorization from some sort of judicial officer.
Somewhere toward the middle of the continuum one could place
"lay" decisionmakers; these people may not be as readily accessible
as other police officers, but could easily be more available than a
judge or prosecutor. 34
In order to have any effect on police behavior, the deci-
sionmaker should possess at least two attributes: some understand-
ing of the substantive standards governing search and seizure, and
Document preparation (of affidavits and so on) and waiting for judicial approval can
take much longer (up to a day in some jurisdictions, NCSC STUDY, supra note 25, at
19-26). But an efficient process should typically take, overall, no more than an hour,
and can be further accelerated if provision for taping of the warrant proceeding is made.
Cf. infra text accompanying note 112 (describing use of telephonic warrants).
30. As shown in a later part of this Article, infra text accompanying notes
104-113, when other costs (such as loss of evidence or a suspect) are added to the
equation, the analysis changes.
31. A regulatory context which provides an interesting comparison to searches and
seizures involves the administration of psychotropic medication (which can cause many
harmful side effects). In Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990), the Supreme
Court upheld a prison policy which required, before nonemergency administration of
such medication, a review by a panel composed of three persons connected with the
prison. Other courts have mandated review by professionals not associated with the
treating facility, see, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), or by a court,
see Rogers v. Commissioner, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983), while others have
not required any review at all, see Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291 (8th
Cir. 1987).
32. In Italy, for instance, search warrants and wiretapping orders are usually ob-
tained from the prosecutor. Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in
Three "Inquisitorial" Systems.- France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 258 n.45
(1977).
33. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971) (explaining
importance of requiring magistrates to issue warrants). But see Shadwick v. Tampa,
407 U.S. 345 (1972) (allowing court clerks to issue warrants under some circumstances).
34. This idea is explicated later in this Article, see infra text accompanying notes
121-123.
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an institutional position which permits application of those stan-
dards with relative objectivity. While any of the decisionmakers
identified above may possess the necessary competence, probably
only the latter two are sufficiently neutral to fulfill the role of ex
ante reviewer.
1. Competence
Any given individual's "competence" to make decisions about
substantive search and seizure law will vary depending upon the
complexity of that law. Before 1961,3 5 for instance, issuing valid
warrants in the United States was an easy matter; the same cannot
be said now, especially for heavily regulated investigative tech-
niques such as electronic surveillance. 36 On the other hand, much
of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be reduced to
more simply framed rules or standards.3 7 Similarly, the substantive
standard proposed in Part III should be readily comprehended by
lay as well as legally educated individuals. 38 Nonetheless, it is
worth emphasizing at this point the fact that unless search and
seizure law can be put in a form that police (and other people with
no legal education) can grasp, we would have to require that ex ante
review be undertaken by a legally trained decisionmaker in every
case, a requirement which, for reasons developed below,3 9 is proba-
bly impracticable.
2. Objectivity
The central issue in choosing the decisionmaker is not compe-
tence but objectivity. As Justice Jackson pointed out, the major
drawback to ex ante review by the police is not their inability to
understand legal rules but rather their tendency to interpret those
35. This was the year the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), which applied the exclusionary rule to the states. After Mapp, there was a dra-
matic increase in the use of search warrants where nearly none were used before. Mil-
ner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 37 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 467, 475 (1971).
36. See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, § 14.04 (describ-
ing requirements of the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act).
37. For instance, every year the Bureau of National Affairs puts out "The Law
Officer's Pocket Manual," a small booklet which summarizes the law of search and
seizure, interrogation, and entrapment in roughly one hundred pages. Simply stated
rules are highlighted in red, with explanations following in black.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 233-242. The point is not that police or
other laypeople should always be able to "get it right," but that the standard should be
simple enough to give them a chance.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 121-123.
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rules in a distorted manner, given the exigencies of their job.40 Je-
rome Skolnick has shown that because the police deal with danger,
they are "generally . . . 'suspicious' [people]. ' 41 Further, the dan-
gerous nature of police work-together with its association with au-
thority-leads to social isolation.42 These inevitable attributes of
front-line law enforcement personnel make the police likely to act
more precipitously than judiciously, 43 and less likely to understand
or endorse conventional norms concerning privacy and autonomy,
the use of harassment, and the effects of stigmatization." When-
ever possible, someone who is not so close to the investigative pro-
cess should be entrusted with making decisions about whether and
to what extent a proposed action will implicate these concerns.
Although prosecutors obviously are deeply involved in law en-
forcement efforts, they are removed from the day-to-day dangers of
the street, and thus they are more likely than the police to be objec-
tive and attuned to public attitudes. Moreover, one cannot discount
the effects of education and training-more prevalent in civil law
countries than here-emphasizing the prosecutor's role as a quasi-
judicial officer of the court;45 the attitudes inculcated by such train-
40. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), Justice Jackson stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it denies law enforce-
ment the support of the usual inferences reasonable men draw from evi-
dence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the of-
ficer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 13-14.
41. J. SKOLNICK, supra note 28, at 44; see also J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR 20 (1968) ("[T]he risk of danger... has a disproportionate effect on the
officer partly because its unexpected nature makes him more apprehensive and partly
because he tends to communicate his apprehension to the citizen.").
42. J. SKOLNICK, supra note 28, at 50 ("Policemen whom one knows well often
express their sense of isolation from the public."); see also id. at 54 ("The element of
danger in the policeman's role alienates him not only from populations with a potential
for crime but also from the conventionally respectable (white) citizenry, in short, from
that segment of the population from which friends would ordinarily be drawn.").
43. Id. at 67 ("Danger typically yields self-defensive conduct, conduct that must
strain to be impulsive because danger arouses fear and anxiety so easily. Authority
under such conditions becomes a resource to reduce perceived threats rather than a
series of reflective judgments arrived at calmly.").
44. Id. at 52 ("Set apart from the conventional world, the policeman experiences
an exceptionally strong tendency to find his social identity within his occupational mi-
lieu."). Given this social identity, even a police officer who is not involved in the investi-
gation will find it hard to be "objective."
45. See generally Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 19, at 1558-59 (differentiating
French procureurs from American prosecutors by noting the former's professional
training as members of the magistracy). European prosecutors generally are not
elected, which also might increase objectivity.
1991]
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ing might help counteract institutional pressures. Objectivity is
even more likely if the reviewing prosecutor is not involved in the
case being investigated. Finally, adoption of an American-style ex-
clusionary rule, which would significantly undermine any prosecu-
tion founded on illegal investigative techniques, should provide
additional incentive to consider the interests of suspects.46 In a
world without the Fourth Amendment, reliance on prosecutors as
the ex ante decisionmakers cannot be ruled out, especially given
their relative accessibility.
Nonetheless, given their essentially adversarial position, prose-
cutors should probably, at most, be considered first alternates for
this job. When faced with a choice between securing a conviction
and protecting the rights of a suspect, prosecutors will be tempted
to favor the former option, and thus are less likely than other poten-
tial decisionmakers to apply the substantive standards neutrally. 47
Ideally, the decisionmaker should be someone who has no vested
interest in the outcome of criminal cases.
Because of their relatively greater distance from law enforce-
ment pressures, judges or quasi-judges are better equipped to evalu-
ate the legitimacy of a search or seizure. Admittedly, research from
the United States, probably the country most dependent on a judi-
cial-type system, indicates that some magistrates merely rubber-
46. If prosecutors were to take on the role of authorizing searches and seizures, a
good faith exception of the type adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), would be unjustifiable. In Leon, the Court held that good
faith searches based on a warrant issued by a magistrate are valid, even if in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion was based largely on the assumption that
judges "have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions"; thus the
threat of exclusion "cannot be expected significantly to deter them." Id. at 917. This
latter assumption cannot be made with respect to prosecutors, even those not directly
involved in the case in question; the temptation to assist a fellow prosecutor (and earn a
favor) through the simple expedient of issuing a warrant would be too great.
47. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice, in its Task Force Report, provides one significant reason for this conclusion, at
least in the United States. The Report states: "Local election [which is the way most
state prosecutors are selected] increases the likelihood that the prosecutor will be re-
sponsive to the dominant law enforcement views and demands of the community."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASlK FORCE REPORT 73 (1967). The Report also contains a statement which is
probably relevant even where prosecutors are not elected: "Political considerations
make some prosecutors overly sensitive to what is safe, expedient, and in conformity
with law enforcement views that are popular rather than enlightened." Id. Relatedly,
prosecutors work much more closely with the police than with any other segment of the
community, and are likely to be more influenced by them. See also J. SKOLNICK, supra
note 28, at 202 ("although the prosecutor plays a magisterial role in the sense of assess-
ing with a critical eye the validity of complaints and the strength of a case, he ultimately
represents law enforcement").
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stamp police and prosecutor decisions.48 Yet, as noted earlier, the
same research suggests that, at its worst, the judicial warrant re-
quirement in this country forces prosecutors and police to consider
the validity of a contemplated search or seizure and to document
their requests for authorization, thus raising their "standard of
care."' 49 With adequate preparation and resolve, a magistrate can
be an effective check on overzealous law enforcement personnel.50
Furthermore, the extra cost to the state of making the deci-
sionmaker a magistrate, rather than a prosecutor, is unlikely to be
significant (at least where the police are involved). 51 The Supreme
Court's preference for decisionmakers who are divorced from the
police and prosecutors is good policy, although it is perhaps poorly
implemented in many jurisdictions.
At the same time, the Court is too closely wedded to independ-
ent judicial authorization of searches and seizures. Although the
Court has sanctioned ex ante review by nonmagistrates when viola-
tions of city ordinances are involved,52 it has ignored the possibility
of expanding this idea to other contexts where the costs of judicial
48. NCSC STUDY, supra note 25, at 32 (judges rarely reject applications for
warrants).
49. See NCSC STUDY, supra note 25, at 148-49; see also supra note 25.
50. Although the warrant process practice in the United States clearly reduces po-
lice misbehavior, its efficacy on that score could be improved with minimal costs to the
state. Two possible problems with the American process, and suggestions on how to
handle them, are made here.
First, as already noted, magistrates typically review warrant applications in a cur-
sory fashion. See NCSC STUDY, supra note 25, at 31 (in only 11% of the cases did the
review process take longer than five minutes, and 65% lasted 2.5 minutes or less). Of
course, in routine cases a cursory review might be all that is needed. To the extent
brevity connotes lack of attention, however, one simple solution presents itself: if the
magistrate were required to state for the record why he or she is granting (or denying)
the application, the process could be made less perfunctory without significant extra
expenditure of time or money.
A second problem is police perjury. Although much more likely to affect the accu-
racy of ex post review, supra note 28, it can also afflict the ex ante process. In particu-
lar, the police have been known to "make up" anonymous informants, or use
informants whose identity they know, but cannot divulge. Cf. H. UVILLER, TEMPERED
ZEAL 116 ("most police officers regard such alterations of events as the natural and
inevitable outgrowth of artificial and unrealistic post facto judgments that release
criminals"). Probably perjury can never be eliminated. But certain steps, beyond crimi-
nal prosecution, can inhibit it at the warrant application stage. By merely requiring
police to provide the identity of their informants to the magistrate (off the record), such
perjury can be deterred while still maintaining confidentiality.
51. Most police departments are located near magistrates. Moreover, several juris-
dictions now permit applications for warrants by phone. See infra text accompanying
notes 112-113. And once an application is completed by the officer and submitted to a
magistrate, review can be completed relatively quickly. See supra note 29.
52. Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 39 UCLA L. Rev. 17 1991-1992
UCLA LAW REVIEW
review might be substantial. As developed below, 53 in some situa-
tions "laypersons" might be the most effective decisionmakers, if
they receive rudimentary training in the substantive standards and
are kept separate from law enforcement efforts.
C. Exceptions to the Independent Authorization Requirement:
The Supreme Court's Approach
Once the ex ante reviewer is chosen, the crucial question be-
comes when he or she should be allowed to monitor ongoing inves-
tigations. Ideally, the imposition of a third party decisionmaker
would provide a realistic check on police excesses, while not need-
lessly stalling their legitimate endeavors. This section describes the
Supreme Court's approach to this issue. The next section analyzes
that approach and suggests an alternative.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's guarantee, the
Supreme Court has held that a warrant is required before every
search or seizure, "subject only," in Justice Stewart's oft-quoted
line, "to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions."' 54 Lip service to the idea that warrants are preferred contin-
ues to this day.55 But, of late, this preference has seldom been
implemented. No longer can one seriously contend that the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Court are either
few in number or "well-delineated." As Professor Bradley has
noted, in at least twenty discrete situations the Court has permitted
the police to proceed without a warrant. 56 And, as he further notes,
every exception typically becomes murkier, not more clear, with
each new case construing it.57
Although the warrant exceptions recognized by the Supreme
Court are legion, they can be categorized into four types: (1) excep-
tions based on a perception that exigent circumstances make ob-
taining a warrant impossible or impractical; (2) exceptions resting
on a finding that the police action does not impinge upon a substan-
tial privacy interest; (3) "special needs" situations where warrants
might frustrate legitimate purposes of the government other than
53. See infra text accompanying notes 121-123.
54. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
55. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2799 (1990) (speaking of "[t]he
ordinary requirement of a warrant"); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)
(quoting Katz).
56. Bradley, supra note 7, at 1473.
57. Id. at 1479 ("Each 'clear rule' has left unanswered questions which have turned
it into an unclear rule.").
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crime control; and (4) situations where magistrates are considered
unnecessary because other devices already curb police discretion.
1. Exigency Exceptions
By far the largest category of exceptions are those based on
exigency. Typically, the Court's exigency exceptions stem from a
concern about one or more of the following: imminent harm to of-
ficers or others, imminent disappearance of evidence, and imminent
escape of a suspect. 58 For instance, the Court's decisions allowing
warrantless public arrests and short-term stops are best explained as
a recognition that requiring judicial authorization in these situa-
tions would likely lead to escape of suspects or harm to others. 59
58. The Court has yet to summarize explicitly its holdings in this way, although it
has come close. In Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1990), the Minnesota
Supreme Court's opinion in the case stated that "a warrantless intrusion may be justi-
fied by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence .... or the
need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons
inside or outside the dwelling." 436 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn. 1989) (citation omitted). In
upholding the Minnesota court's finding that no exigency existed on the facts of Olson,
the Supreme Court referred to this language as "the proper legal standard." 110 S. Ct.
at 1690.
A fourth factor often listed by the lower courts in defining exigency is the serious-
ness of the offense. See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(listing gravity of the crime as well as the dangerousness of the suspect and the likeli-
hood of escape as factors to be considered in deciding whether warrantless entry is
permitted). However, in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Supreme Court
squarely rejected crime severity as a separate basis for an exception. In Mincey, the
prosecution argued for a "homicide exception" to the warrant requirement. The Court
acknowledged that homicide investigations often involved emergencies justifying a war-
rantless search (such as the presence of other victims or the killer). Id. at 392. But it
stated: "We decline to hold that the seriousness of the offense under investigation itself
creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a
warrantless search." Id. at 394.
Several years later, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), the Court held that
the fact that the crime being investigated is not serious will sometimes prohibit warrant-
less entries, citing Dorman, among other cases. Id. at 751-52. However, the Court was
careful to note that it did not necessarily approve of the particular holdings in Dorman
and its progeny. Id. at 752-53. Moreover, its description of their holdings made clear
that it still adhered to Mincey: "[C]ourts have permitted warrantless home arrest for
major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent of the gravity of the offense, existed
at the time of the arrest." Id. at 752 (emphasis added). Mincey and Welsh taken to-
gether indicate that, as far as the Court is concerned, by itself the nature of the offense
may prohibit a warrantless search, but cannot justify it. For further discussion of this
issue, see infra note 109.
59. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Supreme Court stated:
The reason for arrest for misdemeanors without warrant at common law
was to promptly suppress breaches of the peace ... while the reason for
arrest without a warrant on a reliable report of a felony was because the
public safety and the due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous
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Also based on exigency concerns are many of the Court's decisions
permitting warrantless searches. Thus, for example, the oldest ex-
ception to the search warrant requirement-search incident to
arrest-is justified as a means of preventing evidence destruction
and harm to officers by persons who have just been arrested. 6° The
"automobile" exception permits warrantless searches of vehicles
that might leave the jurisdiction if police took the time to obtain a
warrant. 61 The hot pursuit exception authorizes warrantless entries
into homes to make an arrest (as well as warrantless searches up to
the time of arrest) whenever the police are hot on the trail of a
suspect; requiring a warrant under such circumstances might allow
the suspect to escape, destroy evidence, or harm someone. 62 The
police are even allowed to undertake certain bodily intrusions in the
absence of a warrant if they have probable cause to believe the evi-
dence will dissipate in the meantime.63
offense required that such arrests should be made at once without
warrant.
Id. at 157 (citation omitted). The Court has been similarly explicit with respect to
stops. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (to justifiably stop a person,
officers must have "reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is
involved in criminal activity"); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (frisk after stop
allowed if officer has reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous").
60. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (search incident to arrest al-
lowed "in order to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape .... In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arrest-
ing officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction").
61. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (where the Court
distinguished between searches of houses, which generally require a warrant, "and a
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought").
62. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court upheld the warrantless
entry and search of a house by police who were pursuing a suspect, stating:
The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the
course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or
the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search
of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden
was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons
which could be used against them or to effect an escape.
Id. at 298-99.
63. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (warrantless seizure of blood
permitted to detect blood alcohol level if "the delay necessary to obtain a warrant,
under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence' ") (citing Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
Other exceptions which can be explained through exigency analysis include the
plain view seizure exception, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
(items that police see in plain view from a place they validly occupy may be seized
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In all of these situations save the last the police could, given
enough personnel, almost always obtain a warrant without suffering
the consequences of the exigency. In the automobile exception con-
text, for instance, one officer could stand guard over the car while
another takes any arrested individuals to the station house and ob-
tains a warrant for search of the vehicle. But the Court has adhered
to this exception even in the face of such observations." In other
words, the Court has frequently been willing to define exigency
broadly, in light of the realities of law enforcement.
2. Lesser Expectation of Privacy Exceptions
A second type of exception to the warrant requirement entirely
separate from the exigency category is based on expectation of pri-
without a warrant), and some versions of regulatory inspections, see, e.g., Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (permitting warrantless search of burned premises the night
of the fire and the morning thereafter to determine its cause, but finding unconstitu-
tional a warrantless search weeks later).
64. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), for instance, the Court stated
that "there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate
search without a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained." Id.
at 52. Chambers went on to stretch the exigency notion even further by allowing war-
rantless searches at the station house, so long as a warrantless search would have been
permissible on the street. Id. at 52 n.10. The purported reason for both findings was
that a prolonged seizure of a car pending a warrant (either on the street or in the sta-
tionhouse) is just as intrusive, if not more so, than an immediate search, and thus is not
necessarily better. Id. at 51-52. This rationale is specious, for reasons made clear by
Justice Harlan in his opinion in Chambers. Id. at 61-64 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). A better reason for the second holding in Chambers might go
like this: the police should not be forced to get a warrant for a search they could have
conducted in the absence of one, had they felt it practical at the time. See id. at 52 n. 10
(where majority noted that the arrest in Chambers was made in the middle of the night
and "[a] careful search ... was impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers .... ");
cf. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 773 (1983) (where police have authority to conduct
warrantless search of package at an international airport, they also have authority to
conduct warrantless search of same item the next day after it has been delivered to
addressee, so long as there is "a substantial likelihood" that the contents have not
changed). See infra note 10.
In direct opposition to the Court's rationale for Chambers are the Court's
"container" decisions, which suggest that if the movable object sought to be searched
can easily be placed in a police car (e.g., a trunk or suitcase), a warrant is required in
most circumstances. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). As the Court
stated in Chadwick (in language that contradicts the purported rationale of Chambers),
"[t]he initial seizure and detention of the footlocker... were sufficient to guard against
any risk that evidence might be lost. With the footlocker safely immobilized, it was
unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a
warrant." 433 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added). These decisions take the exigency rationale
more seriously, although the Court has begun reneging here as well. See California v.
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (overturning Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979),
which held that search of a container placed in a car requires a warrant).
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vacy analysis. The Court has permitted several types of warrantless
searches and seizures, despite the clear absence of exigency, where it
determined that the privacy interest infringed by the police action
was insignificant. Because this finding usually has meant that the
Fourth Amendment is not implicated at all (on the ground that no
"search or seizure" occurs when no individual interest is
threatened), it also generally leads to a holding that "probable
cause" is not required either. This latter aspect of these cases is
addressed in Part III. Here the focus will be on the effect of expec-
tation of privacy analysis on the warrant requirement.
This analysis is employed most often in assessing the legality of
"searches" (as opposed to "seizures"). 65 The Court has gauged the
privacy expectations associated with a particular area by examining
its exposure to public view, 66 the types of activities that take place
there,67 the steps taken to protect it from public view,68 and a host
of other variables. 69 Relying on one or more of these factors, the
Court has upheld warrantless, nonexigent searches of "open
fields,"' 70 residential 71 and business 72 yards (at least when viewed
65. As just explained, in those cases where the Court holds that no expectation of
privacy was violated, it declares that no "search" occurs for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses. Nonetheless, in all of these cases the police were obviously looking for evidence.
To most lay people, looking for evidence of crime is a "search," regardless of what that
term may mean under the Fourth Amendment. This Article, operating in a "world
without the Fourth Amendment," uses the word "search" as a layperson would.
66. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.").
67. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) ("In assessing the
degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight
to .. .the uses to which the individual has put a location ....").
68. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (whether an area is
within a home's curtilage, and thus afforded Fourth Amendment protection, depends,
inter alia, on "the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
people passing by").
69. In Oliver, the Court named two other such factors: "the intention of the Fram-
ers of the Fourth Amendment," and "our societal understanding that certain areas de-
serve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion." 466 U.S. at 178.
Other cases have looked at whether the police physically intruded upon the searched
area. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 (1986); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (both emphasizing that aerial flights over property
do not involve physical intrusion).
70. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 170.
71. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986).
72. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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from a plane), jail cells, 73 persons at the international border, 74 and
garbage cans at curbside,7 5 to name a few cases. 76
The Court has also permitted warrantless nonemergency police
actions on a related assumption-of-risk/implied consent rationale.
For instance, it has sanctioned warrantless searches of "heavily reg-
ulated" industries on the ground that the owners of such industries
surrender much or all of their privacy when they undertake a busi-
ness known to be strictly monitored by the government. 77 In a sim-
73. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984) (warrantless searches of prison
cells permitted because a prison "shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an
automobile, an office or a hotel room," and the need for "institutional security" is
great).
74. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S, 132, 154 (1925). In United States v. Mon-
toya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), the Court noted that, in addition to the lesser
expectation of privacy accorded individuals crossing the border, "the Fourth Amend-
ment balance between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of the
individual is also struck much more favorably to the Government at the border." Id. at
539-40.
75. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
76. According to the Court, another exception which is partially based on a less-
ened expectation of privacy rationale is the automobile exception. As discussed earlier,
see supra notes 61-64, the primary basis for the so-called Carroll doctrine is exigency.
But in a number of cases the Court has explained that this exception is also based on
reduced expectations of privacy associated with a car. See, e.g., California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) ("In short, [in the car search context] the pervasive schemes of
regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies
attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a
magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met." (emphasis ad-
ded)). Why the Court feels the need to justify the exception on privacy as well as on
exigency grounds is a long story; briefly, it has more 'to do with the Court's desire to
distinguish its automobile cases from its "container cases," see supra note 64, than with
anything else. See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, §§ 7.03,
7.04.
77. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) ("When a [gun] dealer
chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license,
he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will
be subject to effective inspection."). The Biswell Court also stated that "unannounced,
even frequent, inspections are essential," id. at 316, thus suggesting that the decision
was based in part on an exigency rationale (or perhaps a special needs rationale, see
infra text accompanying notes 83-97). But because warrants are obtained ex parte,
requiring them would not prevent the police from engaging in "unannounced" searches.
Nor would a warrant scheme prevent frequent searches. What the Court really seems
to be saying in Biswell is that a probable cause requirement would frustrate the regula-
tory scheme. See infra text accompanying notes 158-161.
The conclusion that the heavily regulated industry exception is based primarily on
a lesser expectation of privacy rationale is supported by the Court's most recent busi-
ness inspection case, in which it stated that "[b]ecause the owner or operator of com-
mercial premises in a 'closely regulated' industry has a reduced expectation of privacy,
the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search, have lessened applica-
tion in this context." New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (citation omitted).
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ilar vein, a series of Court decisions has sanctioned various types of
undercover activity in the absence of a warrant, on the ground that
people assume the risk that their friends or acquaintances are gov-
ernment agents or may eventually become such agents. 78 The
Court has extended this analysis to "institutional" agents as well,
holding that the government need not obtain warrants to search
bank records "voluntarily" surrendered to banks79 or phone num-
bers in the possession of telephone companies.80
Although usually not using expectation of privacy language,
the Court has also upheld warrantless nonexigent detentions by em-
phasizing the low level of infringement on personal autonomy occa-
sioned by the police action. For instance, the Court's decisions
permitting warrantless roadblocks to detect illegal immigration"
and drunk driving 82 are based primarily on the perceived triviality
of the intrusion involved.
78. Using an assumption of risk/public exposure rationale, the Court has found
that no warrant is required to authorize: (1) a search by an undercover agent who is
invited into the defendant's home by the defendant, Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206 (1966); (2) an undercover search of defendant's store during store hours, Maryland
v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985); (3) police efforts to obtain reports about the defendant's
conversations from an acquaintance of the defendant, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966); and (4) use of a concealed listening device on an undercover agent, On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); accord United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971).
79. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
80. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
81. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), the Court gave sev-
eral reasons for not requiring a warrant prior to immigration roadblocks. Most relevant
here is its first reason: "The degree of intrusion upon privacy that may be occasioned by
a search of a house hardly can be compared with the minor interference with privacy
resulting from the mere stop for questioning as to residence." Id. at 565. The Court
also minimized the intrusion involved in such a roadblock by pointing to the "visible
manifestations" of the field officers' authority at a checkpoint. Id. Other reasons given
by the Court for not requiring a judicial warrant, not involving privacy concerns, were
the ease with which the validity of the checkpoint could be reviewed after a challenged
stop, and the fact that the location of the roadblock was not established by officers in the
field. Id. at 565-66.
82. The Court's opinion in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct.
2481 (1990), upholding warrantless, suspicionless sobriety checkpoints, relied heavily
on Martinez-Fuerte. While it never directly addressed the warrant issue, the Court em-
phasized the minimal intrusiveness of such checkpoints, stating that "[t]he intrusion
resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes
indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte." Id. at
2487.
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3. "Special Needs" Exceptions
A third category of exceptions is what has come to be called
"special needs" situations. This language first appeared in Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in New Jersey v. TL.O., 3 where he
stated: "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the war-
rant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court enti-
tled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the
Framers. '8 4 Despite the restrictive tone of this passage, in T.L.O.
Blackmun was willing to label searches of school children's per-
sonal effects a "special needs" situation, and thus joined the major-
ity in eliminating both the warrant and probable cause requirements
in that context.8 5 The special needs jargon has surfaced in several
opinions since TL.O., including cases permitting warrantless
searches of employees' offices86 and probationer's homes, 7 and war-
rantless substance abuse testing of customs agents88 and railway
workers.8 9
Although the precise contours of the special needs exceptions
to the warrant requirement are unclear, they do not appear to be
based either on an exigency rationale (as defined here) or on a find-
ing of reduced expectations of privacy; nor do they rest on a combi-
nation of the two. Some of the special needs cases involved exigent
circumstances, but others did not; in any event, the Court's broad
holdings clearly do not require a finding of exigency in order to
83. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
84. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 353.
86. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987) ("when employers conduct an
investigation, they have an interest substantially different from 'the normal need for law
enforcement'" (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)); see also 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (" 'special
needs' are present in the context of government employment").
87. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) ("[Probation s]upervision ... is
a 'special need' of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that
would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.").
88. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989)
("It is clear that the Customs Service's drug-testing program is not designed to serve the
ordinary needs of law enforcement.").
89. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) ("The
Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety
... 'presents "special needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify depar-
tures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.' " (quoting Griffin, 483
U.S. at 873-74)). The special needs language seems to be the Court's favorite rubric of
late, appearing in cases that are probably best analyzed under other rationales. See, e.g.,
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (where the Court, in addressing whether
junkyards are a " 'closely regulated' industry," also refers to "special need" analysis).
1991]
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sustain a warrantless search under this rubric. 90 And while the
Court did find lessened privacy expectations in some of the special
needs situations,91 it relied on this finding only in justifying aban-
donment of the probable cause standard, not as support for elimi-
nating the warrant requirement. 92
The predominant focus of these decisions appears to be the
"administrative" nature of the searches or seizures in question. The
fact that the government investigators in these special needs situa-
tions typically are looking for proof of something other than crime,
or at least evidence of something other than serious crime, is used
by the Court to minimize the individual interests involved and, at
the same time, bolster the government interest in dispensing with a
warrant. With respect to individual interests, the Court implies
that because the purpose of the search is not directly prosecutorial,
less protection is needed. 93 On the government side, the Court ex-
90. Although some of the cases mentioned above involved arguably exigent cir-
cumstances, see, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985), the opinions
justifying the results all use broad language permitting warrantless searches with or
without exigency, so long as the Court's other requirements are met. For instance, in
T.L.O., the Court flatly stated that "we hold today that school officials need not obtain
a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority." 469 U.S. at 340.
See also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667 ("The Customs Service has been entrusted with
pressing responsibilities, and its mission would be compromised if it were required to
seek search warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment decisions.");
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877 (in the probation setting, "we think it reasonable to dispense
with the warrant requirement."); Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722 ("Imposing unwieldy warrant
procedures in [cases where the employer wishes to enter an employee's office, desk or
file cabinets for a work-related purpose] . . .would conflict with the 'common sense
realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter.'" (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143
(1983)).
91. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 ("Unlike most private citizens or government em-
ployees in general, employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect
effective inquiry into their fitness and probity."); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627 ("[T]he ex-
pectations of privacy of [railway employees involved in accidents or safety violations]
are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated perva-
sively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of
covered employees."); Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725 ("[T]he employer intrusions at issue here
'involve a relatively limited invasion' of employee privacy." (quoting Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)). But see Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 ("A probationer's
home, like anyone else's, is protected by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that
searches be 'reasonable.' "); TL.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38 ("A search of a child's person
or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of
privacy." (footnote omitted)).
92. See infra notes 151-156 and accompanying text.
93. Intimations of this kind of reasoning run throughout the Court's special needs
cases. In T.L. O., the Court notes that its holding does not necessarily apply to searches
by the police or by school officials acting at the behest of the police. 469 U.S. at 341 n.7.
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presses its concern about the impact a warrant requirement will
have on the efficiency of government officials whose primary job is
something other than law enforcement. Whereas the Court is will-
ing to tolerate the inconvenience caused by judicial authorization
when it distracts the police in their single-minded effort to "ferret
out crime," it has resisted imposing the requirement when it com-
promises these other, "administrative" interests of the government.
Thus, for instance, in justifying elimination of ex ante review for
investigations of work-related infractions, the Court stated that im-
posing "unwieldy" warrant procedures on work supervisors "would
seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be un-
duly burdensome."' 94 Similar language is found in the other special
needs cases.95
In short, the special needs exceptions suspend the warrant re-
quirement when, because ordinary police investigation is not in-
In Ortega, the Court stated, "we do not address the appropriate standard when an
employee is being investigated for criminal misconduct or breaches of other non-work-
related statutory or regulatory standards." O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 n.*
(1987). In Von Raab, the Court was most explicit: "Because the testing program
adopted by the Customs Service is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law
enforcement, we have balanced the public interest in the Service's testing program
against the privacy concerns implicated by the tests, without reference to our usual
presumption in favor of the procedures specified in the Warrant Clause, to assess
whether the tests are required by Customs are reasonable." National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab, 498 U.S. 656, 679 (1989). See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21
("The FRA has prescribed toxicological tests, not to assist in the prosecution of em-
ployees, but rather 'to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result
from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs.'" (quoting 49 C.F.A. § 219.1(a)
(1987)).
94. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722.
95. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the Court stated that requiring a
warrant "would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disci-
plinary procedures needed in the schools." Id. at 340. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868 (1987), it concluded that in apprehending those who have violated probation condi-
tions, "[a] warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree .... setting up
a magistrate rather than the probation officer as the judge of how close a supervision the
probationer requires." Id. at 876. Finally, with drug and alcohol testing, the Court
declined to require a warrant in part because it would "divert valuable agency re-
sources," Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666, and require employers to grapple with the unfa-
miliar "intricacies of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence," Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S 602, 623 (1989). In these last two cases, the
Court also gave two other reasons for eliminating the warrant requirement: (1) the fact
that the regulations at issue narrowly and clearly defined who was subject to testing and
thus obviated the need for judicial overview, Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667; Skinner, 489
U.S. at 622; and (2) the possibility that delay occasioned by the warrant requirement
"may result in the destruction of valuable evidence," Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623. The first
reason is discussed further infra in the text accompanying notes 98-103. The second is
clearly an exigency rationale.
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volved, 96 "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search."'97
4. Absence of Discretion Exceptions
In its drug and alcohol testing cases, the Court has given an-
other reason for dispensing with a warrant requirement. There, it
noted that, given the existence of regulations clearly setting out who
could be tested (e.g., customs employees seeking promotion or rail-
way workers involved in accidents), "there are virtually no facts for
a neutral magistrate to evaluate.1 98 Thus, according to the Court,
monitoring by a third party was unnecessary regardless of whether
employee testing is a "special needs" situation. While not yet
clearly identified as such, this absence of discretion idea qualifies as
a separate exception to the warrant requirement.
This basis for an exception first made its appearance in the
Court's decisions allowing warrantless searches of lawfully im-
pounded cars99 and personal effects taken from persons placed in
custody. 1°° Although these decisions include hints of both the di-
minished privacy and special needs rationales, 10 the principal justi-
96. One other case in which the special needs language surfaced is Michigan De-
partment of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), which upheld warrantless sobri-
ety checkpoints conducted by the police. However, in Sitz the Court made clear that
the special needs rubric was not applicable in this context, id. at 2485, reinforcing the
idea that this language is reserved for law enforcement divorced from ordinary police
work.
97. This language comes from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33
(1967), but is quoted by the Court in T.LO., 469 U.S. at 340; Ortega, 480 U.S. at 720;
and Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623. Other pre-T.L.O cases might also be explicable using
this rationale. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 589 (1983)
(permitting warrantless boarding of a boat on intercoastal waterways to inspect docu-
ments because "[c]ustoms officials do not have as a practical alternative the option of
spotting all vessels which might have come from the open sea and herding them into
one or more canals or straits in order to make fixed checkpoint stops").
98. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622 ("[I]n light of the standardized nature of the tests and
the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there
are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.").
99. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); see also Florida v. Wells,
110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Florida v. Meyers, 466
U.S. 380 (1984); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982).
100. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
101. In the leading case permitting warrantless car inventories, South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the majority spoke of the diminished expectation of
privacy associated with automobiles, id. at 367-68, and the government's interest in
avoiding harm to the police, false claims of theft, and vandalism through the inventory
mechanism, id. at 369. Neither point justifies warrantless searches. Cars (searches of
which usually require probable cause, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56
(1925)), do not somehow lose whatever privacy protection they have because they have
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fication for warrantless inventories has been their standardized
nature. As Justice Powell explained in the leading case on the sub-
ject, when making an inventory search of cars
[t]he officer does not make a discretionary determination to
search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present.
Inventory searches are conducted in accordance with established
police department rules or policy and occur whenever an auto-
mobile is seized. There are thus no special facts for a neutral
magistrate to evaluate. 102
Although the inventory and drug testing cases are the only Court
decisions to have explicitly adopted the absence of discretion ration-
ale, a few other decisions seem to rely on it as well. 103
D. Analysis and a Proposal: The Exigency Principle
Maximum protection of individual interests would be afforded
by requiring ex ante protection for every search and seizure. In
light of the police's tendency to be overly suspicious and to under-
value individual prerogatives, we might want to force them to seek
authorization in every case. But this approach would unnecessarily
frustrate the state's interest in combatting crime. In particular,
when exigent circumstances are present, the police should be able to
act on their own. On the other hand, the other categories of war-
rant exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court are not justifiable.
1. Justifying and Refining the Exigency Exception
The "exigency principle" can be more elaborately stated as fol-
lows: the police should be able to proceed without obtaining in-
dependent authorization when they believe, with the requisite
been impounded; indeed, the Opperman Court nowhere suggested as much. And while
the government interests described are the type of "administrative" (as opposed to
"crime investigation") objectives usually advanced in special needs cases, the fact that
the police (who are familiar with warrant procedures) are the government agents per-
forming the search makes this situation unlike those cases. Cf. supra text accompany-
ing notes 83-97.
102. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring). The majority made the
same point less explicitly. Id. at 376 ("[W]e conclude that in following standard police
procedures, prevailing throughout the country and approved by the overwhelming ma-
jority of courts, the conduct of the police was not 'unreasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment.").
103. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 604 (1981) (approving warrantless
searches under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act in large part because the Act's
explicit standards prevent mine owners from being subject to the "unchecked discretion
of Government officers"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976)
("[Slince field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less
room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-
patrol stops.").
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degree of certainty,"°4 that violence to others, disappearance of evi-
dence, or escape of a suspect is imminent.105 The rationale behind
this principle is obvious. Frequently, the police have no time to
seek even a second opinion from a fellow officer, much less ap-
proach a prosecutor or judge, if they are to have any chance at
preventing harm, procuring evidence, or apprehending a suspect.
While the possibility of police miscalculation in such "fluid" situa-
tions (with the consequent damage to individual interests) is fairly
high, the cost to the state of prohibiting action would be even
greater. 106
This calculus is most apparent when the first exigency cate-
gory-preventable harm to others-is involved; the law recognizes
many instances where the interests of a potentially dangerous indi-
vidual are sacrificed to protect other people. 0 7 To some extent, the
104. The requisite level of certainty as to the existence of exigent circumstances
should be determined by the proportionality principle, addressed infra in the text ac-
companying notes 214-242.
105. Police should not be allowed to "create" the exigency; thus, for instance, if they
believe they have sufficient reason to suspect evidence is in a particular house well
before they go to arrest its occupant, they should attempt to get a search warrant, rather
than timing an arrest to create an emergency. Cf. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970)
(where the Court invalidated a search pursuant to a drug arrest made by officers who,
instead of immediately executing two arrest warrants on the defendant for bond viola-
tions, waited until he came out of his house and began the drug transaction).
106. According to Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 32, European countries that rec-
ognize a need for judicial authorization usually have an exigency exception. In France,
for instance, the police do not need to obtain judicial authorization prior to any search
for evidence of "flagrant" offenses; an offense is flagrant if it is" 'in the process of being
committed or ... has just been committed,' or if, 'in the period immediately following
the act, the suspected person is pursued by clamor, or is found in possession of objects,
or presents traces or indications, leading to the belief that he has participated in the
felony or misdemeanor.'" Id. at 252 n.32 (quoting FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE art. 53 (G. Kock trans. 1964)). In Italy, the police may act on their own "in
cases of necessity and urgency," including measures necessary for reasons of "public
safety and security." Id. at 257 n.43. In Germany, warrantless actions are permitted
"where there is 'danger in delay' or where a person is caught in the act of committing an
offense." Id. at 260.
107. The most obvious examples of this phenomenon are those state statutes which
permit summary short-term detention of the dangerous mentally ill based solely on the
application of a mental health professional or a "responsible" citizen. See, e.g., CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1984) (permitting either a police officer or a clini-
cian to authorize emergency, 72-hour admission); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39
(McKinney 1988) (permitting a mental health professional to authorize emergency ad-
mission for up to 48 hours). A finding of dangerousness may also permit abrogation of
the confidentiality usually associated with the attorney-client relationship, see, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1984) (permitting lawyer to re-
veal confidential information to prevent the client from committing a criminal act likely
to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm), and the therapist-client rela-
tionship, see, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
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second and third exigency categories are justified on the same
ground: destruction of evidence or escape of a suspect may endan-
ger the public by preventing conviction of a violent individual.
More straightforwardly, failing to extend the exigency principle to
these latter categories would mean that evidence or suspects within
the state's grasp will often be lost irretrievably, a significant cost the
state should not have to bear merely to ensure that the police's deci-
sion is subjected to independent review. 108 Because the police can-
not be expected, in truly exigent situations, to evaluate whether the
loss of evidence or a suspect will in fact be permanent, they should
be able to act on their own when either of these two categories
apply.
Other types of "exigencies" are sometimes found in court opin-
ions; none of these, however, should qualify the police to act on
their own unless they are based on emergency considerations. l09
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (clinician who believes patient will harm another has a duty to
protect against that harm, including, if necessary, warning the potential victim).
108. Note too that, as between a truly exigent situation and one which is not, the
police officers' certainty assessments are likely to be more accurate in the former situa-
tion, since the danger, evidence, or suspect is more likely to be "right in front of them."
109. As noted earlier, see supra note 58, the most frequently proposed "exigency,"
aside from those discussed in the text, is offense gravity. Professor Bradley, for in-
stance, has suggested that warrantless entries might be considered more reasonable in
serious felony cases than in misdemeanor cases. Bradley, supra note 7, at 1487 n.96.
And Professor Schroeder would prohibit warrantless searches in investigations of non-
serious crimes. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth Amend-
ment Equations-- Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin,
38 U. KAN. L. REV. 439 (1990). If current precedent is any guide, the Supreme Court
would probably disagree with Bradley and, at least in some cases, agree with Schroeder.
See supra note 58. I believe both Bradley and Schroeder are wrong.
The possibility that harm to others, evidence destruction, or escape will occur
probably increases with crime severity. But the fact that an offense is grave does not by
itself create an emergency. When true exigency is not present, the state will not be
damaged by a warrant requirement for serious crimes, except to the extent that such a
requirement inconveniences investigation of a crime the state is particularly eager to
solve. For reasons developed later in this article, see infra text accompanying notes
171-177, this latter interest is insufficient to justify relaxed protection. If anything, we
should be more concerned about controlling the police in serious cases where intense
public pressure may encourage abuse.
On the other hand, the Court's and Schroeder's contention-that exigency of the
type defined here is an insufficient justification for warrantless entries when minor
crimes are involved-gives too much weight to individual interests. In practice, truly
"minor" crimes usually do not involve imminently violent individuals, crucial evidence
that can be destroyed, or suspects who are likely to leave the jurisdiction to escape
apprehension. See Schroeder, supra, at 536-38. But in those cases where any of these
factors are present, the state should not be barred from acting by a warrant require-
ment. Apparently, the fear underlying the contrary position is that police are more
likely to abuse their discretion when investigating minor crimes, or that such abuse is
less easily condoned in this situation, or a combination thereof. See Welsh v. Wiscon-
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Relatedly, because police discretion should be kept to a minimum,
the "imminence" component of the exigency principle must be nar-
rowly defined; otherwise, the exception could easily swallow the
rule, as experience in the United States has borne out. 110 At least in
urban areas, where magistrates are plentiful, any search or seizure
which takes place more than an hour or so after police develop the
relevant level of suspicion can usually be preceded by independent
authorization. I1 ' Indeed, in many American jurisdictions, judicial
warrants can be obtained in much shorter periods of time. Some
states have begun experimenting with "telephonic warrants," which
enable the police to call a magistrate and, based on their recitation
of the facts known to them, receive a judicial ruling over the phone,
sin, 466 U.S. 740, 751 (1984) ("It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes,
even quarters in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any
suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or
threats of it" (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459--60 (1948) (Jack-
son, J., concurring)). But a narrowly defined exigency exception, on those rare occa-
sions when it would apply in investigations of minor crimes, does not give the police
much discretion.
A final problem with basing any search and seizure rule on a severity of crime
factor is the difficulty of discerning which crimes are "minor" and which are "serious"
for this purpose, a difficulty suggested by Professor Schroeder's truly heroic effort to
accomplish the task. See Schroeder, supra, at 498-534, 549-52; cf. Welsh, 466 U.S. at
753 (where the crime labelled "minor" by the Court was driving-while-intoxicated,
which is considered very serious in many states). Moreover, even if a useable definition
of crime magnitude is devised, its application may be impossible, given the realities of
law enforcement; activity which appears to be a "minor" crime at one point may well
be, or become, "serious" and vice versa. Cf. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430
(1984) (rejecting a minor crime exception to Miranda v. Arizona, in part because "[t]he
police often are unaware when they arrest a person whether he may have committed a
misdemeanor or a felony").
110. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), in which the Court per-
mitted warrantless stationhouse searches of cars that could have been searched in the
field pursuant to the automobile exception. Clearly, once the car is at the stationhouse,
no exigency exists. Moreover, even if one accepts the "continuing exigency" rationale
for Chambers, see supra note 64, all it should authorize is a quick search for items that
might harm or be destroyed (akin to what happens in the "field"), not the type of lei-
surely, top-to-bottom search that often takes place at the stationhouse.
111. See supra note 29.
Occasionally the statement in the text will not be true. If police are in "hot pur-
suit," for instance, considerable time might elapse between the point at which the requi-
site certainty is established and the search or seizure. Nonetheless, given the exigency
of pursuit, no warrant should be required. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d
697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976) (warrantless entry held valid
even though it took place 105 minutes after commission of crime, since police were in
pursuit during entire period).
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all of which is recorded and later transcribed.1 12 Such procedures
should be mandated wherever feasible. 1 3
2. The Invalidity of Other Types of Exceptions
While a narrowly defined exigency exception to the warrant
requirement properly balances state and individual interests, the
other types of exceptions recognized by the United States Supreme
Court cannot be justified. Expectation of privacy analysis is irrele-
vant to determining when a warrant is required. Special needs anal-
ysis, at least as described by the Court, is contradictory and gives
far too much weight to the state's interest in combatting crime. The
absence of discretion rationale is usually plausible only in the ab-
stract, and in any event does not justify eliminating ex ante review
entirely.
Without agreeing with the Court's particular findings on the
matter, we can assume that some invasions by the police are less
violative of privacy than others and that many are "minimal."
Moreover, as developed in Part III, expectation of privacy analysis
is useful in determining the level of certainty necessary to pursue a
particular investigation. But so long as some insult to individual
interests occurs, the invasiveness of a police action should have no
bearing on whether ex ante review is required to authorize it.
The benefit of this position is apparent: even "minimal" intru-
sions such as searches of open fields, jail cells, garbage cans, and
heavily regulated businesses should be prevented if they are unnec-
essary. At the same time, the cost of requiring ex ante review for
minimal invasions is no greater than the cost of requiring it for
those which are significant. So long as the exigency exception is
available, in neither case will the state lose evidence or a suspect due
to the need to obtain prior authorization. The only cost is that oc-
casioned by forcing such authorization in a larger number of cases
(and this cost need not be significant' 14).
112. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2); W. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.3(c) (2d ed. 1987).
113. Ideally, prompt procedures for evaluating the allegedly exigent search or
seizure should be available. In the United States, the individual arrested without a war-
rant is entitled to a judicial review of the arrest within two days, Riverside County v.
McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991), but often must wait several weeks or months
before the legitimacy of a search is adjudicated and illegally seized property returned.
The different treatment of searches is due, at least in part, to the prevalent method of
redressing them-the exclusionary rule-which is triggered by pretrial motion that is
normally not made until well after arrest.
114. See supra note 29.
1991]
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To the extent the special needs exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement are based on a finding of a reduced expectation of pri-
vacy, 115 the same criticism is applicable. It will be remembered,
however, that in this category of cases the Court has sought to mini-
mize the individual interests involved in a different way, by focusing
on the "administrative" rather than "criminal" focus of the investi-
gation. This attempt at trivializing the victim's interests also falls
short. There is no doubt that in most, if not all, of the special needs
situations the primary motivation behind a search and seizure is
something other than gathering evidence for criminal prosecution.
For instance, "evidence" discovered during a school search is usu-
ally used for disciplinary purposes' 16 and the results of drug testing
normally form the basis for employment and treatment decisions. 117
Although somewhat stretched, analogous observations can be made
about investigations by probation officers.118 But to rely on these
realities to justify dispensing with judicial authorization is ironic at
best. In effect, such a conclusion means that the state must provide
more protection against police abuse for those suspected of crime
than for those who are not. More importantly, while the motiva-
tion of government agents may be relevant to the level of intrusion
their actions occasion,' 19 the fact that the reason for an investiga-
tion is "administrative" rather than "criminal" does not, by itself,
lessen the insult to individual interests: a search of a school child's
purse to obtain evidence of wrongdoing is very invasive, whether
the "wrongdoing" being investigated is defined criminally or by
school regulation.
115. See supra note 91.
116. But see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385 n.30 (1985) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (citing a number of cases in which evidence
discovered by school officials was used in a criminal prosecution against the student).
117. In the two cases in front of the Court, the test results were to be used primarily,
if not solely, in employee disciplinary proceedings. National Treasury Employees
Union v. Van Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 663 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 682, 620-21 (1989). Most testing programs incorporate a treatment
feature, often making it a prerequisite to retaining one's job after a positive test. See
infra note 345.
118. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the Court made much of the fact
that a probation officer's duty is not merely to discover probation violations (which
themselves are often not separate criminal violations) but also to help the probationer,
through monitoring the client's progress and seeking rehabilitative and other services
for the client. Id. "In such a setting," it concluded, "we think it reasonable to dispense
with the warrant requirement." Id. at 877.
119. See, e.g., Small, Privacy as a Psycholegal Construct 64 (on file with the author)
("ratings of the offensiveness of intrusive activities are significantly shaped by the stated
motive of the intruder"); see also infra text accompanying notes 318-322.
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Before writing off the special needs exceptions, however, one
must also consider the state's interests. In contrast to the Court's
treatment of the lesser privacy exceptions-where no effort is made
to point to any cost a warrant requirement might impose on the
state-the Court's analysis of special needs situations emphasizes
the extra burden such a requirement imposes on government when
its agents are not professional police but "lay" investigators (e.g.,
teachers, employers, or probation officers). In particular, the Court
appears to believe the warrant requirement will: (1) divert lay inves-
tigators from their everyday, primary chores, and (2) enmesh them
in a procedure that is foreign to them.120
These assumptions can be challenged, especially in the proba-
tion context.' 2 1 But even granting -their validity (at least in the
school and employment settings), elimination of ex ante review is
not justified; at most some adjustment of the review process is called
for. Rather than require a court officer to assess the propriety of the
120. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
121. Although the Court emphasizes the rehabilitative role played by the probation
officer, see supra note 118, in reality the principal job of the probation officer is to "con-
trol the probationer-to make him conform his behavior to the requirements of the law
and the probation conditions during the time he is under supervision." R. DAWSON,
SENTENCING 122-23 (1969). As Professor Dawson notes,, "[i]n official documents, the
treatment or rehabilitation objective of probation supervision receives primary atten-
tion. In practice, however, the control objective receives the major expenditure of man-
power." Id. at 123; see also id. at 125 ("In both Detroit and Milwaukee [two
jurisdictions studied by Dawson], the control objective dominates the supervision pro-
cess."). Dawson continues:
Some probation officers feel very strongly that control is best accom-
plished through active surveillance of probationers. These officers em-
phasize the necessity of going into the field to find out 'what actually is
going on.' Like the police, they seek to enhance their control function by
making their 'presence' felt, by making their clients feel that they are
being watched carefully.
Id. at 125-26 (emphasis added).
As this brief description of their job shows, probation officers are much more like
police, in terms of job description and attitude, than the other "lay" investigators in-
volved in the Court's special needs cases. Their job involves both danger and social
isolation, the two factors that make police bad candidates for performing an ex ante
review function. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. At the same time,
because their job is so closely tied to investigation, they are unlikely to be distracted
from their principal duties by a warrant requirement. Nor is that requirement likely to
confront them with alien concepts, since they are very familiar with courts and the
criminal process, if only because of their preparation of presentence reports and involve-
ment in probation revocation proceedings. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.1(a) (1984) (probation officer's role in preparation of
presentence report); id. § 25.4(b) (probation officer's role in initiating revocation pro-
ceeding). In short, the Court's attempt to lump probation officers together with teach-
ers and employers, rather than the police, is based on faulty perceptions about their
function.
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action, an adequately trained lay decisionmaker, located on or near
the school or workplace, could perform the role. 122 The proximity
of this person would lessen whatever time burden is associated with
seeking authorization from a court officer. And the procedural bur-
den could be lightened by eliminating some of the more formal ac-
coutrements of the usual warrant application process: written
applications, affidavits, and the like. Because lay investigators such
as teachers and employers are less likely to fall prey to the hyper-
suspiciousness and tunnel vision that police exhibit,123 the counter-
weight provided by independent review of their proposed actions
need not be as structured as the review the police must face. The
important objective is to provide ex ante protection by an independ-
ent third party; the police/magistrate model need not be imposed in
every context.
The final justification for eliminating the warrant require-
ment-the absence of discretion rationale-is suspect for two rea-
sons. First, in most of the cases in which the Court has relied on it,
police discretion is not in fact significantly minimized by adminis-
trative or legislative standardization of procedures. For instance,
the usual inventory policy does not, contrary to Justice Powell's as-
sumption, require an inventory of every car that is impounded.1 24
Even if it did, the scope of such a search can vary tremendously,
depending upon the police officer's predilections. 125 Second, assum-
ing administrative or legislative provisions do manage to eliminate
122. The model for such a decisionmaker could come from a number of different
arenas. See, e.g., the description of different systems for monitoring nonemergency ad-
ministration of medication, supra note 31.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
124. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1987) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting), where the inventory policy at issue provided the officer who has arrested the
driver of a car three options for disposing of the vehicle: (1) allow a third party to take
custody; (2) take the car to the nearest public parking facility, lock it, and take the keys;
or (3) impound the car and search it.
125. This fact is illustrated by the Court's cases. In Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.
259 (1982), the police found a bag of marijuana in an unlocked glove compartment
during their "inventory" search. They then conducted an extremely thorough examina-
tion under the front seat, inside the locked trunk, and under the dashboard. In Florida
v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984), the police conducted a thorough "inventory" search
eight hours after the impoundment, a lapse of time suggesting their objective was more
than protecting themselves or the owner's valuables.
Although the Court's decision in Opperman warned against inventory searches
that are merely "a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive," South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976), such pretextual searches are exceedingly hard to
prevent unless the police are forced to justify their actions to a third party. See gener-
ally Bursoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66 U. DET. L.
REV. 363 (1989).
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all discretion, they must still be subject to some type of review.
Again using inventory searches as an example, the mere fact that a
police department adopts a detailed inventory policy does not mean
that policy is reasonable; indeed, unless monitored by the judiciary,
the removal of all discretion may well result in serious insult to indi-
vidual interests on a routine basis. 126 In short, the absence of dis-
cretion rationale, while theoretically plausible, should not permit
the state to avoid an ex ante determination.
E. Summary
In a world without the Fourth Amendment, ex post sanctions
for police misconduct would be supplemented with a requirement of
ex ante review before all nonexigent searches and seizures. Exigent
circumstances would exist only when government investigators are
confronted with imminent violence to others, disappearance of evi-
dence, or escape of a suspect. Otherwise, the search and seizure
should be approved beforehand.
The ex ante reviewer must be able to apply the substantive
standards competently and objectively. The former requirement is
controlled by and places limits on the complexity of the substantive
standards and the latter requirement eliminates anyone directly in-
volved in law enforcement. Otherwise, the identity of the deci-
sionmaker and the nature of the review process would vary,
depending upon the extent to which abuse is likely to occur. Police
actions would generally be preceded by judicial review. Searches
and seizures sought to be conducted by lay investigators, on the
other hand, could be reviewed relatively informally by other
laypersons.
126. Consider in this regard Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990), where the
Court stated in dictum that police regulations permitting inventory searches would be
adequate if they mandated either: (1) that all containers found in an impounded car be
opened; (2) that no containers be opened; or (3) that the decision whether to open a
container be left up to the police officer based on "the nature of the search and charac-
teristics of the container itself." Id. at 1635. Obviously, variant (3) does not remove
discretion from the police and thus would not pass muster under the absence of discre-
tion rationale. While (1) and (2) apparently do remove discretion, they would also per-
mit suspicionless searches, which would be unreasonable under the proportionality
principle advanced in this Article, see infra text accompanying notes 214-242. Under
that approach, routine inventory searches of cars would not be permitted. Justification
for such searches would not exist unless the police could show, with the level of cer-
tainty necessary to intrude into a car, that there exists one of the supposed dangers of
not conducting an inventory search (Le., vandalism, false claims of theft, or harm to the
police; see supra note 101).
In any event, regardless of the substantive standard in effect, a court would have to
analyze the reasonableness of any particular policy before it went into effect.
.1991]
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The positions taken here would significantly change practice in
the United States. But the only "real" cost of a warrant require-
ment as defined above is the expense of maintaining a system of
neutral decisionmakers and making the police use it. 127 In most
contexts, this system of decisionmakers already exists. The burden
of training these people, and then training the police and other gov-
ernment investigative officials to rely on them,, is significantly out-
weighed by the increased protection of individual security that
would result.
III. SUBSTANCE: THE NECESSITY OF CERTAINTY THRESHOLDS
AND How TO ESTABLISH THEM
A. The Centrality of the Certainty Inquiry
The procedures just discussed cannot be fully evaluated with-
out knowing the criteria that must be considered-by government
agents in emergency situations and by the neutral decisionmaker in
all others-in assessing the propriety of a given search and seizure.
The primary assumption in this Part of the Article is that the single
most important factor in this assessment is what could be called the
"certainty requirement." This criterion refers to the level of confi-
dence we must have that a search or seizure will be successful
before we allow it to occur (the Fourth Amendment, for example,
speaks of probable cause). Almost by definition, an investigative
action can never be based on complete certainty. At the same time,
routinely allowing police to act on little or no suspicion would lead
to an unacceptable number of unnecessarily invasive, harassing, and
stigmatizing searches and seizures. Thus the central substantive
question in regulating these investigative techniques is how much
certainty the police must have before they act. As with the previous
discussion on the scope of ex ante review, the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to this issue will be examined first, followed by a proposal.
127. One likely cost of adopting the exigency principle will be police disgruntlement
at what they perceive to be another bone-headed bureaucratic obstacle. American po-
lice complain that even the relatively loose warrant requirement currently imposed in
the United States causes the loss of "good cases." NCSC STUDY, supra note 25, at 96.
But, in fact, this complaint appears to be unfounded. Id. Once the police understand
that a warrant need only be sought when there is no significant danger of losing a "good
case," their morale should not be significantly damaged by an ex ante authorization
requirement.
[Vol. 39:1
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B. The Supreme Court's Approach to Determining the Certainty
Threshold
Although claiming that probable cause is the norm, the
Supreme Court has explicitly sanctioned one other, lower level of
certainty-reasonable suspicion-and has implicitly recognized still
another, even lower certainty threshold, which could be called the
relevance standard. It has also permitted government investigations
in the absence of any suspicion. This section first describes these
various certainty levels and the situations in which they are applica-
ble, and then summarizes how the Court justifies its decisions in this
area.
1. Levels of Certainty
The only substantive certainty standard provided by the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment is "probable cause." The defini-
tion given this phrase by the Supreme Court is amorphous,
probably necessarily so. In the arrest context, it exists when the
facts and circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to warrant
a prudent person in believing that the person to be seized has com-
mitted or is committing a crime.' 28 In the search context, probable
cause refers to a belief by the same prudent person that the evidence
or persons to be seized are located at the place to be searched. 129
Despite use of the word "probable," the case law suggests that if the
concept were quantified it would not require a fifty-one percent or
more-likely-than-not level of certainty but rather something some-
what lower.130
Probable cause was the sole standard recognized by the United
States Supreme Court for justifying police investigative efforts until
1968. In that year, the Court decided Terry v. Ohio,131 in which it
indicated that some types of police action short of arrest or the most
intrusive searches may be authorized by what it called "reasonable
suspicion." This level of certainty it defined as suspicion of criminal
128. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
129. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
130. For instance, the American Law Institute's formulation uses the phrase "rea-
sonable cause" to avoid the implication that a standard of "more probable than not" is
required. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.1(5) (1975); see
also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 121, § 3.3(b). Also noteworthy in this regard
is that, when asked to quantify the degree of certainty represented by the phrase "prob-
able cause," 166 federal judges gave, as an average response, 45.78%. McCauliff, Bur-
dens of Proof. Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1982).
131. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1991)
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activity based on specific and articulable facts, rather than on a
hunch.1 32 Although the phrase sounds similar to "probable cause,"
it is meant to connote a lower certainty threshold; if quantified, it
might require only a twenty to thirty percent level of certainty. 33
The Court has also allowed some types of police action on less
than reasonable suspicion. The clearest examples of this phenome-
non are the cases, already alluded to,'3 4 in which the Court has
found that no suspicion is required because the police action is
neither a "search" or "seizure" as those words are used in the
Fourth Amendment, and thus does not implicate the Constitution.
The decisions regarding undercover activity 35 and searches of
"open fields"' 36 fall into this category, as do a number of decisions
finding that various types of brief encounters with the police are not
"seizures."1 37
132. Id. at 27 ("[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such cir-
cumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspi-
cion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience."). Although the Terry holding focused on the
validity of a "frisk" short of a full search, id. at 19 n. 16 ("we ... decide nothing today
concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than prob-
able cause"), the tone of the opinion strongly intimated that the predicate "stop" could
also be based on a level of suspicion lower than probable cause, see, e.g., id. at 22 ("[A]
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach
a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest."). Later cases confirmed this view. See, e.g., Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972).
133. A survey asking 164 federal judges to assign a percentage to "reasonable suspi-
cion" found that, on average, they equated that phrase with a 31.34% level of certainty.
McCauliff, supra note 130, at 1327-28.
The percentages associated with probable cause and reasonable suspicion in this
article are admittedly somewhat arbitrary. They are chosen primarily to contrast rea-
sonable suspicion with probable cause. The reason for doing so should become appar-
ent in later discussion. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 292-306.
134. See supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) ("[P]etitioner in all
probability entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed,
and ... even if he did, his expectation was not 'legitimate.' "); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed
the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."). See supra
notes 78-79 for other cases sanctioning suspicionless undercover activity.
136. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984) ("[W]e find no basis for con-
cluding that a police inspection of open fields accomplishes ... an infringement [of the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment]."). Analogously, the
Court has found that flyovers of private "curtilage" do not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. See cases cited supra notes 71-72.
137. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (chasing a person not
a seizure); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (accelerating and following a
person who began running upon seeing police car not a seizure); INS v. Delgado, 466
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In a second group of cases, the Court has permitted suspi-
cionless investigations despite a finding that the Fourth Amend-
ment applies. For instance, the Court has permitted the police to
stop, without showing any justification, all drivers passing through
roadblocks that are set up to detect illegal immigration or drunken
drivers, despite holding that such stops are "seizures" and therefore
governed by the Fourth Amendment.13 8 Similarly, although finding
that drug and alcohol tests are "searches" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, the Court has sanctioned programs permitting
administration of such tests to all persons who apply for or are pro-
moted into certain types of jobs at the United States Customs Ser-
vice, and to all railway personnel involved in accidents or safety
violations. 39 Inventories, although searches under the Fourth
Amendment, may also be carried out in the absence of any suspi-
cion that evidence of illegality or other damage to state interests will
be discovered. '4
U.S. 210 (1984) (brief questioning at workplace in the absence of obvious physical re-
straint not a seizure); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (showing of badge in a
public airport and request to move 15 feet to where companions were standing with
other officers not a seizure).
138. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), the Court stated at
the outset that "lilt is agreed that checkpoint stops are 'seizures' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment," id. at 556, and concluded by stating, "we hold that stops for
brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the
Fourth Amendment," id. at 566. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 110
S. Ct. 2481 (1990), it cited Martinez-Fuerte in holding that "a Fourth Amendment
seizure occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint," id. at 2485, and concluded
that stopping everyone passing through such a checkpoint to detect drunk driving "is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment," id. at 2488.
139. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17
(1989), the Court held that requiring government employees to produce blood, urine, or
breath samples for chemical testing was a search, and in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989), it reiterated that view with respect to
urine testing. Nonetheless, both decisions permitted suspicionless testing. In Skinner,
the Court concluded "that the compelling Government interests served by the FRA's
regulations would be significantly hindered if railroads were required to point to specific
facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment before testing a given em-
ployee." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633. In Von Raab, it stated: "We hold that the suspi-
cionless testing of employees who apply for promotion to positions directly involving
the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to positions that require the incumbent to carry a
firearm, is reasonable." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
140. Inventory searches of cars are constitutional so long as they are conducted pur-
suant to a lawful impoundment, and are of a routine nature "essentially like that fol-
lowed throughout the country," and not a mere "pretext concealing an investigatory
police motive." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976); see also Illinois
v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) ("At the station house, it is entirely proper for
police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession
of an arrested person who is to be jailed."); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
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The next group of cases are those that appear to require some
degree of suspicion, but at a level well below the reasonable suspi-
cion standard. For instance, although many of the Court's deci-
sions concerning "heavily regulated" industries do not require any
suspicion,'14 some seem to mandate that the government obtain a
subpoena before a nonconsensual inspection. 42 Similarly, the
Court's holding allowing governmental access to bank records may
be limited to cases where a subpoena is obtained. 143 Although issu-
ance of a subpoena must be based on some showing of a connection
between the sought after evidence and state interests, at most it re-
quires proof that the evidence sought is relevant to an ongoing in-
vestigation.'4 Whatever reasonable suspicion may be, it
contemplates more than a showing of relevance, a standard which
merely requires that the evidence have "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
U.S. 579 (1983) (authorizing random, suspicionless boarding of boats on waterways
with access to the sea).
141. In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 311 (1972), the Court upheld 18
U.S.C. § 923(g) (1968), which "authorizes official entry during business hours into 'the
premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition ... dealer ... for
the purpose of inspecting or examining ... records ... and ... firearms or ammuni-
tion." No subpoena was required. See also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)
(upholding New York statute which permits inspections of junkyard records and inven-
tories during business hours); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72
(1970) (dicta approving a federal statute providing criminal sanctions for liquor dealers
who refuse warrantless entry to government inspectors).
142. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 604-05 (1981) (upholding the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 in part because forcible entry was not permitted unless
government seeks a court injunction); cf. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408,
414 (1984) (upholding use of a subpoena because a subpoena does not contemplate non-
consensual entry and can be tested in court).
143. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) ("[Wle hold that respondent
lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment interest to challenge the validity of the subpoe-
nas [seeking respondent's bank records].").
144. Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits issuance of a
subpoena at the request of a party, subject to quashing or modification "if compliance
would be unreasonable or oppressive." One interpretation of this language is that "(1)
the subpoena may command only the production of things relevant to the investigation
being pursued; (2) specification of things to be produced must be made with reasonable
particularity; and (3) production of records covering only a reasonable period of time
may be required." United States v. Gurule, 437 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971). See generally 8 J. MOORE & R. CIPES, MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 17.07 (2d ed. 1991).
In United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 722 (1991), the Supreme Court
held that, at least when issued by a grand jury, a Rule 17(c) subpoena need not meet
even the requirements of relevancy, as that term is defined for trial purposes.
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the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.' '1 45
Finally, in many of its "special needs" cases, the Court has
been coy about the precise level of suspicion required, but intimated
that something below reasonable suspicion might be permissible. In
the probation, work, and school contexts, the Court not only elimi-
nated the warrant and probable cause requirements, but also stated
that the level of certainty need meet only the "reasonableness" stan-
dard. 146 While a citation to Terry v. Ohio usually accompanies this
statement, the Terry language quoted is not that developing the rea-
sonable suspicion standard, but rather the passage defining "reason-
ableness" as an analysis of "whether the ... action was justified at
its inception" and "was reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first place."'' 47 In its
application of this language, the Court appears to be willing to au-
thorize investigative action on less than reasonable suspicion, at
least in some cases. 148
2. Rationales for Exceptions to the Probable Cause Standard
In its decisions justifying searches and seizures based on less
than probable cause, the Court has relied on one or more of the
145. FED. R. EvID. 401 (emphasis added). The commentary to the rule makes clear
that this standard merely requires some logical relationship between the evidence and
any issue in the case.
146. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (search of probationer's resi-
dence "reasonable" because conducted pursuant to a valid regulation which permitted
searches based on "reasonable grounds"); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26
(1987) ("We hold ... that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected
privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes,
as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the stan-
dard of reasonableness under all the circumstances."); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 341 (1985) ("[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.").
147. 392 U.S. at 20, cited in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, and in Ortega, 480 U.S. at 726.
148. For instance, in justifying the search of a student's purse in TL.O. the Court
seemed to approve of a mere relevance standard. After quoting the federal evidence
rule defining relevance, the Court stated: "The relevance of T.L.O.'s possession of ciga-
rettes to the question whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial
that she smoked supplied the necessary 'nexus' between the item searched for and the
infraction under investigation." 469 U.S. at 345. In Griffin, the Court upheld a search
by a probation officer who thought the probationer "may have had" contraband in his
possession. 483 U.S. at 875. In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that this level of
certainty did not amount to reasonable suspicion. Id. at 890 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(information available to probation officer "did not supply support for any suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise, that would justify a search of petitioner's home"). The major-
ity's analysis on this point was almost nonexistent. Id. at 879-80 n.7 (discussing the
identity of the informant).
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following factors: (1) the minimal degree of infringement on privacy
or autonomy occasioned by the police action; 149 (2) the magnitude
of the harm the state seeks to address through the search or seizure;
(3) the difficulty of dealing with the problem if probable cause is
required; and (4) the adverse effect of a probable cause standard on
officials who are not police, given that standard's complexity and
the difficulty of meeting it.150 The Court's use of these factors is
haphazard, in the sense that there is no apparent relationship be-
tween a particular combination of rationales and a given level of
suspicion.
Consider, for example, the cases endorsing the "reasonable-
ness" rule, the last level of certainty described above (which may
equate with a relevance test). In adopting this standard in TL.O.,
the Court relied entirely on the second and fourth factors: while
finding school children's privacy interest in their personal effects
undiminished, 151 the Court permitted searches of those effects on
less than probable cause in recognition of both "the substantial need
of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools" 15 2 and the goal of sparing them "the necessity of schooling
themselves in the niceties of probable cause."'' 53 In contrast, in es-
149. In evaluating this factor, the Court rarely looks at the potential for harassment
or stigmatization arising from a search or seizure, despite their importance in individual
terms. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. Instead it usually looks solely at
privacy and autonomy interests. This narrow focus is presumably due, at least in part,
to the Court's insistence on defining Fourth Amendment protection in terms of prevent-
ing unreasonable incursions into "reasonable expectations of privacy" (for searches) and
"restraints on liberty" (for seizures). See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Fourth Amendment protects "reasonable expectations
of privacy"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) ("Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."). Intrusiveness should be more
broadly defined.
150. This last factor is obviously analogous to the justification for dispensing with a
warrant in special needs cases. See supra text accompanying notes 83-97.
151. 469 U.S. at 337-40. While apparently equating a child's purse with an adult's
for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court avoided addressing whether a schoolchild
"has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks or other school property pro-
vided for the storage of school supplies." Id. at 337-38, 337 n.5.
152. Id. at 341.
153. Id. at 343. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in TL.O. (in which the
special needs rubric first saw the light of day) also stressed these two factors. He spoke
both of the government's "heightened obligation to safeguard students whom it compels
to attend school," and the inefficiency of doing so if probable cause is required: "The
time required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the observations that are neces-
sary to turn reasonable grounds into probable cause is time during which the teacher,
and other students, are diverted from the essential task of education." Id. at 353
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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tablishing reasonableness as the standard for probation violation in-
vestigations, the Court seemed to place weight primarily on the
third and fourth factors (with perhaps a bow to the second factor):
it found that a probable cause requirement would reduce the "deter-
rent effect" of probation and unduly complicate the probation of-
ficer's job. 154 Finally, the basis for the Court's decision establishing
reasonableness as the governing norm for investigation of work-
place infractions was somewhat different than either of the previous
two cases. While focusing on the same variables as T L. 0. in evalu-
ating the state side of the balance (often using similar language), 155
it also noted, in contrast to that case, the diminished expectations of
privacy in the work environment. 5 6
The factors relied upon in cases which allow the police to act in
the absence of suspicion also vary somewhat. As pointed out in
Part II,157 the decisions that simply find the Fourth Amendment
not implicated by the police action normally rely purely on the first
factor (the lack of privacy or autonomy expectations). Those cases
permitting suspicionless government actions that are considered
"searches" look at other factors as well. One of the first of these
latter cases was United States v. Biswell,15 8 where the Court upheld
an inspection of a pawn shop under the Gun Control Act. The
Court first noted that close scrutiny of interstate traffic in firearms
"is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to prevent
violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traf-
154. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878-79 ("[T]he probation regime would ...
be unduly disrupted by a requirement of probable cause" because it (1) "would reduce
the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement" by assuring the probationer "that
so long as his illegal (and perhaps socially dangerous) activities were sufficiently con-
cealed as to give rise to no more than reasonable suspicion, they would go undetected
and uncorrected"; and (2) would prevent the probation agency from "proceed[ing] on
the basis of its entire experience with the probationer, and... assess[ing] probabilities in
the light of its knowledge of his life, character, and circumstances.").
155. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724-25 (1987) ("The delay in correcting the
employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's
work, and ultimately to the public interest [citing the language from Blackmun's opin-
ion in T.L.O. that is quoted supra note 153]. Additionally .... [i]t is simply unrealistic
to expect supervisors in most government agencies to learn the subtleties of the probable
cause standard.").
156. 480 U.S. at 725 ("[T]he privacy interests of government employees in their
place of work ..., while not insubstantial, are far less than those found at home or in
some other contexts.... Government offices are provided to employees for the sole
purpose of facilitating the work of an agency. The employee may avoid exposing per-
sonal belongings at work by simply leaving them at home.").
157. See supra text before note 65.
158. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 39 UCLA L. Rev. 45 1991-1992
UCLA LAW REVIEW
fic within their borders."' 59 Next, it pointed out that "to be effec-
tive and serve as a credible deterrent," inspections must be
"unannounced" and "frequent"; thus, the "prerequisite of a war-
rant [based on probable cause] could easily frustrate [such] inspec-
tion[s]."' 6 Balanced against these government interests, the Court
found little on the individual side of the calculus: "[W]hen a dealer
chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to ac-
cept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his busi-
ness records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective
inspection."' 6'
Like Biswell, the Court's decisions allowing suspicionless drug
and alcohol testing of railway and customs employees relied on the
first three factors. In its decision involving railway employees, for
instance, the Court weighed its assumption that such employees
should expect measurements of their job fitness 162 against the signif-
icant harm to the public that can be caused by their substance abuse
which, it asserted, can be adequately detected only through such
testing. 6 1 On the other hand, the Court needed only the first two
factors to justify suspicionless sobriety checkpoints. The Court sim-
ply contrasted the "slight" intrusion a brief roadblock detention oc-
casions164 with the "magnitude of the drunken driving problem.' 65
C. Analysis of the Rationales
Reframing somewhat more precisely the principal conclusions
of the previous section, the United States Supreme Court has looked
159. Id. at 315.
160. Id. at 316. While the Court refers only to the warrant requirement as a "frus-
trating factor," it was using this requirement as a proxy for probable cause. See supra
note 77.
161. Id.
162. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) ("[T]he
expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their partici-
pation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in
substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees.").
163. Id. at 628-29 ("[T]he Government interest in testing without a showing of indi-
vidualized suspicion is compelling. Employees subject to the tests discharge duties
fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can
have disastrous consequences.... While no procedure can identify all impaired employ-
ees with ease and perfect accuracy, the FRA regulations supply an effective means of
deterring employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks from using controlled substances
or alcohol in the first place.").
164. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2486 (1990).
165. Id. at 2485-86. The Court also discussed the "effectiveness" of the sobriety
checkpoint as a means of achieving the government's goal, id. at 2487-88, but in an
offhand way that suggested this issue was not particularly important. See infra note
178.
[Vol. 39:1
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at four factors in justifying searches and seizures on less than prob-
able cause: (1) the intrusiveness of the search or seizure (the "intru-
siveness" factor); (2) the magnitude of the harm caused by activity
that is being investigated (the "harm severity" factor); 166 (3) the
difficulty of detecting, and therefore deterring, the activity in the
absence of the investigative method in question (the "difficulty of
detection" factor); and (4) the extent to which a probable cause
requirement distracts government officials from carrying out their
noninvestigative functions (the "official distraction" factor).
Although other justifications for reducing the certainty level could
be formulated, probably all of them derive from one of these four. 1 67
This section demonstrates that, of these four factors, the level
of intrusion associated with the police action is the most important
gauge of how much certainty the police must have before they con-
duct a search or seizure. Further, this section argues that the sec-
ond and third factors, to the extent they should be considered at all,
should usually be relevant only to the extent they help analyze the
level of intrusiveness associated with a search or seizure, or the level
of certainty the police possess. Finally, this section contends that
the fourth factor is specious.
1. Intrusiveness: The Core Factor
Let us begin with an observation involving the use of torture-
an investigative technique usually identified with interrogation,
although it could also be called a "search." In many civilized socie-
166. The seriousness of the crime problem facing the government can be viewed at
both a systemic and individual case level. The cases described above usually refer to
"generic seriousness"-e.g., the "substance abuse problem" (as in T.L.O., Von Raab, or
Sitz) or the "illegal immigration problem" (as in Martinez-Fuerte). Several commenta-
tors have also been willing to consider the severity of a particular criminal act as a
factor in determining the level of certainty necessary. See infra note 172. For purposes
of Part III, these two senses of crime seriousness are collapsed.
167. For example, Professor Bradley proposes a number of variables which might be
considered in gauging the reasonableness of a search or seizure. See Bradley, supra note
7. In addition to those listed in the text, he mentions the "dangerousness of the defend-
ant," id. at 1481, "the nature of the property to be seized (e.g., a diary versus the con-
tents of a garbage can), the nature of the entry (day or night; forcible or peaceful), [and]
the scope of the search," id. at 1491. Although, at first glance, all of these factors may
seem different from those in the text, they are not. As discussed below, see infra text
accompanying notes 171-178, dangerousness is subsumed by the harm severity rubric.
The other factors listed by Bradley are all related to the intrusiveness question. Clearly,
the nature of the property searched and the scope of the search are prime determinants
in the degree of privacy invasion occasioned by a police action. The nature of entry is
also relevant to intrusiveness. Nighttime entries are more invasive and more stigma-
tizing than those that take place in the day, and forcible entries are clearly more intru-
sive than consensual ones (which, if truly consensual, are not intrusive at all).
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ties, police use of torture is banned, regardless of the crime being
investigated or the difficulty of it otherwise being detected. 168 In
other words, no state interest can trump the individual interest in
avoiding the extremely invasive procedures associated with this in-
vestigative technique. From this fact, one might conclude that in-
trusiveness is the key variable in regulating the police.
Such a conclusion is warranted, but should not be so easily
reached. Despite the aversion to torture, situations can be imagined
in which its use might be contemplated in civilized countries. For
instance, suppose government agents believe that terrorists have
planted a nuclear bomb in New York City, and that it will go off in
twenty-four hours if it is not located and defused. One of the sus-
pected terrorists is captured and admits to planting the bomb, but
he refuses to reveal its location. Given the magnitude of the harm
that would otherwise occur, and the impossibility of finding out
where the bomb is in any other way, we might be sorely tempted to
authorize torture in this situation, despite its barbaric nature.
Even here, however, the severity of harm and difficulty of de-
tection rationales do not outweigh the intrusiveness factor. For
even on these facts, we would not permit the torture unless the state
can show some degree of certainty that the person tortured pos-
sesses the desired information. For instance, if instead of being a
168. According to Amnesty International, as of mid-1983, 34 countries had unilat-
erally adopted a United Nations declaration outlawing torture. AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES 262 (1984). The Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N.
Doc. A/10034 (1975) defines torture as "any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public
official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person informa-
tion or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating him or other persons." Pain and suffering "arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions, to the extent consistent with the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners" are not considered torture.
Id. The declaration bans torture, so defined, under all circumstances, including "state
of war or a threat of war, internal political stability, or any other public emergency."
Id.
The United States has not signed the declaration, for reasons having mostly to do
with an aversion to ratifying international treaties proposed by international groups.
See generally Nagan, The Politics of Ratification: The Potential for United States Adop-
tion and Enforcement of the Convention Against Torture, the Covenants on Civil and
Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
311 (1990). Nonetheless, the President (with the advice and consent of the Senate) is
expected to sign both the "Torture Convention" (a modification of the above declara-
tion) and congressionally passed statutes implementing the Convention by 1992. Con-
versation with Winston Nagan, Chair of Amnesty International, United States chapter,
Jan. 28, 1991.
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terrorist who admits to knowing the location of the bomb, the per-
son the police propose to inquisition is someone they randomly
picked up off the street, we presumably would not allow the investi-
gation to proceed. People might differ on the level of suspicion re-
quired before the torture could take place. But I would guess that
virtually everyone would require the government to demonstrate
some level of suspicion (perhaps akin to what the Court calls "prob-
able cause"). This requirement would exist because the technique is
so intrusive.
Now let's look at a scenario that is closer to a traditional
"search." Assume scientists develop a device that can "look" and
"hear" through walls, as well as read people's minds. As with the
use of torture, the intrusion occasioned by this investigative tool is
so significant that, in civilized societies, it might be banned outright.
But if we did decide to allow its use because, for instance, there is
no other way of detecting a very serious crime, we would do so, I
submit, only if the police possessed a high level of suspicion that it
would produce results. 169 Again, the intrusiveness of the search
would dictate that some level of suspicion be shown, regardless of
the countervailing state interests.
As these thought experiments suggest, the primary substantive
variable in determining the certainty threshold for searches and
seizures should be their level of intrusiveness. The more intrusive an
investigative technique is, the more assured we want to be that it
will result in the discovery of probative evidence before we allow the
169. An investigative technique that may be almost as intrusive as the hypothesized
mind-reading device is video surveillance. In United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985), the Seventh Circuit permitted the FBI to
use this technique in investigating alleged terrorists who were thought to be manufac-
turing bombs in designated "safe houses." However, in doing so, the court was ex-
tremely cautious. First, it emphasized that the safe houses were "dedicated exclusively
to illicit business" and thus were associated with a lessened privacy expectation. Id. at
883. Secondly, in addition to requiring the government to show probable cause that a
crime was being committed in the safe houses, id. at 884, it required proof that no other,
less intrusive means of pursuing the investigation was available, id. at 883; see also id. at
877 (noting that even electronic surveillance would be unsuccessful, since, according to
the FBI, the terrorists would play the radio loudly and speak in code). The court also
stated that "in declining to hold television surveillance unconstitutional per se we do
not suggest that the Constitution must be interpreted to allow it to be used as generally
as less intrusive techniques can be used." Id. at 882-83.
Unfortunately, the court, taking its lead from Title III's regulation of electronic
surveillance, see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510 (West 1970 & Supp. 1991), did not require the
government to show more than "probable cause" (although, on the facts of the case, a
very high level of suspicion seems to have existed, Torres, 751 F.2d at 877). See also
United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986).
1991]
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police to undertake it. On the other hand, as the level of intrusion
decreases-as we become less concerned about the device's poten-
tial for infringement of privacy and autonomy, harassment, or false
stigmatization-we may not require as high a level of certainty. Put
another way, because the cost to individual interests of a mistake by
the police is greatest when the intrusion is greatest, and diminishes
as the intrusion lessens, the tolerance for such mistakes should vary
inversely with the level of intrusion. Note further that the cost to
the state of a police mistake is also greatest when the intrusion is
greatest, because the public is more likely to perceive unnecessary
police intrusions as illegitimate when they are significant.
While the thought experiments may show that the level of in-
trusion is the single most important factor in determining the level
of certainty, they do not show that factors such as harm severity,
difficulty of detection, or official distraction are irrelevant. In con-
sidering the justifiability of an investigative technique we may be
more willing to lower the certainty threshold as the severity of the
harm, or the difficulty or inefficiency associated with detecting it,
increase. The damage to the state of losing evidence or a suspect,
always significant, is magnified when the crime or the "crime prob-
lem" is a serious one. Similarly, limiting use of a given investigative
technique is most costly when detecting and deterring an illegal ac-
tivity is otherwise difficult. Finally, as the Court points out, where
lay investigators are involved, the harm to government interests
other than crime solving increases with the level of certainty that
must be demonstrated before a search or seizure may occur. Thus,
one might conclude that, although the harm severity, difficulty of
detection, and official distraction factors are secondary considera-
tions, the certainty threshold. should be relatively lower when they
are present than when they are not. This is probably the Supreme
Court's position, to the extent any consistent stance can be
discerned. 170
While plausible, this reasoning suffers from several flaws; at the
same time, it fails to recognize that some of the concerns that un-
derlie what the Court has labeled as "state" interests can be relevant
170. Occasionally, however, one gets the impression that the Court believes the
harm severity and difficulty of detection factors should be the primary considerations.
See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75
(1989) ("Where, as here, the possible harm against which the Government seeks to
guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification
for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government's goal.").
[Vol. 39:1
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in other ways. These conclusions are fleshed out below with respect
to each of the three state interests identified by the Court.
2. The Harm Severity Factor
The harm severity concept is usefully divided into two types.
The first looks at the harm already caused by the offense which is
the subject of the investigation ("past harm"). The second concerns
the harm that will or might occur if investigation of the offense is
not successful ("future harm"). Past harm, no matter how severe,
should never provide the basis for reducing the certainty threshold.
Future harm, if it can be identified in concrete terms, might permit
a reduction in the certainty level, but only in rare instances when
additional considerations are present as well.
In its decisions which rely on the harm severity rationale as a
justification for permitting searches and seizures on less than prob-
able cause, the Supreme Court seems to focus on future harm. 171
Thus, analysis of its decisions is deferred for the moment. Others,
however, have forthrightly proposed that the certainty threshold
vary according to the gravity of the crime already committed. 172
They would, for example, permit police more leeway in murder in-
vestigations than in misdemeanor cases; the level of certainty neces-
sary to carry out a search of a house or a frisk of a person would be
lower in the first instance than in the second.
Even assuming that the severity of past harm can be measured
in a meaningful way, 173 the seriousness of the crime to be solved, by
171. For instance, in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court focused on the effects of illegal
immigration. 428 U.S. at 551 ("Many more aliens than can be accommodated under
the quota want to live and work in the United States."). In Sitz the Court emphasized
the deaths caused by drunk driving. 110 S. Ct. at 2487-88 ("Media reports of alcohol-
related death and mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion."). In Skinner and Von
Raab, it stressed the harm caused by railway employees and customs agents who abuse
substances. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628 ("Employees subject to the [drug and
alcohol] tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a
momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences."). In each case, the
harm most relevant to the Court was not the offense in question, but the consequences
to society if the offense was not detected or deterred.
172. United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 452 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1095 (1969); Bradley, supra note 7, at 1486-87; cf. Kaplan,
The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046 (1974) (proposing
limiting the exclusionary rule to nonserious cases).
173. This assumption is easily challenged. At what point does an offense become so
serious that police no longer need probable cause to search a house? Should the divid-
ing line be between felonies and misdemeanors, between offenses that are considered
"harmful" and those that are not, or should it vary from case to case, depending more
on the nature of the criminal act rather than the technical offense committed? And how
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itself, should be irrelevant to the degree of certainty police must
have before they act. To see why this is so, compare the severity of
harm factor to the other reasons the state might advance for reduc-
ing investigative restrictions. The difficulty of detection and official
distraction rationales, although deficient for reasons to be developed
below, at least provide a logical explanation for lowering the level of
certainty: when the state can show the presence of these factors, it
has demonstrated that the usual certainty requirement, derived
from the intrusiveness associated with the proposed police action,
will compromise its investigation (by making it very difficult or inef-
ficient). The same cannot be said about the harm severity rationale.
Indeed, investigations of more serious crimes, such as murder, are
often less difficult than investigations of lesser crimes, such as bur-
glary or drug offenses. In effect, easing the state's investigative bur-
den in cases of serious crime would not be the result of a
"balancing" process between state and individual interests, but
rather would represent a unilateral surrender of privacy and auton-
omy protection merely because the state is particularly eager to gar-
ner evidence in these cases.
In analogous contexts, the nature of the crime committed does
not lessen the state's obligations to its citizens. For example, the
state's admittedly great interest in solving a murder does not permit
a relaxation of the right to remain silent, the right to jury trial, the
right to counsel, or-most analogous to the subject of the present
discussion-the burden of proof; if anything, given the greater con-
sequences that flow from a murder conviction, we are more protec-
tive of these rights in homicide cases. 174 This reality supports a
common-sense intuition: that differences in individual protections
against government intervention should usually flow from differ-
ences in the consequences of the intervention, not from the nature
of the crime.
does one apply whatever standard is appropriate in cases where it is not known what
crime has been committed?
174. The rights to remain silent and force the state to prove its case beyond a reason-
able doubt do not vary with the crime, and even apply in the "quasi-criminal" juvenile
delinquency context. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (reasonable doubt standard);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (right to remain silent). The rights to jury trial and
counsel do vary with the crime, but inversely. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972) (right to counsel applies to all crimes, including misdemeanors, except where no
jail term is actually imposed); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (right to jury
trial attaches for all crimes except those for which no more than six months imprison-
ment is authorized).
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In the search and seizure context, the consequence of a govern-
ment action is almost always independent of the illegality involved.
The intrusion associated with a search of one's house is usually the
same whether police are looking for a murder weapon or evidence
of forgery, just as the intrusion associated with a frisk is normally
identical whether the police are looking for a gun used during a
robbery or for a marijuana cigarette. 175 Thus, the certainty level
necessary to authorize a search or seizure should not vary with past
harm when all else is equal.1 76
A more sensible variation of the harm severity rationale would
focus on future "danger" to the public (whether posed by a mur-
derer or a misdemeanant) rather than on the harm already caused.
If the danger is significant, then the government's interests expand
to include protection of the community as well as solving the crime.
But this version of the harm severity factor should rarely be appli-
cable, for at least two reasons.
First, it must be narrowly defined to encompass only those sit-
uations where the danger is palpable. Given the ease with which
threats to society can be imagined, the future-danger version of the
harm severity rationale would emasculate the certainty requirement
if the government were not required to articulate reasons for believ-
ing a specific menace exists. The fact that a person who has com-
mitted a murder is on the loose does not meet this test; the danger,
if it exists at all, is too amorphous and thus does not justify relaxing
investigative strictures. 177 Similarly, in its cases invoking the harm
175. But see infra text accompanying notes 198-204.
176. In the only case in which it squarely confronted the issue, the Supreme Court
appeared to agree that the crime magnitude factor, by itself, is not a convincing reason
for allowing the police more discretion. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394
(1978), the Court overturned a decision of the'Arizona Supreme Court adopting a
"murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement, in part because it allowed
searches of homes whenever the police thought their search was a "reasonable . . .
search." Id. at 395. The court seemed intent upon preserving not only the warrant
requirement but also the attendant probable cause rule in this context.
177. In contrast, if a serial killer is at large, there may be a real possibility of harm
both in terms of further deaths and in terms of the debilitating effect this possibility can
have on normal community relations. An example of such a scenario occurred in
Gainesville, Florida: during one week of August, 1990, four young women and one
young man were brutally murdered, apparently by the same person. For several weeks
after these murders, the people of Gainesville, especially the women, were extremely
anxious and curtailed many of their usual activities. 'Life As Usual' Makes Slow Re-
turn, Gainesville Sun, Sept. 2, 1990, at IA; Killings Numb City's Sense of Well-Being,
Gainesville Sun, Aug. 29, 1990, at 8A. Sales of guns skyrocketed, while the business of
many other concerns dwindled. Businesses Affected by Scare, Gainesville Sun, Aug. 30,
1990, at IA; Slayings Convince Many to Buy Guns, Gainesville Sun, Aug. 29, 1990, at
IA.
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severity rationale, the Supreme Court's typically vague descriptions
of the future harms to be averted-whether it be from drunk driv-
ing, an inability to maintain school discipline, or substance abuse by
employees in sensitive situations-provide inadequate support for
its holdings. While these "categories" of harms may be more real
than the harm threatened by a single murderer, their impact varies
from place to place and time to time. Thus, to benefit from a re-
duced certainty threshold, the government should have to show
that its proposed action is responsive to a specified danger at a par-
ticular time and place. But the Court has been content with a
showing that the proposed action is rationally calculated to avert an
abstract harm; no proof of harm in the case in question is re-
quired. 178 The result has been broad rules that permit reduction of
the certainty threshold any time the government can say it has a
"problem" of the type noted by the Court, however ambiguously
defined that problem may be, and even if the problem is nonexistent
among the specific population, or in the specific area, to be investi-
gated. TL.O., for instance, applies the reasonableness/relevance
standard to all public primary and secondary schools, even those
which do not have discipline problems.
The second reason the future-harm version of the harm sever-
ity rationale should be of limited applicability is that, even if a spe-
cific, significant danger can be identified, it should lead to relaxation
of the substantive standard only if the government can show that
development of the usual, intrusion-based confidence level would
compromise its efforts to prevent the perceived danger. Consider
again the nuclear bomb hypothetical: the excuse for permitting tor-
ture in that scenario is only in part the threat posed; at least as
important is the fact that no alternative exists for discovering the
178. See descriptions of various Court decisions, supra note 171 and infra note 330.
In some cases, the Court has referred to statistical information which helps specify the
problem the government wished to tackle. For instance, in both Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 554, and Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2488, the Court referred to data demonstrating that
the roadblocks found reasonable in those cases actually detected the dangerous activity
the government asserted existed (illegal immigration and drunk driving, respectively).
But even in these cases, the tone of the Court's opinion suggested that, in future cases,
the government's burden in terms of proving how its actions will avert a given danger
will be minimal. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court only required a showing of effectiveness
with respect to one of the two roadblocks considered, and relegated its discussion of
that roadblock's effectiveness to a footnote. 428 U.S. at 562 n.15. In Sitz, the Court
was apparently satisfied so long as there was not "a complete absence of empirical data"
suggesting that the sobriety checkpoint in that case was effective at detecting drunk
drivers. 110 S. Ct. at 2487. See infra text accompanying notes 281-306 for further
discussion of these cases.
[Vol. 39:1
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whereabouts of the bomb. If a less severe alternative were available,
and it could be effectively implemented in time, we would not per-
mit torture regardless of the magnitude of the threat to society. In
short, harm severity, to the extent it is a relevant state interest at all,
is intimately linked to the difficulty of detection factor.
3. The Difficulty of Detection Factor
What the Court is usually referring to when it talks about "se-
rious" law enforcement problems is just such a combination of the
harm severity factor and the difficulty of detection/deterrence fac-
tor.1 7 9 The latter factor adds greater weight to the state side of the
balance because, as explained above, it provides a relevant reason
for differing certainty thresholds even for intrusions which have the
same impact on the individual. Thus, for example, while the level
of certainty necessary for search of a house should not vary accord-
ing to the nature of the crime, it might be lowered if there were no
other way to meet the government's legitimate objectives.
Unless reliance on the difficulty of detection rationale is strictly
limited, however, it too, like the harm severity factor, would soon
render meaningless any attempt at establishing certainty thresholds.
In effect, this rationale permits the government to evade any cer-
tainty requirement which it cannot meet. As a practical matter, it
thus would place very few restrictions on law enforcement officials
who, aided by their control over the relevant information, can be
expected routinely to produce ingenious explanations as to why a
particular degree of justification is impossible to achieve.180 For
this reason, operation of the difficulty of detection rationale should
be permitted only when strong justification exists for reducing the
certainty threshold below its typical intrusion-basedt level.
179. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552, 557 (1976) ("In-
terdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico poses formidable law enforcement
problems.... [An individualized suspicion requirement at roadblocks] would largely
eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations, even
though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly."); see also supra note 163
(quoting Skinner). For brief descriptions of the Court's other cases, see supra text ac-
companying notes 158-165.
180. In this regard, it is interesting to consider how the difficulty of detection ration-
ale would interact with the Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984), which held that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is not required when
the police can show they would have discovered the evidence through lawful means. In
any case where the police do not have the requisite certainty and actanyway, they could
choose to argue either that they could not develop that certainty level (thus triggering
difficulty of detection analysis) or that they would have eventually (thus admitting to an
illegality but triggering the Williams rule).
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Here again, the distinction between past and future events is
important: such justification will never exist when the harm being
investigated has already occurred. In such cases, regardless of how
serious the harm was or how difficult the case is to "crack," the
government has the luxury of time. With enough effort, a crime can
eventually be solved, if it is solvable at all, without resort to reduc-
ing certainty levels. Thus, the typical search and seizure, aimed at
procuring evidence with respect to a past act, should not trigger
difficulty of detection analysis.
Conversely, when the search and seizure is aimed at obtaining
proof of future harm, time may not be on the government's side, as
the nuclear bomb scenario illustrates. When imminent damage to
society is anticipated, the state may legitimately point to a need for
loosening investigative restrictions. Again, however, the justifica-
tion for such a step should not be speculative. In addition to show-
ing that a specific, significant danger exists, the state should have to
demonstrate that the danger cannot be averted unless the usual level
of certainty is dispensed with.
While, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court's cases seldom re-
quire precise proof of future harm, they could be said to involve
situations which meet the second part of this test. At least, a plausi-
ble argument can be made that the types of offenses at issue in these
cases-illegal immigration, drunk driving, use of drugs and alcohol,
illegal firearms trafficking-are intrinsically difficult to detect (and
the associated danger thus characteristically difficult to avert) if
probable cause (or even reasonable suspicion) were required. These
offenses are not likely to leave evidence of their commission-such
as a victim, or missing goods-that is easily accessible to investigat-
ing officers. Thus, the argument might go, they are different from
other offenses, such as homicide or burglary, which by nature can
be solved despite a probable cause requirement (and, consequently,
deterred).
Yet, even accepting this distinction, the Court's analysis in
these cases is ultimately flawed, in two ways. Most significantly, it
fails to recognize a central paradox that arises when the difficulty of
detection factor is applied to "categories" of harms as the Court has
done: to the extent the government provides the proof that a spe-
cific, significant societal danger exists (which, as argued above, it
must do if it wants to rely on the difficulty of detection rationale), it
weakens its claim that the danger is difficult to detect.
[Vol. 39:1
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Consider in more detail the Court's opinion in Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives' Association. 181 There the Court relied on the
harm severity/difficulty of detection tandem in authorizing suspi-
cionless drug and alcohol testing of railway employees involved in
accidents or safety violations. The Court first noted the significant
public interest in ensuring that railway workers are not impaired by
psychoactive substances, in view of the harm such employees can
cause.' 82 It then concluded that, given the difficulty of detecting
such impairment from outward appearance,18 3 requiring "individu-
alized suspicion" before testing would prevent significant deterrence
of drug and alcohol use' 84 and would "seriously impede" attempts
to obtain information about the cause of railway accidents,8 " thus
frustrating the government's efforts to prevent this harm.
The fault in the Court's reasoning is its insistence that suspi-
cion must be "individualized." It may be that discerning impair-
ment from an individual's outward appearance alone is very
difficult. But, as developed further in Part V,'8 6 levels of certainty
can be actuarially based as well as founded on observations specific
to a particular individual. Once this concept of "generalized" suspi-
cion is recognized, the complaint that a certainty requirement will
prevent detection becomes much less plausible in the types of cases
in which the Court gives it credence. In Skinner, for instance, the
government's efforts to prove statistically that substance abuse is a
significant cause of railway accidents suggested (however unwit-
tingly) that there might easily be justification for initiating some
181. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
182. Id. at 628 ("[E]mployees who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations
can cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to super-
visors or others.").
183. The Court made this finding both generally, id. at 628 ("An impaired employee
... will seldom display any outward 'signs detectable by the lay person or, in many
cases, even the physician.' " (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 31,526 (1985)), and after a railroad
accident, id. at 631 ("Obtaining evidence that might give rise to the suspicion that a
particular employee is impaired, a difficult endeavor in the best of circumstances, is
most impracticable in the aftermath of a serious accident.").
184. Id. at 630 ("By ensuring that employees in safety-sensitive positions know they
will be tested upon the occurrence of a triggering event, the timing of which no em-
ployee can predict with certainty, the regulations significantly increase the deterrent
effect of the administrative penalties associated with the prohibited conduct, concomi-
tantly increasing the likelihood that employees will forgo using drugs or alcohol while
subject to being called for duty." (citation omitted)).
185. Id. at 631 ("A requirement of particularized suspicion of drug or alcohol use
would seriously impede an employer's ability to obtain ... information [about the cause
of accidents], despite its obvious importance.").
186. See infra text accompanying notes 263-274.
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sort of test program in postaccident situations.18 7 On the other
hand, if a significant level of harm cannot be demonstrated, the
chances are good that the government has no business trying to de-
tect the harm in the first place.' 88 Given this direct relationship
between the magnitude of harm sought to be investigated and the
suspicion requirement (and the inverse relationship between these
two factors and difficulty of detection), reliance on the harm sever-
ity/difficulty of detection tandem will often prove logically
untenable.
Even if the government can prove the (often contradictory)
claims that harm severity and difficulty of detection coexist and
thus that the certainty threshold should be reduced or eliminated,
its authority should be further limited by a requirement that its in-
vestigation proceed in the least intrusive manner feasible. The re-
spondent in Skinner made such an argument, asserting that other,
less invasive methods of detecting drug and alcohol use are avail-
able. 18 9 But the Court, demonstrating the second flaw in its diffi-
culty of detection analysis, rejected the need to consider these
options, even assuming that they existed. Citing previous opinions
187. For instance, a government study showed that from 1972 to 1983 "'the na-
tion's railroads experienced at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol or
drug use as a probable cause or contributing factor.'" 489 U.S. at 607 (quoting 48 Fed.
Reg. 30,726 (1983)). See infra note 342 for further data, and text accompanying notes
341-346 for the impact of these data on the analysis of whether the test program in
Skinner was permissible. For other examples of how the concept of generalized suspi-
cion plays out in practice, see the discussion in Part V analyzing the propriety of road-
blocks to detect illegal immigrants and drunken drivers, infra text accompanying notes
281-306.
188. See discussion of Von Raab, infra text accompanying notes 334-340 (arguing
that drug testing of customs agents is impermissible because government failed to show
any drug use by agents, much less harm deriving from it).
189. In particular, the respondent argued for "reliance on private prescriptions al-
ready in force, and training supervisory personnel 'to effectively detect employees who
are impaired .... .' 489 U.S. at 629 n.9.
An even better alternative might have been a simple functional test, aimed directly
at assessing the degree of impairment induced by drugs or alcohol. This type of test can
often less intrusively, more accurately, and probably less expensively determine the ef-
fect of psychoactive substances (as well as the impact of other factors). For instance,
drivers for the Old Town Trolley Company in San Francisco must daily undergo and
pass a physical test before they can work. According to the head of the test program,
the test is more accurate at gauging impairment than drug and alcohol testing, and is
short enough in duration to permit its administration every day. Interview on ABC
News, June 5, 1990; cf. Comment, Just Say Maybe: A Review of Drug Testing Methods
and Constitutional Challenges to Public Sector Compulsory Urinalysis in the Third Cir-
cuit, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 679, 710 (1988) ("Some types of [drug] tests can approxi-
mate the time of ingestion, but none can supply proof of impairment.").
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which questioned the necessity of canvassing all options, 190 it
pointed out that one "'can almost always imagine some alternative
means by which the objectives of the [Government] might have
been accomplished.' "191
The Court's implication that least drastic means analysis is not
necessary in search and seizure cases is only half right. When the
government has the requisite degree of certainty for a particular
search or seizure (based on its level of intrusiveness), it may not
need to show that no lesser intrusion will achieve its aims. But
when, as in Skinner, the government relies on the difficulty of detec-
tion rationale, it is in effect arguing that it cannot develop the suspi-
cion that would ordinarily be required to justify the proposed
action. If accepted, this argument should at most permit the gov-
ernment to act on little or no suspicion, not grant it the power to
use any technique, regardless of its nature, to detect or eradicate the
harm. Assuming, as argued above, that intrusiveness is the core
variable in regulating searches and seizures, choosing the technique
that may be used in this situation requires least drastic means analy-
sis. In other words, even if one accepts the Court's conclusion in
Skinner that the government must be allowed to proceed without
any showing of suspicion, generalized or otherwise, one must make
an assessment of whether the method it proposes (here, blood tests,
urinalysis, or breathalyzer tests) is the least intrusive means of effec-
tively ascertaining impairment due to substance abuse. To suggest,
as the Court does, that such an assessment is unnecessary not only
cuts against the notion that intrusiveness is the touchstone of search
and seizure analysis, but also creates a disincentive to develop and
disseminate techniques that are less offensive to privacy and auton-
omy interests.192
One possible way of evading both the harm severity/difficulty
of detection paradox and the restrictions posed by least drastic
190. E.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) ("The reasonableness of any
particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence
of alternative 'less intrusive' means."); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
556 n.12 (1976) ("The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments
could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure
powers.").
191. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
686-87 (1985)).
192. For instance, functional testing of employee impairment, see supra note 189, is
much less widely used than drug and alcohol testing. This is probably due in part to the
high profile and stamp of approval given the latter by court decisions. See generally
Gampel & Zeese, Are Employers Overdosing on Drug Testing?, 55 Bus. & Soc'Y REV.
34 (1985).
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means analysis might be to vary the argument somewhat (following
the suggestion in the Court's cases) by focusing on the difficulty of
deterring the targeted harmful activity' if some showing of suspicion
is required. On this account, one might say that, whether or not
serious harm is currently observable or predictable, we need to pre-
vent the possibility of its occurrence in the future. And, because we
are interested in deterrence, not just apprehension, more intrusive
actions may be required even if they are no more effective at de-
tecting the harm. Using sobriety checkpoints, rather than drug test-
ing, as an example, this argument might be applied as follows: even
if suspicionless roadblocks are not the best or least intrusive way of
detecting drunken driving (given police ability to discern its out-
ward symptoms), 193 they are the best way of inhibiting that activity
or making sure it never becomes a problem; the specter of a road-
block is much more likely to deter people from drinking and driving
than is the fear of being spotted weaving down the road.
Assuming, against evidence to the contrary, 194 that this asser-
tion is true, the argument suffers from a flaw often found in utilita-
rian contentions: it offers no principled way of limiting the proposed
justification. 195 Surely an even better method of deterring drunken
193. See, e.g., Justice Stevens's dissent in Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2491 (1990) (noting that during Maryland's several-year check-
point program-involving 125 checkpoints-143 arrests were made, while in Michigan,
in 1984 alone, police made 71,000 arrests based solely on police observation).
194. In his dissent in Sitz, Justice Stevens contended that sobriety checkpoints were
unnecessary, in part because the number of fatal crashes involving drunken driving in
the United States had decreased significantly between 1982 and 1988. Id. at 2491 n.2
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In response, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued for the majority
that "[i]t was during this same period that police departments experimented with sobri-
ety checkpoint systems." Id. at 2486 n.**. The impossibility of deciding which Justice
is right about the deterrent effect of these roadblocks points out still another problem
with the difficulty of detection/deterrence rationale.
Although checkpoints undoubtedly inhibit drunk driving to some extent, probably
the most important deterrents during the six-year period noted by Justice Stevens were
the nationwide media blitz against drunken driving, together with stiffened penalties for
violators of driving-while-intoxicated statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)
(1990) (providing for fines of between $250 and $500 and imprisonment of up to 6
months for first conviction of driving under the influence, a $500 to $1000 fine and up to
9 months for a second conviction, and up to 5 years for a fourth conviction); id.
§ 316.193(5) (providing foi mandatory probationary periods in addition to other penal-
ties, including public service requirements).
195. Cf. F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 86 (1964)
("[D]eterrent theory offers no clear standards by which either the kind or amount of
punishment can be determined .... In times of stress and insecurity the effort to deter
may result in draconian measures with consequent injury to individual and social inter-
ests.") (summarizing the view of Raffaele Garofalo, a criminologist). See generally
Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime
[Vol. 39:1
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driving is to announce that anyone found to be intoxicated at a
checkpoint will be beaten. Such a proposal would not fly because it
is disproportionately offensive to individual interests. Just as retrib-
utive notions prevent the government from punishing all crimes
with the death penalty, despite its supposed deterrent effect, the de-
terrence rationale in the search and seizure context must be subject
to a limiting principle, which can only be the level of intrusiveness
associated with the proposed deterrent measure.
Unless the limitations associated with the difficulty of detec-
tion/deterrence rationale are recognized, significant damage could
result to individual interests, and possibly to state interests as
well. 196 In the Court's hands, this rationale has provided an insidi-
ous way of disguising what at bottom is merely a claim that restric-
tions on investigation (to wit, suspicion and least drastic means
requirements) are burdensome. Instead of requiring the govern-
ment to prove that it has a serious, precisely defined problem on its
hands, and that the proposed solution is the least intrusive way of
attacking it, the Court has been satisfied with vague assertions that
the proposed method can "effectively" deal with or deter a "signifi-
cant" problem and has ignored the possibility of alternative investi-
gative methods.1 97 The danger inherent in the Court's approach
Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315 (1984). Even proponents of deterrent theory admit that it is
not self-limiting. See, e.g., Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 957 (1966).
196. The lower the level of certainty required for a search and seizure, the more
state resources will be wasted in conducting it, since more mistakes will occur. Presum-
ably, the government in some way or another usually considers this cost of a lower
certainty standard and, weighing it against the increased ability to gather evidence and
apprehend suspects that such a standard brings, decides to pay the price. If the govern-
ment is not willing to pay the price, it can always impose a higher level of certainty on
itself. Something like this probably explains why many prosecutor offices dismiss cases
that they think are winnable but weak. See Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal
Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246,
310-13 (1980). However, as is true with sobriety checkpoints after the Court's decision
in Sitz, when the police may act with little or no suspicion and are not required to seek
even minimal ex ante review, unthinking waste of resources is more likely; the police
may have little incentive to avoid repeated possibly futile efforts, at individual and state
expense.
197. For other detailed examples of this tendency, see discussion of the Court's mis-
use of the difficulty of detection factor in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, infra text
accompanying notes 285-287, and in New York v. Burger, infra note 330. Consider
also, in this regard, the Supreme Court's opinion in Michigan Department of State Po-
lice v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), the case which upheld suspicionless sobriety check-
points. There, the Court implicitly acknowledged the lower court's finding that less
intrusive alternatives to such checkpoints exist (e.g., watching for weaving vehicles, see
supra note 193). Nonetheless, it stated that "for purposes of [the] Fourth Amendment
• .., the choice among such reasonable aiternatives remains with the governmental
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should be apparent: to paraphrase the Court's dismissal of the less
drastic means argument made in Skinner, one can almost always
imagine an easier way for the government to achieve its objective.
To summarize, the difficulty of detection/deterrence factor
should generally not be allowed to lower the certainty threshold for
several reasons: alternatives are usually available (both in terms of
developing the requisite suspicion and in terms of other, unintrusive
options); the deterrence rationale is insufficiently bounded; and the
administrative inconvenience arguments which the factor occasions
are a slippery slope. When combined with a showing that some
specific, significant harm might otherwise result, the difficulty of de-
tection/deterrence factor may be dispositive in rare cases, more
readily hypothesized than realized, such as the torture thought ex-
periment. But unless the government's efforts to deal effectively
with an anticipated, specified harm would be thwarted, the level of
certainty necessary to justify a particular search and seizure should
be determined solely with reference to the intrusiveness of the pro-
posed action.
The harm severity/difficulty of detection tandem might still
play a significant role in regulating searches and seizures, however,
because of its usefulness in gauging intrusiveness. Specifically, these
two factors may be germane when the people subjected to the
search or seizure are aware of the obstacles to detecting the harm
and believe it will directly affect them. As pointed out above,, 98 the
level of intrusion usually does not vary with the level of crime being
investigated. Thus, a frisk for a gun is normally equally intrusive
whether its purpose is to gather evidence of a felony or a misde-
meanor. But suppose that the frisk for the gun is conducted at an
airport in an effort to detect and deter hijackings or bombings by
terrorists. If the people subject to the frisk are aware that its pur-
pose is to prevent the possibility of harm to their person, and that it
is the only feasible way of avoiding that harm, they may feel genu-
inely grateful for the government intervention. Their sense of intru-
sion, harassment, or stigmatization might be significantly reduced
given their awareness of the danger confronting them and of the few
officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public
resources, including a finite number of police officers." Id. at 2487. This language is
insidious, for it proposes that, once the government makes the vague showing of harm
the Court allows, an intrusive technique may be used at random, without demonstrating
any degree of certainty that it will be successful and without demonstrating that any less
intrusive, equally effective investigative method exists.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 172-176.
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options available to avert that danger. 199 If this assumption is accu-
rate,200 the certainty threshold necessary to justify initiation of a
blanket frisk operation at the airport could also be significantly re-
duced. Based on the same assumption, any person who thereafter
actually refused the frisk could be considered "suspicious" enough
to warrant a nonconsensual frisk.
This conception of consent, based on informed speculation
about the genuine desires of those searched, is very different from
the Court's version, which assumes that consent given to govern-
ment agents is voluntary unless there is obvious coercion,201 and
which "implies" consent solely from foreknowledge of the search
and seizure. 20 2 At the same time, this conception of consent allows
199. On the other hand, if the possibility of harm to those frisked is infinitesimal or
nonexistent (e.g., because airplane terrorism has been unheard of for years), or if there
are other, less intrusive ways of detecting the weapon (such as a magnetometer), then
the same sense of gratitude is unlikely and the usual certainty threshold for frisks would
be required.
200. The intuition described in the text is borne out by preliminary research con-
ducted by the author and Joseph Schumacher, Ph.D. [research which is hereinafter
referred to as the Intrusiveness Rating Study]. Over 300 students were given fifty
search or seizure scenarios and asked to rate their "intrusiveness" on a scale of 0 to 100.
While frisks and other searches of the person were rated, on average, as fairly intrusive,
airport searches designed to detect terrorist acts were not. Research results on file with
author, pending publication.
201. In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), for instance, the Court
found "voluntary" the following actions by the defendant: (1) accompanying two identi-
fied Drug Enforcement Administration agents from a public airport terminal to a DEA
office; (2) surrendering her purse to be searched; and (3) disrobing for further search.
The Court stressed that "[tihere were neither threats nor any show of force," id. at 558,
and that the defendant had been told twice that she could refuse consent, id. at 559.
The Court discounted the facts that the defendant was a 22 year-old black female with
an 11 th grade education, id. at 558, and had indicated prior to the disrobing that she
had a plane to catch, id. at 559. It ignored the officers' testimony that they had taken
Mendenhall's ticket and driver's license for a time before returning it, id. at 548, that
they noticed she "became quite shaken, extremely nervous" and "had a hard time
speaking" during this initial encounter, id., and that they would have restrained her had
she not accompanied them to the DEA office or had she tried to leave it, id. at 575
nn. 12-13 (White, J., dissenting). As the four-member dissent pointed out: "On the rec-
ord before us, the Court's conclusion can only be based on the notion that consent can
be assumed from the absence of proof that a suspect resisted police authority." Id. at
577 (White, J., dissenting).
In Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984), another airport case, the Court found
that the defendant's agreement to talk to an identified plain-clothes officer and walk 15
feet to where his companions were standing with another officer was "clearly the sort of
consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest." Id. at 5-6.
202. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672
(1989) ("Unlike most private citizens or government employees in general, employees
involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness
and probity."); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989)
("Though some of the privacy interests implicated by the toxicological testing at issue
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the police to draw inferences from a refusal to consent, a position
which, to date, the Court has been unwilling to endorse fully, for
reasons based as much on the Fifth Amendment and the Due Pro-
cess Clause as the Fourth Amendment. 203 Some of the ramifica-
tions of this idea are developed further in Part V.204 For now, the
important point is that, if harm severity and its difficulty of detec-
tion are to be considered in determining the validity of a search or
seizure, they are usually germane only when measuring the strength
of individual interests, not the state's.
4. The Official Distraction Factor
The fourth rationale supporting an exception to the probable
cause standard-the official distraction factor relied upon by the
Court in analyzing school, workplace, and probation investiga-
reasonably might be viewed as significant in other contexts, logic and history show that
a diminished expectation of privacy attaches to information relating to the physical
condition of covered (railway] employees and to this reasonable means of procuring
such information."); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) ("[Suspicionless
inspections] pose only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy
[because w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business.., he
does so with the knowledge [that they will occur]."). Although none of these cases
speak in terms of consent, using instead the diminished expectation of privacy idiom,
the idea is the same: because the victims of the government search knew it was coming
and technically could have avoided it (by getting another job or business), they are
afforded less protection than others.
203. The Court has addressed the issue in language that usually resonates with privi-
lege against self-incrimination doctrine, although occasionally it derives from vagueness
concerns. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (finding unconstitu-
tionally vague a "stop and identify" statute "because it encourages arbitrary enforce-
ment by failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order
to satisfy the statute"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (a
person who is briefly stopped "is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled,
and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to
the need for continued observation"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540
(1967) ("appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to [a
warrantless residential safety] inspection").
204. See infra text accompanying notes 319-330. In Von Raab, the Court at-
tempted to justify the suspicionless drug testing upheld in that case by analogizing to
other situations in which suspicionless government action is accepted, including airport
searches similar to the type described in the text, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3, and searches of
employees of the United States Mint when they leave the workplace, id. at 671. These
two situations seem distinguishable from the drug testing program at issue in Von Raab,
however. In both, those searched would probably "vote" for the searches (although
perhaps begrudgingly)--the airport passengers for the reasons given in the text and the
Mint employees because they know that without these searches the Mint could not
function (meaning they would no longer have a job). In contrast, unless it makes sense
to say that the typical customs agent (as distinguished from the government) is likely to
believe that drug testing is crucial to maintaining the efficiency of the customs service,
this notion of "genuine" implied consent would not aid the state's case in Von Raab.
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tions-is even less plausible than the harm severity or difficulty of
detection rationales. At the outset, note that it applies only to those
investigations conducted by government agents whose principal job
is something other than investigation; the public is harmed, accord-
ing to this rationale, to the extent such officials are distracted from
routine duties in order to justify (at a heightened level) searches or
seizures that they undertake. Thus, even assuming its validity, the
official distraction factor is difficult to apply to at least one of the
situations addressed by the Court: the probation context. Because
the primary job of a probation officer is making sure the probationer
does not stray from court-ordered probation conditions, 205 that offi-
cial should be governed by the rules governing the police.
In the school and workplace, on the other hand, the lay investi-
gator is probably taking time from his or her usual obligations. To
some extent this cost is unavoidable if we want school administra-
tors and employers to be able to control their environments. The
social harms the Court believes are unnecessary in this setting are
twofold: the cost associated with forcing these individuals to master
the "niceties" of the "probable cause" concept, and the cost associ-
ated with requiring them to meet the certainty threshold it implies,
as opposed to some lower level of certainty (subsumed under the
"reasonableness" rubric). Neither cost seems particularly signifi-
cant. And, in any event, before we allow the official distraction fac-
tor to have any impact on the certainty threshold, we must believe
that the public harm caused by imposing a probable cause standard
in the lay investigation context is greater than the damage caused by
that standard's application to normal police work. Otherwise, the
state would be justified in abandoning the probable cause rule in the
latter context as well. Since such a showing cannot be made, the
official distraction rationale is exposed for what it is: the meaning-
less assertion that certainty requirements are inconvenient to the
government.
The Court's assumption that lay investigators will find the
probable cause concept difficult to comprehend is not supportable.
Whether the standard is "probable cause," "reasonable suspicion,"
or simple "relevance," the inquiry boils down to how certain the
investigator is that the search or seizure will produce evidence or a
suspect. As the Court has pointed out many times,20 6 this inquiry is
205. See supra note 121.
206. The Court's first detailed statement to this effect is perhaps the most on point.
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the Court indicated that the probable
cause determination is not to be divorced from "the factual and practical considerations
1991]
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a common sense one, based on logical inference, which suggests it is
not the special preserve of the police or a judicial officer. 20 7 Cer-
tainly, school administrators, teachers, and employers can fathom it
as easily as the police.
The Court's concern that the normal work of lay investigators
will be unreasonably disrupted if they cannot act on a level of cer-
tainty lower than probable cause is also specious. Where police in-
vestigation is concerned, developing probable cause (as opposed to
some lower level of suspicion) may well require a greater investment
of time and resources. In contrast, the damage to public interests
caused by requiring a school official or an employer to meet a prob-
able cause standard, rather than, say, a "reasonable suspicion" or
"relevance" standard, will typically be minimal. As a matter of
course, given the "community" involved, the person investigating
an infraction of school or workplace regulations will either have
witnessed it or have a report from someone who did, and will easily
be able to name or find the perpetrator and collect incriminating
information;208 the same cannot be said of the police officer investi-
gating a robbery, burglary, rape, or homicide. The same aspects of
schools and workplaces on which the Court relies in disparaging the
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id.
at 175 (emphasis added). On several occasions, it has warned against interpreting the
probable cause standard in a "hypertechnical" fashion and insisted on its commonsense
basis. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (warrant affidavits
should be tested in "a commonsense and realistic fashion," and reviewing courts should
"not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than
a commonsense, manner"); accord Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732 (1984);
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
207. Note that in approximately 40 states, at least some of the magistrates (between
13,000 and 14,000 nationally) are not lawyers, suggesting that nonlawyers can ade-
•quately address these concepts. Silberman, Non-Attorney Justice in the United States:
An Empirical Study 24-35 (1979). Moreover, after reviewing the sparse empirical liter-
ature available, Davies concluded that "[i]n contrast to the critics' assumption that
search law is hypertechnical, the few indications we do have about the nature of illegal
searches suggest that legal complexity probably is not the cause of most illegal
searches." Davies, A Hard Look, supra note 27, at 683.
208. As the Supreme Court noted in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977),
the "openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afford signifi-
cant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. The same "openness"
should diminish students' ability to hide their misconduct. Consider, for example, this
list from TL. 0. of the types of activities typically regulated by school rules: secret soci-
eties, students driving to school, use of parking lots, smoking on campus, the direction
of traffic in hallways, student presence in the hallways during class hours without a
pass, profanity, school attendance, cafeteria use and cleanup, eating lunch off-campus,
and unauthorized absences. 469 U.S. at 377 n. 16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To the extent
investigation of any of these activities requires a search or seizure (which is unlikely), a
reliable eyewitness should be easy to come by. Even the more serious individual inci-
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individual interests at stake-their confined, controlled, and quasi-
public nature2°9-- ensure that investigations in these locations will
usually require much less expenditure of effort than does police
work. Thus, in the former contexts, the diversion of resources and
consequent harm to the public interest imposed by a probable cause
standard should be minimal.
In any event, this harm cannot measure up to the damage pro-
duced by application of the probable cause standard to police work.
Because of the probable cause rule, and the attendant warrant re-
quirement, police are less likely to pursue a potential arrest 210 and,
of those arrests they make, a small but noticeable number are likely
to end in dismissal.211 These unsolved or dismissed criminal cases,
both in terms of frustrated vengeance and failed incapacitation, cost
society much more than any inefficiency created by requiring inves-
tigators of administrative violations to meet a probable cause stan-
dard. Assuming searches and seizures by these other public officials
dents likely to occur at school (e.g., possession of drugs or weapons) are unlikely to be
detected at all unless a student or faculty member observes them.
Of course, to the extent the purpose of a search or seizure is to deter a general drug
or violence problem that exists in the school, developing "individualized suspicion" will
be more difficult and dragnet searches will become more tempting. Cf Doe v. Renfrow,
631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (use of dog to sniff entire classes of students for drug odor).
The Court avoided addressing the propriety of such actions in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342
n.8. Under the approach advanced in this article, such searches would not be permitted
unless the government developed enough "generalized" suspicion to authorize the intru-
sion they occasion. See supra text accompanying notes 186-188. While this task might
involve considerable effort, it is the kind of job that can be handled by one administra-
tor, by collecting information about drug usage and violence in the school; it would not
necessitate involvement of individual teachers.
209. Actually, the Court has only explicitly disparaged individual privacy interests
in the latter context. See language from Ortega, supra note 156. How the Court might
characterize expectations of privacy in the general school setting, outside the context of
a search of a school child's purse and other personal effects (the issue in T.L.O.), re-
mains to be seen. See supra note 151. The Court's most likely approach, given the
government-oriented trend of its "special needs" cases, is to follow the Ortega line of
reasoning.
210. It is interesting to note that as early as 1962-before Fourth Amendment law
was well developed, and before the nationwide application of the exclusionary rule in
Mapp could have had any major impact on the conviction rate-Inbau contended that
decisions limiting searches and seizures had "actually facilitat[ed]" the activities of "the
criminal element," and had led to some of the increase in crime observed since 1950.
Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 85, 86 (1962).
211. Although the percentage of cases dismissed by prosecutors or judges as a result
of illegal searches and seizures varies, it usually hovers between 0.5% and 1% of arrests
for all crimes. See Davies, A Hard Look, supra note 27, at 667 (summarizing studies).
Of course, dismissal of cases results from the exclusionary sanction, not substantive law.
If some other sanction were relied upon, dismissal would not be a cost, in either police-
or lay-investigated cases.
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are of comparable intrusiveness to those conducted by the police,
they should be permitted only upon comparable showings of
certainty.
At bottom, the Court's reliance on the official distraction ra-
tionale seems to be an attempt, where lay investigators are involved,
to avoid the inefficiency connected with formalizing the investiga-
tive process.2 12 As an earlier part of this Article indicated, 2 13 the
burden and discomfort associated with requiring employers or
school teachers to approach a judicial officer in a courthouse may
argue in favor of adjusting the procedures attendant to authorizing
a search or seizure. But lowering the substantive standard to ac-
commodate a need for "efficiency" comes close to being a non se-
quitur if we care at all about individual interests.
D. A Proposal: The Proportionality Principle
For the reasons given above, in a world without the Fourth
Amendment the level of certainty necessary to authorize a police
action should, with rare exception, 214 be governed solely by the
level of its intrusiveness. Thus, for example, the government would
generally have to show a higher degree of confidence that a search
will be successful when evidence is thought to be in a private home
than when it is believed to be in a warehouse or in the "open fields."
An arrest, in contrast to a short detention, would usually require a
higher level of certainty that the individual has committed a crime
(and, if warrantless, that the relevant exigency exists). This idea
can be called the "proportionality principle."
All-important to application of this principle is a coherent defi-
nition of the term "intrusiveness." This Article has made a superfi-
cial stab at this task by positing three individual interests
encompassed by the intrusiveness rubric-privacy and autonomy,
freedom from harassment, and avoidance of false stigmatization-
and by suggesting some ways that the harm severity and difficulty of
212. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723-24 (1987) ("To ensure the
efficient and proper operation of the agency ... public employers must be given wide
latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons. ...
[p]ublic employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the
agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner.").
213. See supra text accompanying notes 121-123.
214. The exception arises when the state can show that the certainty threshold ordi-
narily necessary to justify a particular intrusion must be lowered in order to allow the
state a realistic chance to detect clearly harmful future conduct. See supra text accom-
panying notes 179-197.
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detection rationales may be relevant to it.215 But much more must
be done, both empirically216 and theoretically. 21 7 Ideally, this work
would produce a more refined concept of intrusiveness than the
Supreme Court's which, as shown in various parts of this Article, is
both unrealistic 218 and theoretically inconsistent. 219
These observations lead to the primary objection to the propor-
tionality principle: it can be easily manipulated and arbitrarily ap-
plied. A standard which depends upon determining the relationship
between the "intrusiveness" of a search or seizure and its likelihood
of "success" is clearly subject to idiosyncratic interpretation. Ad-
dressing a proposal similar to the one advanced here, Professor Am-
sterdam has argued that adopting a "sliding scale" approach to
searches and seizures would convert the Fourth Amendment "into
one immense Rohrshach blot. ' 220  Operating under such a stan-
dard, he suggested, would mean that the validity of searches and
seizures would be decided on a case-by-case basis, thus providing
little or no future guidance to the police. 2 1 Professor Amsterdam
215. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15 & 198-204, as well as notes 149 &
167. Summarizing the notions expressed at these various spots produces a number of
overlapping factors that might be relevant to the intrusiveness inquiry. In no particular
order, they would include the extent to which a typical person would feel the govern-
ment action (1) infringes privacy/intimacy interests; (2) infringes autonomy/locomo-
tion interests; (3) is conducted in an offensive, harassing, or embarrassing manner
(which would include consideration of whether it is conducted at day or at night,
roughly or politely, for an unnecessary period of time, in public or in private); (4) is
preceded by genuine consent; and (5) is benevolently motivated, in that it will prevent
harm to the person that would otherwise be difficult to detect. Contrary to the Court's
approach, the intrusiveness inquiry should not include whether the target of the action
was on notice that the intrusion should or might take place, nor should it depend upon
whether the target has been similarly intruded upon by private citizens.
216. Some initial attempts have been made. See, e.g., Kagehiro, Psycholegal Re-
search on the Fourth Amendment, I PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 187 (1990); Small, supra note
119; Intrusiveness Rating Study, supra note 200.
217. See materials cited supra note 11; see also Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of
the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73
IOWA L. REv. 541 (1988); Power, Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed
Formulation for Visual Searches, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 34-68 (1989).
218. Consider its statements that "reasonable" privacy interests are not infringed by
intentional police entry onto fenced-in private property marked with no trespassing
signs, Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 171 (1984); flights over private backyards,
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1988); and inspections of businesses, United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
219. See, e.g., discussion of undercover activity, infra text accompanying notes
351-352.
220. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 393. Professor Amsterdam continued: "[P]resent
law is a positive paragon of simplicity compared to what a graduated fourth amendment
would produce."
221. Id. at 394.
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concluded (qtioting from Justice Jackson): "the people would be 'se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,' only in the discre-
tion of the police."' 222 Although this criticism suggests that
adoption of the proportionality principle is most likely to harm in-
dividual interests, one might also criticize it from the state's per-
spective: operation of the principle might cause the police to refrain
from acting when they should, or in good faith confusion act
wrongly (in the process suffering what they feel is undeserved sanc-
tion), thereby increasing the "cost" to the state by undermining ef-
fective law enforcement.
Undoubtedly, given the countervailing interests at stake in the
regulation of searches and seizures, clarity is an important goal.
Further, no claim can be made that the proportionality inquiry will
always be easy, or that it will arrive at many "bright-line" rules.
Nonetheless, there are at least two responses to Professor Amster-
dam, one deontological, the other consequentialist.
First, the alternatives to a sliding scale approach are deeply
inimical to both individual and state interests. Consider the alterna-
tives adopted in the United States: either one level of certainty
(prior to 1968) or, as was the case until recently, two levels. As the
Supreme Court's experience shows, neither is satisfactory from a
theoretical point of view. The Court abandoned the single probable
cause standard because it was too difficult to meet in situations
where the state had a legitimate interest in acting because of the
lesser intrusion involved.223 And now the Court is abandoning the
two-tiered approach, because it has been confronted with searches
and seizures it views to be even less intrusive, as the drug testing
and roadblock cases show.224 At the same time, because it is still
officially wedded to the probable cause and reasonable suspicion
standards for most cases, the Court is prevented, at least techni-
cally, from requiring more certainty than probable cause for partic-
ularly intrusive investigative techniques. 225 From a deontological
222. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)).
223. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968) ("[A] perfectly reasonable apprehen-
sion of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate information to
justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime.").
224. See supra text accompanying notes 163-165.
225. See, e.g., New York v. P.J. Video, Inc. 475 U.S. 868, 874 (1986) (rejecting a
"'higher' standard of probable cause than that used in other areas of Fourth Amend-
ment law" when the search is of material protected by the First Amendment); Tennes-
see v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) ("Where the officer has probable cause to believe
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perspective, the proportionality principle is essential to establishing
a sound regulatory framework for searches and seizures.
Professor Amsterdam, for one, would readily agree with this
conclusion. 226 Nonetheless, he believed (along with many others)227
that without clear rules to guide them, the police are more likely-
in fact if not in theory-to harm individual interests. On the sur-
face, this argument is a plausible attack on the proportionality prin-
ciple. The argument's flaw is not so much its conclusion as its
premise: that clear rules are possible. As has been ably demon-
strated by several commentators, with respect both to law generally
and regulation of search and seizure specifically, even seemingly
"bright-line" rules usually become blurred as the police and the ad-
versarial process test their outer limits. 228 The grail of "rule-ori-
ented" jurisprudence is as mythical as King Arthur's.
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others,
it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.").
When confronted with particularly intrusive situations, the Court has occasionally
avoided the limitations of the probable cause standard while claiming to adhere to it.
For instance, in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), it considered the permissibility of
state-coerced surgery to obtain a bullet thought to be evidence of a crime. The Court
found that, as far as the certainty threshold is concerned, a probable cause finding that
the bullet was where the state said it was is sufficient. Id. at 760. But the Court also
required the reviewing court to find that the procedure does not threaten the safety or
health of the individual or unnecessarily impinge on the individual's "dignitary inter-
ests" before such surgery could be authorized. Id. at 761. It also required the trial
court to consider the extent to which prohibiting the intrusion would affect "the com-
munity's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence." Id. at 762.
In applying this last factor to the facts of the case, the Court made clear that it would
only be satisfied if the state could show a "compelling need" for the evidence. Id. at
765.
226. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 393 ("A sliding scale approach would
considerably ease the strains that the present monolithic model of the fourth amend-
ment almost everywhere imposes on the process of defining the amendment's outer
boundaries.").
227. See, e.g., Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. REV. 518, 532; LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication"
Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127,
141.
228. Speaking of the Court's experience, Professor Bradley has stated: "In an effort
to give 'clear rules' to the police while maintaining a degree of flexibility, the Court has
failed on both counts." Bradley, supra note 7, at 1479. Even proponents of bright-line
rules come close to admitting defeat. See LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imper-
fect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PIr. L. REV. 307,
333 (1982) (after discussing the problems with the "bright-line" rule established in New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), Professor LaFave states, "the quest for clear rules
must proceed with caution if reasonable and predictable results are in fact to be ob-
tained").
More generally, see Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661-69 (1958) (arguing that even simple rules are subject
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This is particularly so with respect to rules concerning levels of
certainty, which comprise the bulk of search and seizure jurispru-
dence. To say that probable cause, or probable cause and reason-
able suspicion, represent the only permissible levels of certainty, as
Professor Amsterdam would have it, is not to propose a bright-line
rule. As the Supreme Court's experience illustrates, the supposed
adherence to a two-tiered approach to certainty has exerted little
control over judges.2 29 The phrases "probable cause" and "reason-
able suspicion" are broadly defined, with the result that their appli-
cation to particular facts is often difficult to predict.230 These
developments were inevitable: outside of quantifying the standards,
as this Article did earlier,23' meaningfully distinguishing between
these or any other levels of certainty (other than at the extremes) is
very difficult.2 32 Given the absence of concrete guidance provided
to ambiguity); see also Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986
DUKE L.J. 1 ("[A]ny attempt to achieve certainty regarding any important constitu-
tional issue is unlikely to succeed and--even if it does succeed in the short run-will
inevitably create uncertainty as to more issues than it settles. The process of rendering a
decision will tend to distort the issue decided as well as the applicable precedents and
doctrines.").
229. See supra text accompanying notes 134-148 for a description of cases in which
the Court veered from both the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards.
230. This point is difficult to support in a short note. One must read several opin-
ions relating to the same general fact pattern to see how minimally the probable cause
and reasonable suspicion concepts constrain the courts and to get an idea of the subtle
factors that affect their analysis. Compare, e.g., Justice Powell's concurrence in United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 560-61 (1980) (reasonable suspicion exists when
defendant arrives from a source city, is the last to leave the plane, appears nervous,
claims no luggage and goes to the desk of an airline other than one on which she ar-
rived) with Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980) (no reasonable suspicion when
defendant arrives from a source city, nervously looks over shoulder, has no luggage
other than a shoulder bag, and makes efforts to conceal he is traveling with someone
else). See also Justice Jackson's dissection of the majority's finding of probable cause in
Brinegar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 184-88 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice
Jackson disparaged the majority's equation of the facts in that case with the facts of
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), by noting that "while several facts are
common to the two cases, the setting from which those facts take color and meaning
differ in essential respects." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 185 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
231. See supra notes 130 & 133 and accompanying text.
232. As Professor LaFave notes, "the difference between the two may lie in the de-
gree of probability required. However, comparison on this basis is not without difficul-
ties, for, as explained elsewhere in this Treatise, it is less than clear precisely what
quantum of probability is required in order to make a lawful arrest." 3 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 112, at 431 (footnote omitted). Nonetheless, he suggests that a distinction
can be made:
The point is well illustrated by the case of Luckett v. State, where a state
patrolman stopped a green car with a license prefix 82J on the basis of a
radio broadcast that such a car had been used by those persons fleeing
from a recent burglary. The court quite properly concluded that while
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by these malleable concepts, a decisionmaker is likely to set the cer-
tainty threshold at whatever level seems reasonable, taking into ac-
count factors such as level of intrusiveness, severity of the crime,
and so on.
Thus, a second, consequentialist argument in favor of adopting
the proportionality criterion is that it would allow courts and police
to do more openly what they will do in any event, with the advan-
tage that the number of factors they must consider in arriving at
their decisions will be significantly reduced. In arriving at the nec-
essary confidence threshold, intrusiveness alone will determine the
level of certainty. While that concept is by no means self-defining,
and incorporates a number of variables, 233 at least courts and gov-
ernment officials will not need to confront the problematic issues
connected with ascertaining the seriousness of the harm involved2 34
or the difficulty of detecting it235 (except to the extent these issues
are relevant to the intrusiveness inquiry236), and will not have to
measure the degree to which noninvestigative duties of the investi-
gator will be compromised by a particular certainty threshold.
the officer "did not have probable cause to stop every green automobile
with an 82J license prefix and formally arrest its occupants," there was a
basis for a Terry-type stop because the officer "had a brief, but sufficient,
description of the automobile; the crime had been committed only a short
time beforehand, and the car was discovered traveling away from the
scene of the crime at a location which was within the range of possible
flight."
Id. at 436 (footnote omitted).
If this case is considered a good illustration of how probable cause and reasonable
suspicion can be distinguished, it makes my point. I would argue that probable cause to
arrest existed on these facts (even if, after stopping the car, nothing further alerted the
officer's suspicion). The chances are extremely high that the car stopped was the car
described by the radio broadcast and fairly high (given the short time between the bur-
glary and the stop) that the people in it were those who fled the burglary. The quantum
of probability required in Luckett for reasonable suspicion would make the latter cer-
tainty threshold difficult to meet in a wide variety of situations in which the Supreme
Court and other courts have found it to exist.
The police are no better than the courts (or law professors) at making the distinc-
tion between probable cause and reasonable suspicion. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 28,
at 214 ("It is often difficult for police to draw a line between what, on the one hand,
constitutes suspicious behavior, and on the other, provides sufficient evidence to infer
'reasonable or probable cause' for an arrest---even under present standards allowing
search only as incident to an arrest. No simple formula can determine reasonable cause,
since many factors must be taken into account.").
233. See supra note 215.
234. See, e.g., supra note 173 and note 109.
235. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 177-197.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 198-204.
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These latter factors, which are easily as manipulable as the intru-
siveness concept, would play little or no role in the typical case.
None of this should suggest that, with the adoption of the pro-
portionality approach, the search for ways of easing investigative
decisionmaking would be abandoned. Police confusion, although
perhaps inevitable, can be moderated through several mechanisms.
First, as has occurred over time with the equally amorphous lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment, application of the proportionality
principle to recurring situations would undoubtedly lead to the de-
velopment of some relatively clear "rules," many of them similar to
those that exist today in the United States. 237 Second, in developing
these rules, only rough proportionality should be the goal: in some
cases, individual (or state) interests may be sacrificed, at least mar-
ginally, to achieve greater clarity.238 To help the courts achieve this
approximate justice, empirical work can provide information on the
public's views concerning the hierarchy of privacy interests,239 as
well as measure levels of certainty in typical investigative situa-
tions.240 Third, where clear rules do not develop (which will often
be the case), the police would at least have an easily remembered
"standard of thumb" that will help fill in the gaps. Given the ambi-
guity of the proportionality standard, the crime control bias of the
police will probably lead to mistakes in interpretation. 241 But over-
all, as noted above, its application will result in more "reasonable"
237. For instance, as Part V indicates, infra text accompanying notes 253-257, the
basic rules concerning the degree of certainty necessary for arrest, as opposed to a stop,
seem congruent with the proportionality principle, as do the certainty threshold differ-
entials between a search of a house and a frisk. Search incident to arrest doctrine would
also be unlikely to change drastically, since if probable cause to arrest a person exists,
enough suspicion usually exists to justify a search for weapons or evidence. However, if
the arrest were for a minor misdemeanor, or the police have no reason to suspect harm
or evidence destruction, the proportionality rule might arrive at different results than
the Court has. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (allowing search of inte-
rior of car incident to arrest even if occupants no longer in car); United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (allowing a search incident to an ordinary traffic offense).
238. Professor LaFave has argued that "as between a complicated rule which in a
theoretical sense produces the desired result 100% of the time, but which well-inten-
tioned police could be expected to apply correctly in only 75% of the cases, and a
readily understood and easily applied rule which would bring about the theoretically
correct conclusion 90% of the time, the latter is to be preferred over the former."
LaFave, supra note 228, at 321. This makes sense, if in the 10% of the clear rule cases
in which the police are wrong, they are not too wrong.
239. The author is beginning some work in this regard. See description of Intrusive-
ness Rating Survey, supra note 200.
240. For examples of such attempts, see Part V, infra note 264 and accompanying
text, and text accompanying notes 292-295.
241. Thus, Skolnick states that "[w]here the policeman perceives the line between
legality and illegality as hazy, he usually handles the situation in the interest of justify-
HeinOnline  -- 39 UCLA L. Rev. 74 1991-1992
FOURTH AMENDMENT
searches and seizures than occur under rigid, inflexible rules.242 Fi-
nally, and perhaps most importantly, if the first half of the proposal
advanced in this Article is also accepted, in all nonexigent situations
(i.e., much of the time), an independent party, rather than law en-
forcement officials, would be applying the proportionality principle.
IV. RECONCILIATION WITH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Combining the two proposals advanced above into one, I
would propose that, whenever some level of justification is required,
authorization by a neutral third party should be obtained in all
nonexigent situations (the "exigency" principle). In both exigent
and nonexigent circumstances, a search or seizure is usually author-
ized only if the likelihood of its success is roughly proportional to
its intrusiveness (the "proportionality" principle). Part V offers
some applications of this two-factor approach. Here its relationship
to the language of the Fourth Amendment is examined.
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, the proposal
is inconsistent with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
several ways. Most obviously, because it requires a warrant prior to
all nonexigent police investigations, the proposal would not be con-
sistent with current case law recognizing exceptions in a number of
nonemergency situations. Additionally, it would not adhere to the
two- (or three-?) tiered approach to certainty officially favored by
the Supreme Court, but rather would require a flexible, sliding scale
analysis. Finally, as a result of these two differences, the proposal
would run afoul of well-accepted Fourth Amendment doctrine in a
third way: because it would require warrants prior to all nonexigent
intrusions, even minimal ones, and because it permits minimal in-
trusions on a low level of suspicion, the proposal would allow war-
rants to issue on less than probable cause, at least as that term is
currently defined by the courts.
While the proposal thus conflicts, in three significant areas,
with the Fourth Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court, it
does not necessarily conflict with the language of the Fourth
Amendment, nor with the intent of the Framers. The language of
the amendment only requires that searches and seizures be "reason-
able," and that warrants be based on "probable cause." Neither of
these terms are defined in the Fourth Amendment, and there is very
ing a contention of legality, irrespective of the actual circumstances." J. SKOLNICK,
supra note 28, at 214.
242. For an example of how rigid rules can result in unreasonable searches, see Pro-
fessor LaFave's analysis of New York v. Belton, in LaFave, supra note 228, at 324-32.
1991]
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little information as to what the founding fathers had in mind when
they used these phrases.
This Article, like the Supreme Court, has taken the position
that the "reasonableness" of a search and seizure should be deter-
mined through a balancing of state and individual interests. But,
unlike the Court, this Article concludes that an appropriate balanc-
ing of these interests should lead to the proportionality principle.
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment or its "legislative history" pre-
vents such a conclusion about how the reasonableness of a search or
seizure should be analyzed, nor dictates the Court's current multi-
factor approach to this issue. 243
The Fourth Amendment does require that warrants be based
on "probable cause." But the Court's equation of this phrase with a
level of certainty akin to a more-likely-than-not standard is not the
only possible interpretation of it. Indeed, little in the history and
nothing about the language of the Fourth Amendment suggests that
this phrase stands for any particular level of certainty. 244 I would
propose that "probable cause" be defined as that cause which makes
probable the reasonableness of the intrusion occasioned by a given
search or seizure. Under this definition, if a search or seizure is
very intrusive, more "probable cause" would be required than if the
search were minimally intrusive. So long as the proportionality cri-
243. Professor Taylor has demonstrated that the exclusive focus of those involved
with drafting the Fourth Amendment was on searches under "general" warrants and
writs of assistance: in particular the Framers were concerned with the extent to which
warrants not based on any showing of suspicion were used to justify searches. T. TAY-
LOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24-41 (1969). Thus, one
can conclude that the Framers were not interested in a warrant requirement, but in
avoiding abuse of such a requirement. Nothing about the proposal in this Article runs
counter to this concern. But the proposal, for reasons articulated earlier, supra text
accompanying notes 24-30, deals more directly with the abuses associated with war-
rantless searches and seizures.
244. Clearly, the drafters of the Fourth Amendment wanted warrants to be based on
"probable cause" in order to prevent their misuse. Id. Thus, probable cause probably
meant something more to them than a "bare suspicion." Cf. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMS 142 (L. Worth & M. Zobel eds. 1965) (recounting that James Otis argued that
general writs "totally annihilate" a person's privilege to be safe in the home because
"[c]ustom house officers may enter our houses when they please--... bare suspicion
without oath is sufficient."). But what else probable cause meant to the Framers is
unclear from preconstitutional history. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 395 ("The
third and fourth problems in developing a satisfactory general theory of the fourth
amendment's scope can be stated in one sentence. Its language is no help and neither is
its history."). Thus, the most one can say about the founding fathers' intent on this
score is that when a warrant is used to authorize searches and seizures involving "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects" it must be based on something more than a suspicion
that evidence will be discovered there.
[Vol. 39:1
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terion is met, however, a warrant could issue on "probable cause,"
regardless of the level of certainty thereby represented, without vio-
lating the language of the amendment.
Because the courts have been unwilling to define probable
cause in this adaptable way, the warrant requirement is slowly being
read out of the amendment and many types of searches and seizures
are unregulated. For any type of police action associated with a low
probability of individualized suspicion (e.g., searches of heavily reg-
ulated industries, drug tests, sobriety checkpoints) the Supreme
Court has been unable, even if it had been willing, to impose a war-
rant requirement; the Court knows that establishing such a require-
ment would in effect prohibit such actions because the police would
so rarely be able to meet the probable cause threshold. And because
the Court has adopted only one concrete alternative to probable
cause, it has either explicitly (as with "open fields" searches) or im-
plicitly (as with roadblocks) declared a wide array of police actions
that any layperson would not hesitate to call a search or a seizure to
be outside the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. Arguably, the
Court would have felt less pressure to invent the "lesser expectation
of privacy" and "special needs" exceptions to the warrant require-
ment, and felt less compelled to permit the suspicionless and virtu-
ally suspicionless searches and detentions that it has, had it opted
for the flexible definition of probable cause proposed here.245
At one time, almost twenty-five years ago, it appeared the
Court might do just that. In Camara v. Municipal Court,246 the
Warren Court held that the government must obtain warrants to
conduct nonconsensual health inspections of residences. But, for a
number of reasons, 24 7 the Court concluded that such warrants did
not have to be based on cause to believe the particular house
245. The Court's preference for permitting suspicionless searches and seizures when
the intrusion is "minimal" is particularly unfortunate, since in many of the cases where
it did so, some degree of suspicion existed, perhaps enough to satisfy the demands of the
proportionality principle proposed here. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct.
1547 (1991) (defendant and others ran from police after spotting their car); New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985) (vice-principal searched purse after teacher reported
T.L.O. was smoking in bathroom and T.L.O. denied it; found cigarettes and saw rolling
papers; searched further and found marijuana); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 3-4
(1984) (detectives detained two men after one of the men saw them and said "get out of
here" twice, and the other started "running in place"); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 173 (1984) (agents entered defendant's fields "[a]cting on reports that marihuana
was being raised on [his] farm"). See also undercover agent cases discussed infra note
354.
246. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
247.- See discussion of Camara in Part V, infra text accompanying notes 314-317.
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searched was in violation of the health code. Rather they could
issue whenever the state could show that conditions of the area "as
a whole," including passage of time and the nature of the buildings,
merited inspection of the houses within the area. 24 In effect, the
Court created a new type of "probable cause"; a warrant to inspect
a house could be based on a relatively low statistical probability that
the house was in violation of a health or safety regulation.
In justifying this holding, the Court stated: "[T]here can be no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. ' 249
It also stated: "If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion con-
templated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted
search warrant. '250 These passages suggest that probable cause is
whatever level of certainty seems reasonable under the circum-
stances. But the Camara Court never explicitly said so, and subse-
quent cases continued to give lip-service to a "single-standard"
definition of probable cause. 251 A better approach would have been
to redefine openly the term to allow the sliding scale approach sug-
gested in this Article.252
248. 387 U.S. at 536.
249. Id. at 536-37.
250. Id. at 539.
251. As Justice Scalia stated for the majority in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
877 n.4 (1986):
In the administrative search context, we formally required that adminis-
trative warrants be supported by "probable cause," because in that con-
text we use that term as referring not to a quantum of evidence, but
merely to a requirement of reasonableness. See, e.g.,... Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court .... In other contexts, however, we use "probable cause"
to refer to a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, to be
distinguished from a lesser quantum such as "reasonable suspicion."
Note that, although Camara and its progeny remain alone in endorsing this flexible
type of probable cause for warrants, other cases indicate that the Court has at least
contemplated judicial authorization on less than probable cause. See, e.g., Hayes v.
Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) ("We ... do not abandon the suggestion ... that
under circumscribed procedures, the Fourth Amendment might permit the judiciary to
authorize the seizure of a person on less than probable cause and his removal to the
police station for the purpose of fingerprinting."); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
718 n. 5 (1984) (rejecting the government's contention that reasonable suspicion should
be sufficient to issue a warrant authorizing placement of a beeper in a private home by
saying: "It will be time enough to resolve the probable cause-reasonable suspicion issue
in a case that requires it.").
252. For a different, but in some ways related, slant on how the Fourth Amendment
should be interpreted and on Camara specifically, see Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383
(1988). A second article, published after this Article was accepted for publication, pro-
poses an economic model of the Fourth Amendment that results in an approach akin to,
[Vol. 39:1
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V. CASE STUDIES
To gain a better idea of how the exigency and proportionality
principles proposed in this Article would work, this Part discusses
five general types of seizures and searches which raise some of the
more interesting issues in this area: street stops, roadblocks, regula-
tory inspections, drug testing, and undercover agent operations.
Also addressed, in greater detail, is the idea of using "generalized"
suspicion to satisfy the certainty requirement.
A. Street Stops
The classic example of police investigation occurs when a po-
lice officer notices suspicious activity while on the beat. Under
American case law, if the officer has "probable cause" to believe a
crime has been committed, the suspect or suspects may be arrested
and a search of their person conducted. 25 3 If probable cause is lack-
ing, but there is reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,
the officer may still detain the suspect for a short time and conduct
inquiries. 254 Furthermore, a limited patdown or frisk (as opposed
to a full search) is permissible if the officer has a reasonable suspi-
cion that someone may be endangered by concealed weapons.255 A
warrant is not required in any of these situations. These rules are
consistent with the approach advanced in this Article. No warrant
is required for the typical street stop because exigency exists: the
suspect could escape or people could be hurt if the police tried to
obtain judicial authorization before acting. 256 Because arrests and
searches are more significant intrusions than stops and frisks, the
former actions should require a higher degree of certainty. If a stop
becomes prolonged (say, more than ten minutes), it should be
treated as an arrest, which requires a higher level of certainty. 257 If
such certainty is not present, the person should be released.
but ultimately different from, the proportionality principle. Fritzler, Optimality in
Fourth Amendment Law, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 519-21 (1990).
253. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
254. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
255. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
256. However, unlike the Court's rules, the approach proposed in this Article would
require a warrant for nonexigent arrests. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976) (no warrant required for nonexigent public arrest). In practice, most public ar-
rests are exigent.
257. Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (permitting a stop of 15-min-
ute duration); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROC. § 1 l0.2(5)(a)(ii) (1975)
(limiting stops to 20 minutes).
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Although, to this point, current Fourth Amendment law and
the approach advocated in this Article are congruent, they diverge
when one analyzes the extreme ends of the "seizure" spectrum. At
one end, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to recognize that
the Fourth Amendment is implicated by detentions short of an ac-
tual restraint by the police. It has declared that no seizure occurs,
and thus no suspicion is required, when government agents briefly
question people at their place of work,258 chase a pedestrian down
the street in a police car,259 or approach a person in an airport and
request him to walk fifteen feet to where his companions are stand-
ing with other officers. 260 At the same time, the Court has required
nothing more than "probable cause" to justify long-term pretrial
detention. 26' Application of the proportionality principle would
probably arrive at different results in all of these cases. 262 Escalat-
258. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
259. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
260. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
261. Such detention is much more intrusive than most searches and should thus
require greater justification. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), however, the
Court held that an arrested person may be kept in jail for an indefinite period-later
limited to 48 hours, Riverside County v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991)--based on
a finding of probable cause. Although it also held that this finding must be made by a
magistrate, Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, it permitted the decision to be made ex parte, and
held that the rights to counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination do not attach. Id.
at 123.
262. Two Court decisions handed down in the 1991 term illustrate the differences
between the Court's approach and the approach advocated in this Article. In the first
case, California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991), police in an unmarked car came
across a group of five youths huddled around a red vehicle. When the youths saw the
police car, they ran and the red vehicle sped away. One officer gave chase to a youth,
who threw away crack cocaine just before being caught. The Court held that the co-
caine was admissible because at the time it was discovered the defendant was not
seized-that is, there had been no "physical contact" or "submission to authority." Id.
at 1550-51. The dissent pointed out the disingenuousness of this holding: no reasonable
person would feel free to go about his business in such a situation. Id. at 1556-57 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). At the same time, the result in Hodari is correct. Although the
police did "seize" the defendant when they gave chase, they also had a high degree of
suspicion that the youth was up to no good, sufficient to justify at least a temporary
detention.
In Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991), the Court was wrong in both result
and rationale. There two officers, one armed, boarded a bus and surveyed the passen-
gers. Without any suspicion, they singled out the defendant and asked to search his
luggage. The Court rejected the Florida Supreme Court's holding that a seizure oc-
cuffed at this point. Although the Court remanded the case for a determination as to
whether the defendant had felt free to go about his business when confronted by the
police, it strongly suggested that it would find no seizure. It stressed that a seizure does
not occur simply because police question an individual, id. at 2386, or because the de-
fendant does not feel free to leave, especially here, where the defendant stated he would
not have left anyway because of the imminent departure of the bus. Id. at 2387. Again,
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ing intrusions, from a brief stop for questioning, to more elaborate
questioning, to searches, to arrest, and so on through long-term de-
tention, should be predicated on increasing levels of suspicion. Stip-
ulating to one or two "levels" exacerbates the possibility of
harassment and arbitrariness.
How is one to determine whether a particular certainty thresh-
old has been reached? As already noted, by nature this inquiry
must usually be a common sense, seat-of-the-pants assessment, just
as it is under current Fourth Amendment law; in such cases, there
are very few concrete guidelines. However, occasionally the degree
of certainty possessed by police is roughly quantifiable. For in-
stance, "drug courier profiles" offer the police the potential, at least
theoretically, to correlate certain aspects of an individual who is
disembarking from an airplane (e.g., departure point, arrival point,
place in line, nervous appearance, type of luggage)263 with a partic-
ular likelihood that he or she is a drug courier.264 To date, the
Supreme Court has refused to sanction explicitly the use of these
investigative tools265-commendably so, given the post hoc nature
of the so-called "profiles" at issue in the cases before it.266 How-
however, a person in the cramped confines of a bus confronted by two officers is not
likely to feel "free to go about his business." See supra note 13. And here, unlike in
Hodari, there was no suspicion, even of the generalized variety. Cf United States v.
Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 710 (4th Cir. 1990) (where a sweep of 100 buses, possibly con-
taining as many as four to five thousand people, resulted in seven arrests).
263. These examples of items found in profiles are gleaned from Supreme Court
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4-5 & n.6 (1989); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 n.2 (1983). The precise contents of the profiles are often kept
"classified," for obvious reasons.
264. For instance, according to one study conducted by the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration, between 40 and 50% (depending upon how one interprets the results) of
those identified as drug couriers pursuant to a profile turned out to be carrying either
illegal drugs or other evidence connecting them with the illegal drug trade. See J.
MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 226-27
(1985) (describing the study).
265. In the five Court decisions where agents appeared to, or claimed to, rely on a
profile, the Court either fails to mention the fact, or discusses it only in passing, making
no serious effort to analyze its use. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 ("A
court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent
to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be
set forth in a 'profile' does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as
seen by a trained agent."); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (no mention of
profile despite discussion in petitioner's brief, see Brief for Petitioner, id. at 32 (No.
83-1367)); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 565 n.6 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("I do not believe that these statis-
tics [connected with use of a profile] establish by themselves the reasonableness of this
search."); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980) (per curiam).
266. In his dissent in Sokolow, Justice Marshall noted "the profile's 'chameleon-like
way of adapting to any particular set of observations,'" 490 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J.,
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ever, if a profile is proven to show the requisite correlation with
crime,267 and it is clear that the profile was actually used by the
police in deciding to act, rather than made up afterward, 268 then its
use should not be prohibited.
Two conceptual objections to the use of such profiles have been
advanced. 269 The first is that a stop made pursuant to this type of
instrument is not based on anything intrinsic to the particular indi-
vidual stopped, and thus violates the notion of "individualized" jus-
tice. Assuming that "individualized" justice is something we
should care about at the investigative phase, 270 the argument that
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) (case
below)). He then described a series of cases which set forth the types of factors police
have claimed were part of a drug courier profile. In one profile, the fact that a person is
first to deplane was listed; in another the fact that the person is last to deplane was
considered important; and in still another, the focus was on persons who deplaned in
the middle. Id. Other comparisons in Marshall's list are also interesting. Id. at 13-14
(one-way ticket, nonstop flight, changed planes; no luggage, a gym bag, new suitcases;
traveling alone, with companion; nervous, too calm).
267. Under current law, for instance, a 30% success rate might be required if the
government plans to stop and question the individuals for a brief period of time. Cf.
supra note 133 (equating reasonable suspicion with a 30% likelihood). However, if the
confrontation becomes prolonged, then further suspicion should be demonstrated, see
supra text accompanying notes 256-257, based either on the profile or other informa-
tion. Moreover, the government should not be able to escape this further showing by
proving that the extended confrontation was the product of "consent," unless the con-
sent is genuine. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 201-204.
268. In order to avoid police manipulation of the profile to fit the facts, it should first
be filed with the court.
269. See Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and
Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U.L. REV. 843, 853 (1985).
270. At trial, we would not want conviction to rest on the conclusion that the de-
fendant is one among many, or even one among a few, who could have committed the
crime. Cf. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968)
(rejecting the use of mathematical probability theory at the trial stage). But during the
investigative phase, the focus is on who may have committed a crime. Thus, the fact
that a "profile's focus is literally not upon an individual's unique conduct, but upon that
conduct's alleged similarity to the behaviors of others," Cloud, supra note 269, at 853,
should not matter. The individual's "uniqueness" is taken into account in assessing the
intrusiveness of a search or seizure; it need not be considered in developing the level of
certainty necessary to justify the intrusion.
Perhaps the lack of "individualization" concern is that profiles are more likely to
lead to "dragnet" searches involving large numbers of innocent people. (The DEA
study of profile use cited supra note 264, for instance, involved contacting 1.3 persons
per thousand in various airports over an eight week period. J. MONAHAN & L.
WALKER, supra note 264, at 226.) If we bar use of profiles for this reason, however,
then a number of-other government investigative techniques (e.g., roadblocks, drug test-
ing, residential and business inspection programs) would be called into question. Per-
haps they should be. But the basis for prohibition should be a lack of sufficient certainty
in light of the intrusion occasioned by such dragnet searches, not the fact that they are
not based on "individualized" suspicion.
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"generalized" suspicion is an insufficient basis for police action both
proves too little and too much. It falls short because a person
targeted by a profile is being stopped for characteristics or actions
specific to that individual, such as nervous appearance, choice of
luggage, and choice of flights (factors which, when taken together,
happen to correlate at a particular level with being a drug courier).
It proves too much because, if carried to its logical conclusion, the
argument would circumscribe many accepted types of police action.
For instance, the suspicion underlying the detention of a person be-
lieved to be a potential criminal is often based on police experience
with previous crimes under similar circumstances; 271 thus, in a
sense, these stops too are based on "generalized" suspicion.
The second objection aimed at profiles and similar investigative
tools is that they often rely on "innocent" facts-that is, facts that
are not clearly related to criminal activity. If police are relying in
an ad hoc, seat-of-the-pants manner on such facts to justify their
actions, there may be cause for concern. 272 But if the state has sta-
tistically demonstrated the relevant correlation between a certain
cluster of individual traits and criminal activity, then the potential
271. Consider, for example, the basis for the stop in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). There Officer McFadden, an officer with 30 years experience in the Cleveland
police department, observed two men take turns walking down the street to stare into a
window 24 times, conferring with each other after each trip. Id. at 5-6. Why is this
behavior cause for intervention? According to Professor Cloud, it is suspicious because
it is "so unique that it distinguishes [the two men] from innocent shoppers and pedestri-
ans." Cloud, supra note 269, at 853. But why is it "unique"? Presumably because all
of us, including Officer McFadden, know from past experience how innocent shoppers
act, and thus how people who are not shoppers act. As many have noted, the difference
between individualized and "actuarial" decisionmaking is not as clear as it seems. See,
e.g., Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Infer-
ence and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1427 (1979) ("Although the
clinician need not identify in advance the characteristics he will regard as salient, he
must nevertheless evaluate the applicant on the basis of a finite number of salient char-
acteristics, and thus, like the statistical decisionmaker, he treats the applicant as a mem-
ber of a class defined by those characteristics."). Like other decisionmakers, police
inevitably act on stereotypes derived from their experience.
The following hypothetical from J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 264, at
225, might better make the point:
Assume that the Cleveland Police Chief asked Officer McFadden and
other similarly experienced officers to address a class of new recruits at
the police academy on the topic, "What to Look for in Preventing Bur-
glaries." Could a recruit take notes at this lecture and then rely on the
experience of Officer McFadden and Officer McFadden's colleagues to
justify the recruit's own reasonable suspicion in making future stops?
If the answer to the question is yes, then one would be hard pressed to conclude that
drug courier profiles cannot be used because they are not "individualized."
272. Especially given the police's crime control bias. See supra note 241.
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 39 UCLA L. Rev. 83 1991-1992
UCLA LAW REVIEW
for abuse is not readily apparent, even if the traits are not by them-
selves usually connected with such activity.
In Camara v. Municipal Court,273 the Supreme Court implic-
itly recognized both of these points. The types of inspections per-
mitted in Camara were, and still are, based on "generalized" rather
than "individualized" suspicion, since they are authorized whenever
evidence of deteriorating conditions in the neighborhood as a whole
exists. Moreover, these inspections routinely rely entirely on facts
as "innocent" as those found in a drug courier profile. Compare, on
the one hand, the relationship between the age of buildings in an
area sought to be inspected and the possibility of a safety code viola-
tion in a particular building and, on the other, the connection be-
tween the departure city of an airplane passenger (say, Bogota,
Colombia) and the possibility that he or she is violating the drug
laws. In both situations, the facts are at best marginally related
"logically" to the illegality in question. But, in each, they may be
relied upon because of their statistical relationship to the eventual-
ity sought to be proven by the government. In short, the fact that
suspicion is "generalized" or based on "innocent" information usu-
ally should not, by itself, bar police action. 274
Occasionally, however, the basis for the level of suspicion pos-
sessed by the police may taint the stop or search. For instance, im-
agine that police in a particular jurisdiction routinely ask all black
persons found in predominantly white neighborhoods for identify-
ing information and an explanation of why they are there.275 By
273. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
274. A third reason for not relying on generalized suspicion is more persuasive: that
the data, statistics, or inferences upon which it relies are unreliable. Empirical assess-
ments are often suspect; for instance, to date, good work on the drug courier profile has
been scanty. See generally Cloud, supra note 269, at 884-920. But see DEA study,
described supra note 264. If well done, however, statistical analyses are hardly less
reliable than the intuitions, unfounded assumptions, and guesswork on which the courts
and police now rely. See generally Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 123, 146 (1980-81) ("[T]he
decisionmaker whose only tool is intuition will often err .... It has been well estab-
lished for some time now that when the same information is available to intuitive
humans or a good mathematical model, the human's decisions are consistently less ac-
curate." (footnote omitted)). The ex ante review process should be able to ferret out
grossly inaccurate empirical information. And the adversarial ex post process is always
available to make more subtle challenges to empirical findings. See generally Monahan
& Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in
Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 498-512 (1986) (recommending methods of evaluating
research and discussing the judiciary's ability to do so).
275. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Taylor, 110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990) (finding unconstitutional a loitering
statute which permitted the police, on 15 separate occasions, to detain or arrest Mr.
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definition, these stops are not based on "individualized" suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot. Nonetheless, analogous to a stop
based on a drug courier profile, the police might have a "genera-
lized" suspicion that a certain percentage of blacks found in all-
white areas are intent on committing or already have committed
crime.
These stops should not be permitted, even in the unlikely event
the aforementioned percentage rose to the level necessary to author-
ize a stop (which, in addition to infringing the autonomy interest,
involves the stigmatization associated with being singled out on the
public street by the police, as well as the possibility of perceived
harassment). The rationale for this conclusion is not that the indi-
vidual interests involved are somehow weightier in this situation
than in others; under the proportionality principle, once the requi-
site certainty (based on the level of intrusion) is established, these
interests have been taken into account. Rather it is grounded in the
belief that a police action which depends upon factors such as race
denigrates the state's interest in maintaining a democratic society
and the allegiance of the populace. As Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion 276 implicitly recognized, the symbolic and actual effect of this
type of government action damages societal institutions regardless
of its empirical justification. 277 Some citizens might see the state's
behavior as a justification for using race as a surrogate in their own
Lawson, a black, because he refused to identify himself and account for his presence in
white or business neighborhoods); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1980) (finding uncon-
stitutional a police stop solely because detainee is in a "high drug problem area").
276. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional separate but equal education of
blacks).
277. The Brown Court quoted the lower court to the following effect:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detri-
mental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.
347 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added). The rest of the quotation (and the Court's opinion)
discusses the negative effects of this sense of inferiority on a black child's ability to learn
and psychological well-being. But the Court has consistently upheld Brown, despite
empirical findings suggesting that segregation may not be particularly harmful educa-
tionally and psychologically. See, e.g., Stephan, School Desegregation: An Evaluation of
Predictions Made in Brown v. Board of Education, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 217
(1978). Moreover, there is considerable evidence to suggest that some members of the
Brown Court preferred focusing on the types of concerns encapsulated in the high-
lighted language. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 689, 706 (1976) (noting Justice
Jackson's aversion to relying on psychological assessments of the impact of segregation
and Chief Justice Warren's minimization of this part of Brown).
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decisionmaking. 278 Other, more sensitive, citizens who experience
or hear about such stops will question the legitimacy not only of the
stops themselves, but of the government that would permit them.279
In either case, the democratic state's interests are severely damaged.
Thus, the proposition advanced here is that those "innocent"
facts which are likely to accentuate or create the appearance of in-
vidious discrimination may not be relied upon in determining inves-
tigative certainty. Other than race, there may be no other
characteristics that fit in this category. For instance, use of factors
such as age or gender in making investigative decisions is probably
permissible, since such a practice is unlikely to induce the kinds of
societal repercussions that use of race would. 280 The full implica-
tions of this idea cannot be developed here; a few further comments
about how its scope might be limited are made in the next section.
B. Roadblocks
Because it is a convenient way of screening for many types of
illegal activity, the roadblock is becoming a popular investigative
technique. As noted earlier in this Article, the United States
Supreme Court has approved the use of roadblocks to detect both
illegal immigration and drunken driving. A closer examination of
these two situations provides further opportunity for elaborating
278. Probably the best example of this phenomenon comes from South Africa,
where private actions are clearly influenced by the government-supported policy of
apartheid. When President F.W. DeKlerk called for the end of apartheid in February
1991, the leader of the Conservative Party stated the move "struck at the roots of white
community life." See South Africa Moves to Scrap Apartheid, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1991,
at Al, col. 1.
279. Monroe, Complaints About a Crackdown, TIME, July 16, 1990, at 20 (describ-
ing hostile community reaction to "dragnet" stops of Hispanics and other minorities by
Los Angeles police).
280. For this reason, the position in the text is quite different from traditional equal
protection analysis. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW §§ 14.1-14.10 (3d ed. 1986). The latter analysis, at bottom, focuses on
whether a particular characteristic is irrelevant to the decision at issue; in most cases in
which an equal protection claim is raised, such as decisionmaking about employment
and housing, race is not pertinent and discrimination based on it makes out a colorable
constitutional claim. Id. § 14.5. In the investigative context, on the other hand, race
may well be a useful discriminating variable. See J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PRE-
DICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 74-75 (1980). The argument here is that, even if this
correlation exists, race may not be relied upon as an investigative factor, given the nega-
tive effects on state interests described in the text. See generally Johnson, Race and the
Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 241-50 (1983). Use of other factors
that have a high correlation to crime (e.g., gender and age) is unlikely to create the same
negative effects.
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the two-factor approach to search and seizure regulation advocated
here.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,281 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a checkpoint established in southern California
to detect illegal immigration. The Court required neither a warrant
nor any level of suspicion as authorization for either the initial
"slow-down" stop at this checkpoint, or the referral of selected indi-
viduals to a secondary checkpoint where their papers could be
checked. 282 This holding is clearly suspect under the exigency prin-
ciple; whether it conforms with the proportionality principle is
more difficult to ascertain.
Unlike the street stops described above, the illegal activity
sought to be discovered by the checkpoints did not present the gov-
ernment with an emergency. Thus, the exigency principle would
require authorization of the roadblock by someone independent of
the law enforcement officers who operated it. On this point, the
Court noted that "[t]he location of a ... checkpoint is not chosen
by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall
decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement
resources. '283 Although the officials "responsible for making over-
all decisions" probably were not involved in front-line law enforce-
ment, neither were they immune from the crime control biases of
the police. Some check on their authority by an independent magis-
trate would prevent indiscriminate use of the checkpoint
mechanism. 284
The more difficult aspect of Martinez-Fuerte is whether the in-
dependent authority should permit such a roadblock. In addressing
this issue, the Court relied primarily on the harm severity/difficulty
of detection rationales. It concluded that the illegal immigration
problem was "substantial" and that checkpoints of the type advo-
cated by the government are the only method of detecting signifi-
cant numbers of illegal aliens. 28 5 These facts, in addition to the
281. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
282. See id. at 546-47 for a detailed description of the procedures at issue.
283. Id. at 559.
284. The Court's only comment in this regard was to "assume that such officials will
be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists
as a class." Id. This point is probably true, but does not consider whether the officials
will have sufficient justification, as discussed below, for authorizing a particular
roadblock.
285. Id. at 557-58 ("[Iln their absence [the] highways would offer illegal aliens a
quick and safe route into the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many
smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of such highways.").
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relatively unintrusive nature of the roadblocks, 2 6 lead the Court to
hold that no suspicion is required before stopping people at such
checkpoints and referring them to a secondary checkpoint. 287
Martinez-Fuerte is another example of how the harm severity/
difficulty of detection concept can be abused. While the Court's
findings with respect to the scope of illegal immigration and its elu-
siveness are readily acceptable, they distract from the central pro-
portionality question that should determine the legitimacy of a
search or seizure: is the government action effective enough to jus-
tify its impact on autonomy and privacy interests? In Martinez-
Fuerte, this determination would have required an attempt to gauge
the extent to which, without the roadblocks, the harm associated
with illegal immigration-whatever its magnitude and however dif-
ficult to prevent-would increase. In other words, some effort at
generating generalized suspicion should have been made.
As developed below, sufficient information is available from
the Court's opinion in Martinez-Fuerte to make such an assessment.
But before the certainty inquiry required by the proportionality
principle can be taken up, an important preliminary issue needs to
be addressed. Justice Brennan's dissent in Martinez-Fuerte argued
that the stops authorized by that case were unconstitutional be-
cause, inter alia, the immigration officers focused almost exclusively
on Hispanics.288 Note that race was not the sole criterion for the
stops in Martinez-Fuerte: at the initial stop, every car was detained,
however briefly,289 and the secondary referrals, although based
"largely" on race, did not rely entirely on that factor, since only a
small proportion of Hispanics were referred. 29° But race clearly
286. Id. at 565 (degree of intrusion associated with roadblock "hardly can be com-
pared" with that occasioned by search of a house).
287. The Court's conclusion that suspicionless stops were permissible was most ex-
plicit with respect to the initial stops; there, requiring "reasonable suspicion would be
impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized
study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal
aliens." Id. at 557. With respect to the referral stop it stated: "As the intrusion here is
sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify it, we think it
follows that the Border Patrol officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor-
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved." Id. at 563-64.
288. Id. at 571-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 546 ("The 'point' agent standing between the two lanes of traffic visually
screens all northbound vehicles, which the checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a com-
plete halt." (footnote omitted)).
290. Id. at 563 n.16 ("Less than 1% of the motorists passing the checkpoint are
stopped for questioning, whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and legally
resident Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the population
of southern California.").
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was an important criterion in the decision to refer drivers to the
secondary checkpoint. Absent this factor, the government's level of
suspicion would have been significantly reduced (and, under pro-
portionality analysis, the level of intrusion permitted correspond-
ingly decreased).
Nonetheless, on the facts of Martinez-Fuerte, race may have
been a legitimate factor for government officials to consider, despite
the position taken above against race-based investigative decisions.
In contrast to the hypothetical in the previous section, this trait is
directly relevant to the substantive crime which the government
was attempting to detect in Martinez-Fuerte, at least if one assumes
that all or virtually all illegal immigrants in Southern California are
of Hispanic ethnic origin. On this assumption, those who enter the
country illegally are known to be Hispanic; in the previous hypo-
thetical, those who commit or are about to commit burglary are not
known to be black. Put another way, the negative symbolic effect of
stopping Hispanics in order to detect illegal immigration by Hispan-
ics in Southern California is negligible compared to that associated
with stopping blacks to prevent burglary in white neighborhoods. 291
Citizens are unlikely to view this state activity as a model for engag-
ing in racist behavior or as a sign that the state is corrupt or dis-
criminatory. Although a close question, one could provisionally
conclude that, in this context, race was a permissible factor to
consider.
Assuming the use of race as one of the bases for developing
suspicion is not problematic, the stops in Martinez-Fuerte were jus-
tified under the proportionality analysis suggested in this Article.
According to data from one of the cases consolidated for that deci-
sion, during an eight-day period, 0.12 percent of those initially
stopped and twenty percent of those referred to the secondary
checkpoint were illegal immigrants. 292 Translated into levels of sus-
picion regarding future stops at this location, these success rates are
relatively low. But the initial "slow-down" involved only a visual
survey of the car's occupants, thus requiring little or no suspi-
291. In the Court's words, "[d]ifferent considerations would arise if, for example,
reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Ca-
nadian border." Id. at 564 n.17.
An analogous situation arises when police know the perpetrator of a particular
crime is of a certain race. Certainly they would be allowed to rely on race as one of the
factors in deciding who to investigate for that crime.
292. Id. at 554 (171 out of the 146,000 vehicles referred contained illegal aliens); id.
at 564 n.17 (roughly 20% of referred vehicles contained one or more illegal aliens).
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cion.293 The secondary referral was more intrusive, but generally
involved only a few questions and a document check, lasting from
three to five minutes. 294 To me, the levels of "generalized" belief
that illegal immigrants will pass through the checkpoint seem
roughly proportional to the levels of intrusion associated with the
effort to detect them.295
Thus, the result under the proportionality principle could be
the same as the Court's result using harm severity/difficulty of de-
tection analysis. But proportionality reasoning is preferable, be-
cause it requires the state to make a showing of some suspicion (if
only of the "generalized" variety) before it acts296 and because it
focuses solely on the level of intrusion as the gauge of how much
certainty should be required. In contrast, the Court's approach im-
plies that the government may set up such roadblocks at will, and
reaches this conclusion relying in part on abstract factors such as
the "substantiality" of the illegal immigration problem and the
"formidable" obstacles to detecting it.
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 297 the Supreme
Court relied on similar factors in holding that warrantless, suspi-
cionless' stops may be made at roadblocks set up to detect drunk
drivers, so long as every driver is stopped. Sitz not only used the
inappropriate analysis, but, unlike Martinez-Fuerte, is clearly
wrong. First, while the roadblock in Martinez-Fuerte was at least
authorized by a third party, the location of the checkpoint in Sitz
was chosen by police on the street in obvious violation of the exi-
gency principle.298 Second, the success rate in Sitz was too low to
293. Id. at 546 ("Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress without any
oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a relatively small number of cases the
'point' agent will conclude that further inquiry is in order.").
294. Id. at 546-47.
295. Note that, at least according to one survey, judges, on average, equate reason-
able suspicion with a 30% degree of certainty. McCauliff, supra note 130, at 1328. The
second document-check stop in Martinez-Fuerte is probably shorter and, more impor-
tantly, less likely to result in harassment or stigmatization, than the typical stop and
frisk authorized by Terry v. Ohio.
296. How is the government to obtain the types of statistics normally relied upon for
an assessment of generalized suspicion without carrying out the proposed action and
thus possibly unjustifiably infringing on individual interests? Occasionally, data may be
available from another jurisdiction. Cf. Michigan Dep't of Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct.
2481, 2491 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (looking at Maryland data). If not, the ex
ante reviewer might, based on informed speculation, authorize a new type of search or
seizure with the proviso that careful records be kept and that subsequent review take
place.
297. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
298. The checkpoint was set up by the Saginaw County Sheriff's Office, operating
under general guidelines established by the Sobriety Check-Point Advisory Commis-
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justify the degree of intrusion involved in the case. The record re-
vealed that only 1.6 percent (2 out of 126) of those stopped at the
sobriety checkpoint in question were drunk.299 Under the propor-
tionality rule, the issue is whether this level of success is sufficient to
justify the type of intrusion involved in a roadblock. By comparing
the intrusion in Sitz with other situations already discussed, we can
get a rough sense of why this issue too should have been resolved
against the government.
The brief detention of motorists that occurs at the type of road-
block at issue in Sitz clearly is not as intrusive as an arrest. Nor is it
as invasive as a stop on the street if, as the Court required, every car
is stopped (thus reducing the potential for harassment and stigmati-
zation) and the occupants are questioned for only a few moments
and allowed to remain in their car (thus reducing the insult to pri-
vacy). But even under these circumstances, a significant intrusion
occurs. Unlike the permanent checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, so-
briety checkpoints are transient. 300 A driver is thus more likely to
be surprised by the checkpoint, and is less able to prepare for or
limit the intrusion into privacy it occasions. 30 1 More importantly,
the kind of search for evidence of intoxication authorized in Sitz is
likely to be' far more wide-ranging than the routinized check con-
ducted at an immigration checkpoint. The typical stop in Sitz
lasted as long as necessary to convince the officer (using whatever
criteria he or she wanted) that the driver was not intoxicated (with
the average stop taking twenty-five seconds, despite the fact that
many drivers were undoubtedly waved on after a very brief encoun-
ter). 302 In contrast, the initial stop in Martinez-Fuerte consisted of
a cursory visual inspection lasting only a few seconds, and the sec-
ondary stop, although on average lasting longer than the stops in
Sitz, could be brought to an end as soon as appropriate documents
were produced. As Justice Stevens intimates in his Sitz dissent, 303
the roadblock in that case was more invasive than the initial stops
sion, composed of state police, local police forces, state prosecutors, and representatives
of the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. 110 S. Ct. at
2483 -84.
299. Id. at 2487.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 2484 (majority opinion).
303. Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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permitted in Martinez-Fuerte, and at least as invasive as the secon-
dary stops authorized by that decision.3a 4
In justifying the majority's conclusion in Sitz, Chief Justice
Rehnquist compared the 1.6 percent success rate in that case with
the 0.12 percent detection rate at the initial stop in Martinez-
Fuerte.305 Based on the foregoing, the more relevant comparison in
terms of intrusiveness is not this latter figure but the success rate at
the secondary referral point, which was twenty percent. Applying
the proportionality principle on these facts, the generalized suspi-
cion possessed by police operating the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz
did not justify their conduct.306
C. Regulatory Inspections
Often a government search and seizure will be designed to im-
plement regulatory objectives, as opposed to prosecutorial or disci-
plinary goals. This Article has already alluded to some of these
situations. 30 7 Other examples are as diverse as the government's
regulatory interests. For instance, a city may conduct regular
health inspections of restaurants and stores, or look for sources of
disease, such as rat infestation, in residential areas.30 Or a state or
federal government may want to inspect certain kinds of industries
for violations of safety regulations3°9 or to ensure that government
304. Note that, in Australia, sobriety checkpoints are operated in a much less intru-
sive manner. Every driver passing through a given location is stopped, told the reason
for the stop, and subjected to a breathalyzer test. If the results are positive, arrest re-
sults. If they are negative, the driver is allowed to pass through. The entire length of
the detention is one to three minutes. Conversation with members of Monash Law
Faculty, Melbourne, Australia (April 1991). This method, which leaves no discretion
to the officer and is standard practice for all drivers, would be justifiable on a lower level
of certainty than that required for the open-ended detentions involved in Sitz.
305. 110 S. Ct. at 2488.
306. Sometimes the "success rate" for a particular investigative technique may be
artificially lowered by its deterrent effect. Thus if, prior to the checkpoint conducted in
Sitz, Michigan had relied on sobriety checkpoints and widely publicized that fact, the
1.6% figure might not have accurately reflected the percentage of drunken drivers who
normally drive through that area. However, this potential problem did not affect the
data in Sitz, since the checkpoint at issue was the first of its kind in the state. Id. at
2484. Thus, Sitz was a useful "test case." See supra note 296.
307. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
308. See, e.g.,.Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362 (1959), overruled by Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (quoting BALTIMORE CITY CODE art. 12, § 112,
which requires that "[e]very dwelling and every part thereof shall be kept clean and free
from any accumulation of dirt, filth, rubbish, garbage or similar matter, and shall be
kept free from vermin or rodent infestation").
309. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (dealing with Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1985), which permits inspec-
[Vol. 39:1
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restrictions on sales of certain types of products (for example, liquor
or weapons) are met.310
When such inspections are nonconsensual and nonexigent, 311 a
decisionmaker divorced from agency activity should authorize
them. Although it may argue for less formal procedures, 312 the
mere fact that the inspectors are not police does not exempt them
from the law enforcement orientation that precludes police objectiv-
ity in deciding whether a search or seizure is necessary. Such moni-
toring is required because it will make the agency justify itself, thus
helping to prevent personal vendettas and pretextual inspections. 31 3
However, as Camara and other Court decisions have recog-
nized, the level of certainty that health or safety problems exist in a
particular residence or business need not be very high. 314 Justice
White's opinion in Camara gave three reasons for this conclusion:
First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all danger-
ous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any
tions of the work area of most large companies in the United States, for the purpose of
locating safety and health hazards and ensuring conformance with OSHA regulations).
310. See, e.g., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 73-74
(1970) (dealing with 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) (1989), which provided that Treasury agents
may enter and inspect the premises of retail dealers in liquors to inspect certain records,
documents, and inventory).
311. Most regulatory inspections are not of an emergency nature. However, a few
are. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (immediate searches of burned
down premises to discover cause of fire); Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(inspections for purposes of discovering contagion that might spread quickly).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 121-123.
313. As the Court stated in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978),
"[t]he authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbridled discretion
upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to
search and whom to search." The Court has also noted the possibility that inspectors
may serve as a "front" for the police. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 229-30
(1960).
For some types of inspections, the absence of discretion exception to the warrant
requirement, see supra text accompanying notes 98-103, may be applicable. See, e.g.,
Dome Realty, Inc. v. City of Paterson, 83 N.J. 212, 240, 416 A.2d 334, 350 (1980)
(inspectors certifying that unoccupied premises are occupiable by new tenant have "no
discretion regarding which dwellings are to be searched .... Under the ordinance an
inspection occurs only when the landlord requests one. It is restricted to a determina-
tion of compliance with each of the several standards contained in the housing code."
(citations omitted)). Note, however, that even when this exception is applicable, a judge
should evaluate the reasonableness of the statute authorizing the inspection. See supra
text accompanying note 126.
314. In addition to the Court's ruling in Camara, see supra text accompanying notes
246-250; Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321 & n.17 (allowing a warrant to issue for an OSHA
inspection upon a showing that the requested inspection is part of a general enforcement
plan based on "neutral criteria" such as "accident experience and the number of em-
ployees exposed in particular industries").
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other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results....
Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature
nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a
relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. 315
The first reason given by the Court may or may not be a make-
weight,316 depending upon what is meant by "public acceptance," a
phrase to which we will return in a moment. Justice White's second
reason describes the harm severity/difficulty-of-detection rationale,
which this Article has argued should be considered only in unusual
cases. Residential inspections of the type addressed in Camara
might be one of these rare cases: without entering the house, deter-
mining whether it might be in violation of health or safety codes is
often almost impossible. Nonetheless, for reasons given below, re-
sort to this rationale is probably unnecessary and thus, given the
drawbacks associated with it,317 inadvisable.
Justice White's final rationale for permitting house inspections
on less than traditional "probable cause" is that they are less intru-
sive, in two ways: first, such inspections do not focus on those parts
of the home most likely to house personal or intimate items or ac-
tivities; and second, their purpose is not to find evidence of crime,
but rather is motivated by a desire to discover and correct condi-
tions that otherwise might harm the individual. The second reason
may be the most important. While inspectors will not rifle through
desk drawers or snoop through closets, they will often see the inside
of one's house, traditionally viewed as one's private sphere. In the
process, intimate or personal items may inadvertently be discov-
ered, even when notice of the inspection is given. But the searched
party may still perceive such inspections to be relatively noninvasive
if they are primarily regulatory in nature. 318
Research indicates that the motivation behind a search is ex-
tremely relevant to the level of intrusion associated with it.319 Of
315. 387 U.S. at 537.
316. Professor LaFave, for one, discounts this reason, noting that in Frank v. Mary-
land, 359 U.S. 360, 384 n.2 (1959), the dissenters had referred to a "history of acquies-
cence." 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 232, at 603.
317. The drawbacks of relying on this rationale are discussed supra.in the text ac-
companying notes 179-197. Here, such reliance, in practice, removes any suspicion
requirement, even of a generalized nature, thus creating a disincentive to obtain better
statistical analysis of what outward factors correlate with health and safety violations.
318. In residential inspection cases, criminal prosecution, if it occurs at all, typically
comes only after the resident has been given the opportunity to correct the violation.
See Camara, 387 U.S. at 531. Occasionally, a criminal complaint will be filed immedi-
ately after a violation is discovered, but it too will be withdrawn if the problem is
promptly rectified. Id.
319. Small, supra note 119, at 64.
[Vol. 39:1
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course, as already pointed out,320 merely calling a search "regula-
tory" or "administrative" in nature does not lessen its intrusiveness.
When the purpose of the government action is to punish or shame
(as with searches for infractions of school disciplinary rules), it is
likely to be seen as intrusive even if it does not result in criminal
prosecution. But if the object is to facilitate and aid (as in fire,
safety, and health inspections), then the typical reaction may be dif-
ferent. As in the airport frisk scenario presented earlier, 32' people
subjected to such inspections may be grateful for the intrusion even
if nothing is discovered; this may be what the Court meant when it
stated that regulatory searches have a "long history of public ac-
ceptance." If this perception is correct, 322 residential inspections
may be justifiable based on a very low level of generalized suspicion
without resorting to the difficulty-of-detection rationale.
The same type of analysis might apply to businesses subject to
health and safety regulations. Typically, those parts of a business
that are inspected are even less likely to be associated with intimate
activities than are the areas of a house subject to regulation. And,
one would hope, business owners should welcome government at-
tempts to improve working conditions or ensure conformance with
valid regulations. Thus, one might conclude that, like residential
inspections, these inspections should not be subject to a stringent
certainty threshold.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 115-119.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 198-200.
322. But cf. Justice Clark's dissent in Camara, which described a voluntary inspec-
tion program in Oregon in which one out of six persons refused entry to inspectors. 387
U.S. at 552-53 (Clark, J., dissenting). This refusal rate is not low, but it does not dis-
prove the conclusion in the text. Given the voluntary nature of the program, the 83%
consent rate (5 out of 6) seems quite high; it is unlikely anything approaching this rate
would be obtained from truly uncoerced individuals asked to permit a search of their
house or person for evidence of crime.
Note also that if the assumption about people's generally accepting attitudes to-
ward residential inspections is correct, then most of the refusers in the Oregon study
must have been persons who were covering up conditions they thought might result in
significant repair costs if discovered; accordingly, the refusals should be viewed as evi-
dence of guilt, sufficient to authorize a nonconsensual entry. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 201-204. It would be nice to know why the refusers in the Oregon study
refused and what percentage of them were covering up code violations.
If one does not accept the rationale advanced in the text for concluding that resi-
dential inspections are unintrusive, the proportionality principle would probably require
a higher level of certainty for residential inspections than the government is currently
able to demonstrate (given the fact that they take place in the home). If so, as the text
notes, this might be one of the few situations in which the future harm/difficulty of
detection rationale would permit intrusions based on a disproportionate level of
certainty.
1991]
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Although this is probably the correct result in many cases, it
cannot be arrived at so easily. First, except for those parts of a
business which are truly open to the public323 rather than to just its
employees or management, some degree of privacy is and should be
expected.324 Second, the reality is that business owners are less
likely than homeowners to believe that government health and
safety regulations are designed for their benefit. Workplace inspec-
tions are likely to be much more disruptive and expensive;325 more-
over, they occasion considerably more anxiety, given the myriad
ways in which a business can incur civil and even criminal liability
through violation of complex regulations that are often not well un-
derstood or even known about. 326 Consequently, in some indus-
tries, the sense of intrusion experienced by inspected business
owners, even "innocent" ones, is probably greater than that felt by
the typical homeowner subjected to a safety check.
There are two ways in which this heightened sense of invasion
might be minimized. The first, adopted by the Supreme Court in
connection with inspections of "heavily regulated industries, '327 is
to assume that business owners agree to undergo random, surprise
323. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978) ("What is observable
by the public is observable, without a warrant, by the Government inspector as well.");
see also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985) (no "search" when a detective entered
an adult bookstore and purchased two magazines which later formed the basis for an
obscenity prosecution).
324. See Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 315 ("The owner of a business has not, by the neces-
sary utilization of employees in his operation, thrown open the areas where employees
alone are permitted to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents.").
325. For instance, under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 801-840 (1988), underground mines are to be inspected at least four times per year
and surface mines twice a year. Such inspections are time-consuming. The mine in-
spection contested in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), had gone on for an hour
before it was terminated by the president of the mining company. Id. at 597. More-
over, they can result in significant expenditure. In Dewey, for instance, the contested
inspection was designed to determine whether 25 violations had been corrected. Id.
326. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (criminal conviction of
company president under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act affirmed, based on
a finding that he had a responsible relation to the situation, which was rodent activity in
a company warehouse located in another city). See generally O'Keefe & Shapiro, Per-
sonal Criminal Liability Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: The Dot-
terweich Doctrine, 30 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 5, 14 (1975) (describing cases where jail
sentences have been imposed on a negligence basis).
327. The leading case is United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), described
supra note 77. The heavily regulated industries rubric is a category which expands with
each new Court case dealing with business searches. For a recent entry, see New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (finding that New York junkyards covered by a recently
passed state statute are heavily regulated). As Justice Stewart pointed out in Donovan
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), the Court's cases suggest that government can now
constitutionally "define any industry as dangerous, regulate it substantially, and provide
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searches as a condition of doing business. If, as this Article con-
tends, intrusiveness is the key variable in determining the reasona-
bleness of a search, this "implied consent" rationale is a hoax. A
surprise inspection is not made less offensive because its victim has,
in effect, been forced to consent to it in advance.328 While the inten-
sity of government regulation may indicate the extent to which an
industry is "dangerous" (thus suggesting that the requisite "genera-
lized" certainty level will be easily achieved), the potential for un-
necessary invasions of privacy, harassment, and stigmatization is
similar whether one's business is "heavily regulated" or not regu-
lated at all.
A second way of looking at business inspections-which more
persuasively shows why at least some of them may be thought of as
minimally intrusive-is to consider them from the perspective of
the employees rather than the employers. Most health and safety
inspections, for instance, are more an invasion of the workers' space
than of the owner's. Although the owner has legal title to the in-
spected building, the employees are the people who work in and
suffer from an unhealthy or unsafe environment. Viewed from the
latter's perspective, the motivation behind a government inspection
may well be benign, not punitive.
Consider government inspections of a toxic chemical plant.
Although the management of such a company might want to pre-
vent unrestricted government access, the employees of the plant
(the occupiers of the space to be inspected) would probably wel-
come government agents as often as they wish to come.329 As with
the airport frisks analyzed earlier-and in contrast to the Court's
"heavily regulated industry" analysis-here the implied consent is
likely to be "genuine," and thus likely to support a finding of re-
duced intrusiveness. In situations where this is SO, 3 30 the same low
for warrantless [and probably suspicionless] inspections of its members." Id. at 613-14
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
328. As one court nicely put it, in discussing the state of affairs in the mining indus-
try: "It would be far more accurate to state that [the] legislation and regulations ...
'entered' [the operator's] business activity" than to state that the operator "subject[ed]
himself to governmental supervision and regulation." Marshall v. Wait, 628 F.2d 1255,
1259 (9th Cir. 1980).
329. For interesting examples of how the interests of workers and owners are often
in direct conflict where health and safety issues are involved, see Fidler, The Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act and the Internal Responsibility System, 24 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 315 (1987). Fidler concludes: "[M]anagement and workers do not ... have conver-
gent interests in workplace health and safety." Id. at 339 (emphasis in original).
330. Of course, this analysis would not apply to many types of business inspections.
In some of the cases where it does not, e.g., Biswell (which involved search of a single
1991]
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level of certainty that is sufficient for residential inspections may be
appropriate for business inspections.
D. Drug and Alcohol Testing
One of the more controversial issues in the United States today
is the legality of state-conducted tests to determine whether govern-
ment employees are using drugs or alcohol.331 Whether such test-
ing relies on hypodermic needles, urine samples, or breath analysis,
it constitutes an infringement of individual interests3 32 and, under
the approach advocated in this Article, should only be permitted if
some degree of suspicion exists. But the United States Supreme
Court has indicated that warrantless, suspicionless drug testing is
permitted under the Fourth Amendment in any government work
environment where the state can show a compelling interest in en-
suring that the employees are drug and alcohol free. This Article
has already criticized the reasoning of the decisions which support
this proposition;3 33 to some extent this criticism is repeated and
elaborated upon below, but the primary effort here will be to illus-
proprietor pawn shop under the Gun Control Act of 1968), virtually suspicionless in-
spections might be allowed under a future harm/difficulty of detection rationale. But in
others, this rationale is clearly inapposite.
Consider, for instance, the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691 (1987), upholding a state statute which permits warrantless, surprise inspec-
tions ofjunkyards and vehicle dismantlers at any time during business hours. The pur-
pose of the statute is to allow checks of the junkyard owners' license status and records,
and to determine whether any vehicles or parts on the premises were stolen. See id. at
694 n. 1. The searches authorized by the law are more intrusive than the typical busi-
ness inspection in that their primary purpose is not to help the owner but to procure
evidence of crime; indeed, they may be, and often are, conducted by the police. Id.
Thus, under the approach advocated in this Article, they should be based on a fairly
high level of certainty that the searched junkyard owner is involved in receiving stolen
property (and should also require a warrant). There is no indication that such suspicion
would be any more difficult to develop than in other cases of street crime: the junkyard
could be monitored from off-premises, car thieves could be tracked (after stealing cars
"planted" by the police), or suspicion might be derived through "generalized" means.
But the Court's sole justification for permitting random, suspicionless searches was that
"the State rationally may believe that it will reduce car theft by regulations that prevent
automobile junkyards from becoming markets for stolen vehicles and that help trace the
origin and destination of vehicle parts." Id. at 709. Burger is another example of
"weak" harm severity/difficulty of detection analysis that borders on evaluating the
propriety of an investigative technique solely by looking at whether the government's
effectiveness claim sounds plausible. See infra text accompanying notes 179-197.
331. A computer search solely for legal articles about drug testiig published in the
past two years revealed over fifty pieces.
332. These techniques are described in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 624-27 (1989). Their intrusiveness is evaluated further, infra text accom-
panying notes 344-346.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 179-192.
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trate how the ideas developed in this Article might apply to the two
fact situations that faced the Court.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 334 is the case,
alluded to earlier, in which the Court upheld a drug test program
administered by the Customs Service. This program requires test-
ing of anyone who applies for or seeks promotion to a customs job
connected with interdicting drugs or use of arms.335 The Court
found that the program, which clearly permits suspicionless testing,
was necessary to safeguard against employment of agents who, "be-
cause of their own drug use, [become] unsympathetic to their mis-
sion of interdicting narcotics" or impaired while using their
weapons.336
In short, the Court relied on the harm severity/difficulty of de-
tection rationale. Use of this rationale should be sparing, and was
clearly not called for here. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dis-
sent in Von Raab, the government made no showing that any harm,
much less severe harm, results from drug use by customs agents.337
Recognizing this fact, the Court had to fall back on the assertion
that, because drug-induced impairment might become a substantial
problem for the Customs Service sometime in the future, a drug
testing program should be in place now to prevent it.338 For rea-
334. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
335. Id. at 677.
336. Id. at 670.
337. Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What is absent in the Government's justifi-
cations--notably absent, revealingly absent, and as far as I am concerned dispositively
absent-is the recitation of even a single instance in which any of the speculated hor-
ribles actually occurred: an instance, that is, in which the cause of bribetaking, or of
poor aim, or of unsympathetic law enforcement, or of compromise of classified informa-
tion, was drug use." (emphasis in original)).
338. The Court stated:
The mere circumstance that all but a few of the employees tested are
entirely innocent of wrongdoing does not impugn the program's validity.
The same is likely to be true of householders who are required to submit
to suspicionless housing code inspections, [citing Camara] and of motor-
ists who are stopped at the checkpoints we approved in [Martinez-Fu-
erte]. The Service's program is designed to prevent the promotion of
drug users to sensitive positions as much as it is designed to detect those
employees who use drugs. Where, as here, the possible harm against
which the Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent
its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches cal-
culated to advance the Government's goal.
Id. at 674-75 (citations omitted). The Court's reliance on Camara and Martinez-Fuerte
is to no avail: in both of those cases, the government, although it should have been more
specific, at least demonstrated that a significant problem existed (in the first case, wide-
spread hazardous violations, 387 U.S. at 551, and in the second, "formidable" numbers
of illegal immigrants, 428 U.S. at 552). In Von Raab, .it did not.
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sons described earlier, 339 deterrence justifications such as this have
no place in search and seizure analysis separate from an assessment
of how intrusive the deterrent might be. And because the evidence
in Von Raab indicated that people who apply for or become cus-
toms agents are extremely unlikely to engage in drug use, they
should not be subject, absent "individualized" suspicion, to even the
least intrusive type of test.34°
On the other hand, as already noted, Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association 341 illustrates a situation in which a govern-
ment drug test program might have been justified. Skinner, it will
be remembered, involved a program which required drug and alco-
hol testing for all railway workers involved in an accident or sus-
pected of having violated certain rules (such as failing to heed a
signal). In contrast to the paucity of information provided in Von
Raab about the anticipated harm, in Skinner the government
presented historical data suggesting a nontrivial probability that
such workers are impaired by drug or alcohol use.342 Because the
statistical information was not presented with the proportionality
inquiry in mind, it does not clearly make out a good case under that
principle. But the potential for showing sufficient "generalized sus-
picion" was surely there.343
339. See supra text accompanying notes 193-195.
340. The specific test at issue in Von Raab was urinalysis, which requires the em-
ployee to remove outer garments and personal belongings, and to produce a urine sam-
ple behind a partition, while a monitor of the same sex "remains close at hand to listen
for the normal sounds of urination." 489 U.S. at 661. Much less offensive is a
breathalyzer test, but this method only provides information about blood-alcohol con-
tent, see Comment, supra note 189, at 710, and thus was not at issue in Von Raab.
Even the breathalyzer test should not be permitted if no suspicion exists.
341. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
342. A Federal Railway Administration study found that from 1972 to 1983 "the
nation's railroads experienced at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol or
drug use as a probable cause or contributing factor .. " Id. at 607 (quoting 48 Fed.
Reg. 30726 (1983)). The same study connected "an additional 17 fatalities to operating
employees working on or around rail rolling stock that involved alcohol or drugs as a
contributing factor." Id. Finally, 23% of the railways' operating personnel were
"problem drinkers." Id. at 607 n. 1.
343. Most useful would have been information about the number of railway acci-
dents in the 11-year period studied by the FRA, see supra note 342. Had the 21 acci-
dents attributable to substance abuse been a significant percentage (say over 20%) of the
total number of accidents during that period, then the government would have had a
strong case for subjecting all those responsible for any accidents to testing, or at least for
the less intrusive types of tests (e.g., breathalyzer and perhaps urine tests). If the per-
centage were insufficiently high, then the state should not have been able to use these
devices. However, other less intrusive alternatives may exist. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 189-192.
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Once a certainty level is established, the difficult issue, again, is
gauging the level of intrusion involved in the government action-
here, blood, urine, and breathalyzer tests. In both Skinner and Von
Raab, the Court's treatment of the intrusiveness issue consisted al-
most entirely of the familiar-sounding conclusion that government
employees have a lowered expectation of privacy vis-a-vis testing
because they know information about their on-the-job fitness will be
elicited. 3" This reasoning is merely another version of the spurious
("nongenuine") implied consent rationale encountered in the busi-
ness inspection cases: being told you will be subject to a search does
not make it less intrusive. Any employer is entitled to make sure its
employees are fit for the job. But this truism does not justify every
technique the government devises to test fitness.
Under the proportionality principle, a more sensitive appraisal
of the privacy and autonomy interests infringed by drug and alcohol
testing is necessary. Like residential inspections, such testing might
be characterized as "facilitative" in nature because the individual
who tests positive is often treated rather than punished.345 But, in
contrast to the inspection context, even a truly beneficent motiva-
tion is unlikely to diminish the sense of privacy invasion occasioned
by testing for psychoactive substance use. First, such testing is
more likely to embarrass and stigmatize than inspections of the
home, both because it is conducted at the workplace and because it
involves a search of the person. Second, unlike faulty wiring or
leaky plumbing, drug and alcohol use is something that, for all sorts
of reasons, people want to keep private. Third, the government's
role in the two situations is very different. Regulatory inspections
are often welcomed in part because government expertise is needed
344. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 ("Unlike most private citizens or government em-
ployees in general, employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect
effective inquiry into their fitness and probity. Much the same is true of employees who
are required to carry firearms."); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627 ("More importantly, the
expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their partici-
pation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in
substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees."). Note how, under the
Court's analysis, the "strong" government interest in avoiding the harm caused by sub-
stance abuse not only weighs down the government's side of the scales but also lightens
the individual's.
345. Roughly 60% of the Fortune 500 companies have employee assistance pro-
grams (EAPs), which give employees who test positive the opportunity to undergo reha-
bilitation as a condition of keeping their jobs. BNA, ALCOHOL & DRUGS IN THE
WORKPLACE: COSTS, CONTROLS, AND CONTROVERSIES 40 (1986) (quoting a National
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism survey).
1991]
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to ascertain whether health or safety codes are being violated. 346 In
contrast, people do not require government intervention to alert
them to the fact that they are using drugs or alcohol; if they need
help, they can seek it on their own. In short, the intrusion associ-
ated with substance abuse testing is significantly greater than that
associated with residential inspections and, accordingly, the cer-
tainty threshold should be much higher.
A second aspect of both Skinner and Von Raab was their rejec-
tion of a warrant requirement. In Skinner, the Court gave two rea-
sons for this holding that are of concern here.3 47 The first was the
rapidity with which drug or alcohol dissipates from the blood-
stream.3 48 Clearly, to the extent a warrant cannot be obtained
before a given test or test program (as will often be the case after a
railway accident), the exigency principle would apply and a warrant
should not be required. However, the Court also relied on the ab-
sence of discretion rationale, pointing out that the governing regula-
tions require all railway workers involved in an accident or safety
violation to be tested.349 Thus, according to the Court, judicial au-
thorization is unnecessary even in the absence of exigency.
.This latter justification for dispensing with ex ante review falls
short. It may be that no discretion is exercised by the railway offi-
cials who conduct the tests, thus making judicial oversight before
each individual administration useless. Indeed, when "generalized"
suspicion is relied upon, every individual who fits the general cate-
gory of suspects--e.g., those involved in railway accidents-must
be tested for the certainty level to have any relevance. Even so, the
reasonableness of the testing program should still be analyzed by
someone who is not involved in the procedure. Unless an independ-
ent authority makes the determination, based on the type of general
data referred to above, that the requisite probability is present, a
routine post-accident testing program like that involved in Skinner
should not be inaugurated.
346. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) ("Many ... condi-
tions-faulty wiring is an obvious example-are not observable from outside the build-
ing and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself.").
347. The third reason was the "special needs" justification that employers should
not be burdened with a warrant requirement. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-24. For a
discussion of this aspect of Skinner, see supra text accompanying notes 115-123.
348. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623.
349. Id. at 621-22 ("[I]n light of the standardized nature of the tests and the mini-
mal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are virtu-
ally no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.").
[Vol. 39:1
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E. Undercover Activity
Investigation by undercover agents has always been an impor-
tant component of law enforcement in the United States, and its use
has increased tremendously with the growth of organized crime and
the drug trade. Nonetheless, it is essentially unregulated. As noted
earlier,350 in a series of decisions the United States Supreme Court
has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to this investi-
gative technique-whether performed by persons or by institutions
such as banks or phone companies-because citizens assume the
risk that anyone they deal with might reveal their confidences.
It cannot be denied that one risks public revelation of private
thoughts any time one takes on a confidante. Once again, however,
the Court's assumption of the risk/implied consent analysis takes
on an air of fantasy. We "assume the risk" that people may look
through unshuttered house windows or break into an unlocked or
poorly secured house, yet, to date, the Supreme Court has rightfully
refused to deny Fourth Amendment protection in such situations.
The Court's analysis in its undercover cases (and in a number of
other cases defining the word "search") 351 is based on a dangerous
premise: that we should expect no privacy from the government
when we do not expect it from others.3 2 If this premise were taken
seriously, the only sphere of privacy still protected from unneces-
sary government intrusion would be what we kept to ourselves.
However, establishing that the Court's analysis is bankrupt
does not necessarily rule out the results it has reached in its under-
cover cases. Again, the key variable in deciding whether, and how
much, to regulate a particular search or seizure is its level of intru-
siveness. Undercover work is quite different from the other types of
350. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
351. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (helicopter over yard); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (plane over fenced-in factory yard);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (plane over fenced-in private yard); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (search of private fields demarcated by fence and
"No Trespassing" sign).
352. See Slobogin, Capacity to Contest a Search and Seizure.- The Passing of Old
Rules and Some Suggestions for New Ones, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 387, 397 (1981)
("Expectations of privacy that are unreasonable with respect to ordinary citizens are not
necessarily unreasonable with respect to intrusions by the government."). Many state
courts have recognized this difference, at least to the extent they have been unwilling to
follow the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971),
that a person's expectations of privacy are not violated when the police plant a bug on
an informant. See, e.g., State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978), aff'd on rehearing,
596 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1979); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975).
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government investigations examined in this Article, in that the vic-
tim of the search does not know a search is occurring: the target of
an undercover search is unaware his or her privacy is being invaded,
does not feel harassed by the government, and will not experience
any embarrassment or stigma connected with a mistaken investiga-
tion (unless it is foolishly made public). Thus, one might argue
that, under the proportionality principle, regulation of undercover
activity is not required.
Such analysis is flawed, however, because it fails to consider
the overall impact of undercover work on people's security from
investigative abuses by the government. Ultimately, this type of
search is more inimical to individual interests than any of the other
types of searches and seizures discussed in this Article. Because it
allows the government to use personal and commercial relation-
ships for investigative purposes unbeknownst to the target, it opens
up to government inspection virtually all of those affairs that are
shared with anyone else. By comparison, the typical search or
seizure is much narrower in scope, if only because the individual is
alerted to it and can take precautions against disclosure. Further-
more, undercover activity is more likely than other types of
searches to occasion prolonged insinuation into people's privacy. In
the typical search and seizure scenario, the target can minimize the
intrusion by consenting to particular actions or proving his or her
innocence in some way. When the government proceeds covertly,
however, these options are not available.
Added to this denigration of individual interests is the damage
undercover police work causes to the democratic state's objective of
remaining legitimate. First, because it relies on fraud and deceit,
covert investigation undermines trust in the government. More im-
portantly, it increases distrust of everyone, since anyone could be a
government agent. Ironically, the end result of extensive under-
cover activity, as we have seen in totalitarian countries, is too much
privacy. Thus, undercover activity undercuts both the state's inter-
est in maintaining the allegiance of its citizenry and its objective of
nurturing an open, democratic society.353
353. Admittedly, this concern that undercover activity will damage the fabric of
society is more realistic when the substantive criminal law makes relevant information
that usually comes from arguably "innocent" private transactions. Cf. UK RSFSR
(Russian Criminal Code), art. 7 (1972) (making criminal "anti-Soviet" remarks) (re-
pealed 1988). But, as experience in this country demonstrates, as crime increases, so
does the scope of the substantive law, in ways that are, at the least, perturbing. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) (Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act, permitting prosecutions against corporations as well as organized crime for a wide
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Because of these possible effects, one might argue that under-
cover activity should be banned; indeed, in some of its guises it
comes perilously close to the hypothetical mind-reading device de-
scribed earlier in this Article. 354 At the least, judicial authorization
should be obtained prior to any nonexigent undercover activity.
Moreover, in applying the proportionality principle, the particularly
intrusive nature of this activity should be recognized. Thus, simply
requiring the government to meet whatever requirements it would
have to meet if the police were operating in the open will often be
insufficient. For instance, one might be tempted to conclude that
covert work which involves casual conversation on the street should
be permitted if police possess the level of suspicion required to au-
thorize a street stop. But, because its target does not suspect the
government is involved, this type of street encounter will often con-
stitute more of a privacy invasion than would the typical stop, and
thus warrants a greater level of certainty.355 For the same reason, if
array of illegal activities); 31 U.S.C. § 5311-5314 (1988) (mandating reporting of depos-
its of $10,000 or more). The techniques used to gather evidence under such statutes
often use "undercover" agents, of both the human and "institutional" variety, in ways
that affect normally "law-abiding" organizations and persons. Moreover, regardless of
the substantive law, decisions permitting suspicionless subpoenas of financial records,
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and phone numbers, Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979), can have real effect on "innocent" behavior.
354. Supra text accompanying note 169. In rebuttal, one might argue that much
undercover activity should be permitted on little or no suspicion, despite its intrusive
nature, because it is- used to detect types of underground or superficially legitimate ac-
tivity (e.g., organized crime, drug dealing, prostitution) that are otherwise hard to de-
tect. Such an argument once again demonstrates the insidiousness of the difficulty of
detection rationale. In virtually all the undercover cases decided by the Court, the po-
lice had some suspicion before they started their undercover work. See, e.g., Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 298 (1966) ("Partin ultimately cooperated closely with
federal authorities only after he discovered evidence of jury tampering [by Hoffa].").
The fact that certain illegal activity is most effectively investigated covertly should not
lead to elimination of a suspicion requirement.
355. Professor Stuntz has suggested that when the street encounter consists of noth-
ing more than proposing a drug transaction (which the target can quickly dismiss), the
degree of intrusion is significantly reduced (and the degree of trust accorded noncrimi-
nal acquaintances is not damaged). Personal communication with author (March 14,
1991). If a short conversation about a drug deal is all that transpires, I would agree.
Usually, however, the police are not interested merely in nabbing a person for a small
drug sale or purchase. In the course of going after the big fry, significantly greater
intrusions may occur, including contacts which result in revelation of information unre-
lated to the transaction and entry into the target's home or business. See, e.g., United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (conversations between informant and the defend-
ant at various locations, including the home of the defendant, electronically transmitted
to government agents acting without a warrant); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952) ("bugged" informer sent into defendant's laundry by narcotics agents acting
without a warrant). Of course, as suggested above, supra note 354, this escalating series
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the intent is to gain deceitful entry into a person's house, a greater
showing of certainty than that required for the usual house search
may be required. And if the undercover activity is to be pro-
longed-as occurred in one case where the agent, as the defendant's
chauffeur, had access to the defendant's house for a six month pe-
riod356 -the government's burden would need to be even more
demanding.
CONCLUSION
Freed from the constraints of Fourth Amendment language
and precedent, this Article has proposed a reconceptualization of
search and seizure law along both procedural and substantive lines.
Procedurally, it has focused on the prevention of improper govern-
ment action by proposing that law enforcement officers be required,
prior to all nonexigent searches or seizures, to seek authorization
from a decisionmaker (not necessarily legally trained) who is suffi-
ciently isolated from the action in question to make an independent
evaluation of it. Substantively, this Article has proposed that the
justification for a search or seizure, whether pursuant to authoriza-
tion or not, should depend entirely (except in rare cases where pre-
vention of danger is otherwise impossible) on a congruence between
its intrusiveness and the degree of certainty that the proposed action
will be successful.
Although the principal focus of this Article is to explicate and
justify the exigency and proportionality principles described above,
it has also tried to show that these principles are consonant with the
language of the Fourth Amendment. Through the simple expedient
of redefining "probable cause" to mean that cause which makes
probable the reasonableness of the intrusion associated with the
search or seizure, the exigency and proportionality principles could
be applied consistently with the plain meaning of the amendment.
At the same time, this Article has examined the conflict be-
tween these two principles and current Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence as promulgated by the United States Supreme Court. In
particular, this Article has criticized the Court's adoption of the
"lesser expectation of privacy" and "special needs" exceptions to
the warrant requirement, and its willingness, in analyzing the rea-
sonableness of a search or seizure, to exaggerate the state's interests
of intrusions may well be justified by escalating certainty, and sufficient exigency (after
the first confrontation) to obviate the need for a warrant.
356. United States v. Baldwin, 621 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1045 (1981).
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(by relying on the "severity of the harm," "difficulty of detection,"
and "official distraction" rationales) and to trivialize the individ-
ual's interests (through distorting the notions of "implied consent"
and "assumption of the risk").
This Article has also continued, in a modest way, the effort to
refine analysis of both the certainty threshold and the concept of
intrusiveness. It has argued that "generalized" (as opposed to "in-
dividualized") suspicion can properly be considered in determining
the validity of a search or seizure, and has provided some examples
of how statistical information may be relevant to this determination.
It has also contended that measuring the intrusiveness of a search
or seizure is a multifaceted task which should include analysis of a
police action's potential for privacy infringement, harassment, and
false stigmatization. Relevant to these interests is the extent to
which those subjected to the search or seizure believe it will benefit
them, a factor which may involve consideration of the severity of
the criminal problem being investigated, its difficulty of detection,
and the motivation behind the investigation.
The approach outlined in this Article makes more sense than
the United States Supreme Court's approach, both theoretically and
practically. Theoretically, it better balances the competing state
and individual interests. Practically, although unlikely to provide
clear guidelines for the courts or the police, it asks them to consider
fewer factors, and thus ultimately is likely to be less confusing and
less difficult to administer. Finally, because it asks questions that
are often susceptible to empirical investigation, it may facilitate,
more so than current doctrine, sensible regulation of search and
seizure.
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